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Abstract 
 
This project is an investigation into the character of the Christian imagination. It 
examines in depth three central aspects: paradox, anarchy and the childlike, 
acknowledging that within each category there is something of the unreasonable or non-
rational. Rather than trying to iron out or explain away the logically problematic, the 
thesis explores the possibility that an idea can be contrary to rationality and yet be true 
and meaningful. It is demonstrated that a number of central tenets of the Christian 
doctrine require a faith that often goes beyond reason or does not exclusively identify 
with it. 
 
The study involves the systematic analysis of central stylistic features of literary nonsense 
using Lewis Carroll’s famous Alice stories as exemplar. The construction of a non-
pejorative model of nonsense is then used to introduce analogous components of 
Christian theology with a particular focus on the doctrine of Salvation. Sparked by G. K. 
Chesterton’s description of the Fall as the condition of ‘being born upside-down’, 
soteriology is conceived of as a tospsy-turvy reorientation of the will and an imaginative 
attunement to the absurd. 
 
The project culminates in the setting-up of a nonsense theology by considering the 
practical and evangelical ramifications of associating Christian faith with nonsense 
literature; and conversely, the value of relating theological principles to the study of 
literary nonsense. Ultimately, the research suggests that faith is always a risk and that a 
strictly rational apologetic misrepresents the nature of Christian truth. 
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Prologue: An Irrational Apology 
Has God not made foolish the wisdom of the world? 
1 Corinthians 1:20 
 
A major problem confronting any apologetic account of Christianity is that certain crucial 
tenets of the faith seem to carry us the other side of reason. However, whilst Christianity 
has always had a sense that its claims will appear foolish from a certain perspective, a 
dominant strand of its traditional self-exposition has sought to demonstrate its conformity 
to Western standards of reason. As a result, the importance of ‘a-rational’ modalities of 
faith has been significantly downplayed. In response to this widespread underemphasis, 
this thesis calls for a corrective balance of reason with unreason, logic with paradox, 
scepticism with credulity as well as the recovery of a number of other biblical themes 
side-lined by the rationalistic tendencies of modernity. In sum, the hypothesis explores 
the idea that in certain crucial ways Christian teaching runs counter to the customary 
secular practices of reason. The primary method by which this is articulated is through an 
on-going dialogue with nonsense literature, focussing on the work of Lewis Carroll. In 
this way, I hope to demonstrate that some of the structural devices used in literary 
nonsense share a deep resemblance with and cast new light on traditional modes of 
religious thought. 
Part One of the thesis discusses the character and the role of the imagination in 
Christian belief. Three aspects of this are seen as central: the paradoxical, the anarchic 
and the childlike. The first chapter considers a range of apparently incompatible claims 
within Christian doctrine and suggests, in view of this, that paradox is an essential feature 
of the Christian imagination. The areas examined include the epistemological paradox of 
transcendent and immanent knowledge; paradoxical accounts of time and space within 
Christology; the logical problem of the Incarnation; the traditional numerical conundrum 
 2 
of the Trinity; and the relationship between freewill and grace. These puzzles are 
customarily seen as a result of linguistic limitation (where the claim is accepted) or as a 
way of deflecting attention away from empty premises (where the claim is rejected).  In 
contrast, I offer a description of these tensions as ‘theoretic’1 paradoxes, which convey an 
accurate description of essential ‘illogicalities’, acknowledging their importance as tenets 
of Christian faith, whilst recognising that this represents a departure from the commonly 
upheld law of non-contradiction. The aim of this section is to show how thinking in 
paradoxical terms is a vital component of the Christian imagination since it allows the 
believer to hold these contraries in a meaningful tension. 
The second chapter concentrates on the interval of suspense between Christ’s 
defeat and his reign to come. In particular, the focus is on the implications of the teaching 
that the Kingdom of God is situated both in the ‘now and the not yet’, and the correlative 
belief that Christ is absolutely sovereign even though his sovereignty has in some sense 
not yet come into its fullness of divine rule. The term I use to describe the experience of 
living in this epoch of ‘eschatological suspension’, between Christ’s victory and the final 
establishment of his Kingdom, is ‘anarchy’. The aim of the section is to show how during 
this ‘in-between time’ it may be advantageous for the Christian to develop an anarchic 
imagination in order to live faithfully in this era of dual temporalities.  
The third part of the project seeks to recover the ‘childlike’ as a category of the 
religious imagination. I discuss the significance of the gospel declaration that only those 
who change and become like children can enter the Kingdom of Heaven and ask whether 
the term ‘childlike’ is a necessary description or merely an analogy of peripheral 
significance to Christian faith. In essence, I consider this injunction to ‘change’ to involve 
                                                     
1
 W. D. Hart distinguishes between linguistic or ‘semantic’ paradoxes and logical or ‘theoretic’ 
paradoxes, suggesting that in the first instance there is an appearance of the paradoxical, conceding 
that the contradiction is ultimately solvable. In the case of ‘theoretic’ paradox the core of the conflict is 
a logically irreconcilable tension. For an initial outline see W. D. Hart, The Evolution of Logic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 67. 
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an imaginative re-orientation towards a childlike mode of relating to God as Father. There 
are several qualities that this transformation seems to demand: an attitude of simplicity, 
trust, wonder, and the ability to indulge in make-believe or to play at faith. On the basis 
of this I conclude that the childlike is not simply a phase of being before God, but the on-
going ideal of that relationship. The aim of this section is to show how the adoption of a 
childlike posture fosters a mode of imaginative play that opens up the possibility for a 
genuine encounter with God. In general, I suggest that this attitude, though born in the 
imagination, may nevertheless involve real development and transformation. The 
childlike, together with the anarchic and the paradoxical, I believe, go some way to 
describing the necessary role the imagination plays in Christian faith and its divergence 
from the dominant Enlightenment model of rationality. 
In Part Two of the thesis, after considering how each of these aspects of the 
religious imagination comes into conflict with a secular construal of reality, I develop a 
counter-theology of nonsense, and explore the theoretical, practical and evangelical 
implications of associating nonsense literature with Christian faith. Of particular concern 
is the response of the non-believer to the apparent unreason of religious claims. I suggest 
that ‘nonsense’ has the potential to be a peculiarly useful descriptor in the communication 
of the Christian message, since in accepting the atheist’s application of unreason the 
believer necessarily challenges the presumption that because it is unreasonable it is 
therefore untrue. Prompted by the work of G. K. Chesterton, I conceive of the Fall as ‘the 
condition of being born upside down’ and in this light consider an imaginative reordering 
of our notions of the possible as a vital aspect of faith. This provides the underlying 
warrant for offering ‘nonsense’ as an illuminating and hitherto unexplored way of 
conceptualising Christian theology. 
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Introduction: A Brief History of Faith and Reason 
Every man is stupid and without knowledge. 
Jeremiah 10:14 
 
In a general sense this project is concerned with the longstanding opposition between 
faith and reason—the conflict, reconciliation or deconstruction of which has been an 
abiding concern throughout Christian history. Thus, in order to contextualise the 
investigation it will be helpful to begin with a short overview of the development of this 
antagonism within the history of religion. An obvious place to begin is with the wisdom 
of the Greek philosophers, with philos sophia, the love of reason, which seeks to 
understand the nature of how things are.  
Traditionally, the philosopher’s elevation of reason presupposes a faith in its 
ability to discover and reliably describe that which is. A central feature buttressing this 
faith in reason is the law of non-contradiction—a fundamental precept of classical logic, 
which is, for the most part, presented as an undisputed arbiter of sound reasoning. The 
modern philosopher and theologian James Anderson serves as exemplar of this 
assumption; he affirms: ‘what is deemed unacceptable is for some person to speak against 
or deny some proposition whilst also affirming that same proposition. Such a practice is 
invariably viewed as the height of irrationality’.2 Nearly two and half thousand years 
earlier Aristotle articulated the same rule: ‘if whenever an assertion is true its denial is 
false and when the latter is true its affirmation is false, there can be no such thing as 
simultaneously asserting and denying the same thing truly’.3 Logician J. C. Beall 
observes likewise: ‘that no contradiction is true remains an entrenched ‘unassailable 
dogma’ of Western thought’.4 
                                                     
2
 James Anderson, Paradox in Christian Theology (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007), p. 108. 
3
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Christopher Kirwan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 1008a34, p. 14. 
4
 Graham Priest, J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Gard, (eds.) The Law of Non-Contradiction (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2004); J. C. Beall ‘Introduction: At the Intersection’, pp. 2-3. It is worth noting that 
 5 
Although the Greek philosophers did not have the Judeo-Christian concept of a 
relationship with a personal god, this period is nonetheless indispensable in charting the 
interaction between faith and reason, as Paul Helm observes: ‘the classical period 
provided the tools of reason which are applied to faith and have been ever since’.5 
Ultimately, Aristotle along with Plato sought to show how religious sensitivity evolves 
from rational inquiry. Plato believed it was the rational aspect of his tripartite theory of 
the soul that yearned after truth and that alone could discover the real. Furthermore, Plato 
claimed, ‘it [is] appropriate for the rational element to rule, because it is wise and takes 
thought for the entire soul’.6 So we find in the Hellenic period both a sensitivity to 
spiritual truths but also the foundations of rationalism with an ultimate emphasis on the 
primacy of reason. Accordingly, when the teachings of Christ and the apostles arrived in 
Athens there was much that St. Paul found in common with Greek philosophy, but also a 
substantial amount that did not accord with the superior wisdom of the Greeks. 
The biblical confrontation of issues of faith and reason is of course an area of 
enormous complexity and my aim here is only briefly to sketch an outline. But even a 
cursory summary, however, should recognise that the New Testament presents truth both 
in accordance with classical reason and also as its antithesis. According to the book of 
Acts, Paul ‘reasoned […] from the Scriptures, explaining and proving that it was 
necessary for the Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead’.7 Here the emphasis is on 
Christianity’s reasonability; those who believed ‘were persuaded’.  
                                                                                                                                                        
scholars tend to recognise three versions of Aristotle’s description of the law of non-contradiction: an 
ontological variant, a doxastic or psychological form, and a semantic version. Paula Gottilieb writing in 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains: ‘The first version is about things that exist in the 
world, the second is about what we can believe, and the third relates to assertion and truth’. Gottilieb 
indicates that it is not clear which of these strains Aristotle intends as the core foundation of the rule. 
However, for the purpose of our investigation the ontological version—the statement: ‘it is impossible 
to predicate contraries simultaneously’(Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1007b17, p. 12)—will take precedence, 
since this tends to be the most common application of the law, and indeed, provides the greatest 
potential for hostility to statements that seem to oppose the law. 
5
 Paul Helm, (ed.) Faith and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3. 
6
 Plato, The Republic, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 441 E, p. 
138. 
7
 English Standard Version (Wheaton, Illinois: Good News Publishers, 2001), Acts 17: 2-3, my 
 6 
On the other hand, Paul gives equal emphasis to the view that Christianity appears 
as folly to the wisdom of the Greek philosophers. In his letter to the Corinthians, he 
writes: ‘Christ did not send me to baptize but to preach the gospel, and not with words of 
eloquent wisdom, less the Cross be emptied of its power’.8 Here, Paul seems to caution 
against the presentation of religious truths in synthesis with a contemporary 
understanding of good reason. Instead, Paul associates the gospel message with 
foolishness, and yet at the same time undercuts this emphasis by preaching that ‘the 
foolishness of God is wiser than men’.9 Given these two contrasting attitudes, then, how 
can we accurately characterize the approach of the New Testament to the dialogue 
between faith and reason? 
The biblical teaching that God alone is wise has often led theologians to 
downplay or sidestep the reality of this foolishness, perhaps because wisdom seems the 
more appealing characteristic, especially if the theologian is engaged in apologetics. But 
the truth that Paul teaches clearly entails a dual dimension: Christianity is both supremely 
wise and supremely foolish. The wisdom that the world does not understand not only 
seems like folly, but indeed it is folly by the world’s standards. Festus is thus in a certain 
sense correct when he tells Paul that he is out of his mind, and yet Paul is also correct in 
his affirmation that he is not mad but speaking rationally.10 Therefore an accurate 
depiction of the biblical attitude to issues of faith and reason seems to involve a direct 
challenge to Aristotle’s law of non-contradiction in order to uphold the affirmation that 
faith is both rational and a scandal to reason. 
                                                                                                                                                        
emphasis. 
8
 1 Corinthians 1:17. ‘Eloquent wisdom’ is the translation of σοφίᾳ meaning clever and wise. See also 
note below.  
9
 1 Corinthians 1:25. Here, Paul draws on the classical concepts of wisdom and folly (‘moros’ and 
‘sophos’) but inverts their roles by applying a different standard of wisdom that has the outward 
appearance of moros. 
10
 ‘Festus said with a loud voice, “Paul, you are out of your mind; your great learning is driving you out 
of your mind.” But Paul said, “I am not out of my mind, most excellent Festus, but I am speaking true 
and rational words”’. Acts 26:24-25. 
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Broadly speaking, the Christian conjunction of reason and faith seems less 
complicated in the patristic period that followed, or rather less strikingly paradoxical, as 
this era by and large can be characterised by Augustine’s desire ‘to understand what we 
believe’,11 an idea that forms a central part of his work De Libero Arbitrio, written 
between 387 and 395. Augustine’s influential thought established a clear order: faith is 
primary; reason is always a secondary aid to theological reflection since belief comes 
before understanding. On the one hand, Augustine defines theology as ‘reasoning or 
discussion about the Divinity’,12 and describes the Christian God as ‘a God who gives 
blessedness to the rational and intelligent soul’.13 We cannot therefore dismiss the 
importance Augustine places on human reason. And yet, elsewhere, in his work City of 
God, Augustine rebukes ‘the unbelievers’ who ‘demand a rational proof from us when we 
proclaim the miracles of God’. He observes that ‘since we cannot supply this proof of 
those matters (for they are beyond the powers of the human mind) the unbelievers assume 
that our statements are false’.14 Here Augustine does not deny that certain acts of God 
seem unlikely or impossible, but impresses upon the reader the reality of the limitations 
of his own reason, suggesting that we should not expect to be able to understand all 
aspects of divinity in a rational manner. Indeed, Augustine interprets rationality as a gift 
from God that is itself beyond human understanding.15 
By the sixth century, Pseudo-Dionysius had laid a greater stress on the via 
negativa and with this emphasis came the idea that religious revelation can seem contrary 
to common sense. ‘The man in union with truth’, he writes, ‘knows clearly that all is well 
with him, even if everyone else thinks that he has gone out of his mind’.16 Denys’ desire 
                                                     
11
 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1993), p. 7. 
12
 Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin, 2003), bk. VIII, Ch. 1, p. 298.  
13
 Ibid., p. 299. 
14
 Ibid., bk. XXI Ch. 5, p. 971.  
15 ‘It is in no trivial measure that a man understands and knows God, when he understands and knows 
that this knowledge and understanding is itself the gift of God’. Ibid., bk. XVII, Ch. 4, p. 721. 
16
 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names in Pseudo-Dionysius The Complete Works, trans. Colm 
Luibheid (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987), p. 110. 
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to provide a faithful theological account leads him to describe God using paradoxical 
expressions such as ‘brilliant darkness’.17 One of the advantages Denys saw in using 
paradox to speak of God is that it prevents the individual from fixating upon any single 
attribute or manifestation; God can be praised in the same breath for his meekness and for 
his majesty. Denys’ commitment to paradox is such that he even undercuts his own 
apophatic method by maintaining that in addition to being ‘beyond every assertion’, God 
is also ‘beyond privations [and] beyond every denial’.18 Denys’ paradoxical account of 
God seems to imply therefore that strict obedience to the law of non-contradiction cannot 
provide a satisfactory description of the divine. The principle that God is beyond all 
assertions cannot logically be held together with the notion that God is equally beyond all 
privations; a thing that is fully meek cannot not also be supremely majestic, unless of 
course it is accepted that paradoxical statements can provide an accurate means of 
describing reality. 
Whilst the Medieval theologians never lost sight of Denys’ practice of speaking 
paradoxically in an attempt to signify the divine, the significant landmark in the dialogue 
between faith and reason in the Middle Ages was of course the rediscovery of Aristotle, 
and by the latter half of the thirteenth century the re-integration of Greek logic into 
Christian dialogue was firmly established. The masterful assimilation of Aristotelian 
reason into Christian theology by Aquinas (1225-1274) has come to be seen by many as 
the beginning of a deeply rationalised Christianity and the prioritisation of reason over 
mystery. Whilst there is without doubt an element of truth in this, it is easy to 
misunderstand Aquinas’ view of reason on account of its distorted reflection in 
Enlightenment theism. As Rowan Williams points out, for Aquinas ‘intellectus […] is a 
rich and comprehensive term which is totally misrepresented if understood as referring to 
                                                     
17
 Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology in Pseudo-Dionysius The Complete Works, p. 135. 
18
 Ibid., p. 136. 
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the discursive intellect’.19 Thomas’ extensive application of reason always finds its 
genesis in his prayerful contemplation of a transcendent deity. ‘His arguments’, 
Chesterton observes, ‘are rational and natural; but his own deduction is all for the 
supernatural’.20  
It could be suggested that what Aquinas’ work most significantly reveals is that 
the great quarrel between reason and faith had not yet arrived. Chesterton, for example, 
believed that Aquinas ‘belonged to an age of intellectual unconsciousness, to an age of 
intellectual innocence’,21 and perhaps this, more than anything, characterises the 
Medieval response to issues of faith and reason. Certainly there was a strong urge to 
systematise Christian theology and demonstrate its inherent coherence, but without the 
modern distinction between the theologian and the philosopher, the objectives of 
philosophy were met and satisfied in Christian metaphysics. Paul Helm describes the 
reintroduction of Aristotle into theological thought as ‘a synthesis and not a take-over’,22 
and one of the principal reasons that Helm’s hypothesis seems true and that Hellenic 
discourse did not usurp Medieval piety is that scholasticism always remained sceptical 
about the role of reason, using it as a means of interacting with an already established 
faith, not by way of primary justification for that belief. 
Throughout the work of Anselm, the father of the scholastic tradition, we can 
further trace the Medieval sense of harmony between rational argumentation and 
meditative devotion. In his Proslogion (1077-1078) Anselm writes: ‘I give thanks to You, 
since what I believed before through your free gift I now so understand through Your 
illumination’.23 In this sentence, we again witness the acknowledgment that both belief 
and illumination—faith and reason—are gifted from God to the individual. This supports 
                                                     
19
 Rowan Williams, The Wound of Knowledge (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1990), p. 125. 
20
 G. K. Chesterton, St Thomas Aquinas (London: Hodder and Stroughton, 1933), p. 37. 
21
 Ibid., p. 234. 
22
 Paul Helm, Faith and Reason, pp. 85-6. 
23
 St. Anselm, ‘Proslogion’ in The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 89. 
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the case that many Medieval philosophers did not see faith and reason in antagonism with 
each other, but believed like Augustine that both reason and faith were gifts from God 
Yet, alongside the development of a ‘rationalized’ scholasticism, the Medieval 
period is also known for its embrace of mystical theology24 and the tradition of holy folly. 
John Saward remarks on the unlikely juxtaposition of folly with the schoolmen and asks 
‘why was it that the golden age of the fool coincided with the age of scholasticism?’25 
Saward answers his question by suggesting that ‘in the late Middle Ages there is an 
unselfconscious revelling in mirth, joy, and good humour of life in Christ’.26 Saward thus 
gestures to an important feature of this ‘intellectually innocent’ age, which is the idea that 
scholastic endeavour could co-exist happily with mystic ecstasy and foolish revelry 
because there was an implicit understanding of the interwovenness between reason, folly 
and mystery.  
However, Mark A. McIntosh in his book Mystical Theology tells a different story 
altogether. He describes how ‘during this period of the rise of scholastic theology there 
were also shifting trends in Christian spirituality that made it harder for the two realms of 
life to communicate, let alone nourish each other’.27 For example, he believes that there is 
an awareness throughout Lady Julian’s writing that her mode of theological engagement 
as a mystic was unlikely to be respected. McIntosh believes that this is because ‘the 
ecclesiastical and academic culture of her era was already less than open to the insights of 
someone situated far from the impressively authoritative halls of the university’.28 Here 
we are faced with the suggestion that far from an era of ‘intellectual innocence’, the later 
Middle Ages were in fact an epoch dominated by an intellectualised Christianity, which 
rather than embracing the words of fools and mystics, inhibited this avenue of spiritual 
                                                     
24
 Some of the great mystics date from this period, such as Meister Eckhart (c. 1260 – 1327) and Lady 
Julian of Norwich (c. 1342 – after 1416). 
25
 John Saward, Perfect Fools: Folly for Christ’s Sake in Catholic and Orthodox Spirituality (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 81. 
26
 Ibid., p. 80. 
27
 Mark A. McIntosh, Mystical Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 63. 
28
 Ibid., p. 13.  
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discourse. ‘The real tragedy’, McIntosh writes, ‘is that by the later Middle Ages fewer 
and fewer saints, mystics and theologians still knew how to knit spirituality and theology 
together in their own life and work’.29   
It is hard to decide, given the complexity of the issue, whether McIntosh or 
Saward offers the more realistic portrayal of the character of Medieval theology. 
However, either way it is clear that the following period—the Renaissance and 
Reformation—radically disrupted the Medieval synthesis of faith and reason and 
established a divide between God’s revelation and man’s rationality. Some element of 
this divide we can assume stemmed from the scholastic flourishing of the Medieval 
church and the extensive influence of Aristotelian logic. 
As we move into the first half of the sixteenth century, a dominant figure in the 
discussion between faith and reason is of course Martin Luther (1483-1546). Luther 
argued that reason outside of grace is bound by sin and that reason therefore can never 
form the sole basis from which religious truth is articulated.30 Within the history of faith 
and reason, Luther presents a strong case against the elevation of reason, arguing instead 
for the primacy of faith. He cautions the Christian in strong terms: ‘away with reason, 
which is an enemy to faith’.31 Luther’s more extreme denunciations of reason as ‘impious 
and sacrilegious’32 or most famously as ‘the Devil’s bride’33 are frequently quoted, 
though the impression they encourage leaves out the nuances of Luther’s dialogue with 
reason; for it is not that he is hostile to reason in all its manifestations. Indeed, in his 
response before the Diet of Worms in 1521 he states: ‘Unless I am convinced by the 
                                                     
29
 Ibid., p. 63. 
30
 McGrath describes how ‘Luther’s fundamental point is that “the Fall” is first and foremost a fall 
from faith’. McGrath, Christian Theology, p. 155. The implication of this belief for Luther is the 
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testimony of the Scriptures or by clear reason […] I cannot and will not retract 
anything’.34 Here it is evident that Luther trusts the conviction of his own reasoning, 
which might suggest that when he speaks antagonistically it is because he believes reason 
is in a particular instance being used in a manner other than that which God intended. 
Generally speaking, however, Luther did see reason as an inadequate and 
impoverished method of comprehending divine matters. ‘Reason’, he writes, ‘interprets 
the Scriptures of God by her own inferences and syllogisms […] how foolish she is in 
tacking her inferences onto the Scriptures’.35 The Gospel, by contrast, Luther explains, 
‘leadeth us beyond and above the light of the law and reason, into the deep secrets of 
faith, where the law and reason have nothing to do’.36 Faith and salvation for the 
reformers were seen as gifts that cannot be attained through human reason, and it was 
during the popularisation of their views that the concept of faith underwent a distinct shift 
from fides to fiducia, from faith that to faith in.37 
By the beginning of the seventeenth century the extreme volatility of the 
Reformation period had largely abated. Yet growing incompatibility between scientific 
and religious claims brought about a different set of circumstances whereby faith and 
reason again came into conflict. The Galileo controversy concerning the geocentric model 
of the solar system engendered a greater schism, whereby church leaders saw certain 
advances in science as heretical, and scientists such as Galileo found religious authorities 
intolerant and ignorant. John Lewis believes that the most prominent effect of the Galileo 
affair, in particular his trial and imprisonment, was that it ‘helped in no small measure to 
create that perceived separation of faith from reason, of religion from physical 
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sciences’.38 Certainly, it was during the seventeenth century that the establishment of the 
modern polarity between science and religion took root. Science started to be perceived 
as the authoritative voice in matters of the phenomenal world, and as a result, religion 
began to be confined to the territory beyond the physical. However, as one historian 
observes, ‘the great scientists of the seventeenth century, including Kelper, Galileo and 
Newton, had pursued their work in a spirit of exalting God not undermining 
Christianity’,39 and so it is not totally accurate to characterize the seventeenth century as 
the establishment of the radical schism between religious faith and scientific reason. 
Nevertheless, the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century inevitably gave weight 
to the religious scepticism that arrived with the Enlightenment in the century that 
followed. 
Within the history of faith and reason, the Enlightenment is the high water-mark 
of rationality; although it is important to note, as McGrath does, that ‘the Middle Ages 
was just as much an “Age of Reason” as the Enlightenment; the crucial difference lay in 
the manner in which reason was used, and the limits which were understood to be 
imposed on it’.40 Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant (1724-1804) wanted to see 
theology develop within the limits of reason alone and, arguably, as a result, lost sight of 
the careful qualifications maintained by the pre-moderns. Kant declared instead: ‘The 
public use of reason must at all times be free, and it alone can bring about Enlightenment 
among men’.41  
The Enlightenment recast rationality in its own image, the guiding sentiment of 
which Isaiah Berlin describes as the conviction that ‘all principles of explanation 
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everywhere must be the same’.42 This of course extended from practices of law, politics 
and science to philosophy and religion. Hence, religion for many believers became an 
‘enlightenment theism’, which according to McGrath had two major consequences: ‘First, 
Christianity was in effect reduced to those ideas which could be proved by reason […] 
and second, reason was understood to take priority over revelation’.43 Gavin Hyman, who 
argues that atheism is ‘roughly contemporaneous with the birth of modernity’,44 also 
describes how one of the major differences between Medieval and modern theism was 
modernity’s dissatisfaction with abstract theology and the desire for a more normative 
and rationalized religion. Hyman believes ‘Hume and Kant demonstrated how their 
frameworks disallowed, in principle, any substantive metaphysical knowledge of God’.45  
The chief sentiments of the Enlightenment thus expanded into the modern period; 
scientific advancement in biology and geology continued to broaden the gulf between 
reason and faith; evidentialism and verificationism gained popularity as the accurate 
means of testing the validity of a statement; empirical proof was the stipulation of many 
rationalists and religious truths simply could not satisfy these new demands. For this 
reason Hume’s essay disparaging the miraculous basis of Christian belief in 1748 was 
taken seriously, as was Locke’s earlier request for faith to show itself in accord with 
reason. ‘Faith’, Locke taught, ‘can never convince us of anything that contradicts our 
knowledge’.46  
Whilst some believers greatly supported the Enlightenment task of bringing 
religion in line with modern rationalization, others reacted strongly against this. Johann 
Georg Hamann (1730-1788), for example, one of the fathers of German Romanticism, 
wrote passionately against the attempt to redefine faith in accordance with this strict 
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application of rationality. In his essay, ‘Metacritique on the purism of reason’, Hamann 
argued that ‘analysis is nothing more than the latest fashionable cut, and synthesis 
nothing more than the artful seam of a professional leather or cloth-cutter’.47 At the time, 
Hamann’s rebuttal did not pose a significant hindrance to the rationalists. Berlin believes 
that this was because Hamann was one of few vocal dissenters against the swift 
imperialisation of reason.48 In the year of Hamann’s death, however, an influential ally in 
the revolt against the supreme rationalization of thought was born.  
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was among the first of the nineteenth century 
philosophers to dissent from the belief that the universe is ultimately rational. Instead, he 
developed a proto-Nietzschean rejection of the ultimacy of reason and introduced a pre-
Freudian emphasis on desire and drive as what constitutes the knowing of the self. 
Schopenhauer was critical of Kant and Hegel49 for their belief that reason is the founding 
principle of a just society, and their reliance upon logic as the way of reaching this truth. 
Like Hamann before him, Schopenhauer sought to dethrone reason from its imperial 
reign: ‘He argues that rationality confers on us no higher moral status than that of other 
sentient beings’.50 
Schopenhauer is an interesting figure to consider from a theological perspective, 
since on the one hand it would seem in the interests of religion to qualify the claims for 
an entirely rational justification for belief. Yet on the other hand, his work argued for the 
possibility of achieving moral excellence without religion and so he is in this sense an 
unlikely ally for the church. His book On the Basis of Morality is concerned primarily 
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with critiquing the Kantian dependence upon God as the only possible postulate for moral 
behaviour. Instead, Schopenhauer argues, gallantry, selflessness and compassion are 
‘universal and occur irrespective of religion’.51  The separation of the religious from the 
moral led Schopenhauer to associate religion with the irrational and with superstition. 
This interest in the sociological and psychological explanation of religious belief was 
continued after his death, culminating at the turn of the century in Freud’s declaration that 
religious belief compensates the need for a father-figure.  
Freud (1856-1939) expressed the view that whilst religion had once been 
beneficial to the civilisation of humanity, the rational development of the human race 
meant that there was no longer a social need to believe in religion, and that those who 
tried to maintain its importance did so for psychological reasons. Freud sided with the 
empirical atheism of his age when he spoke of the inevitable demise of religious belief 
driven by a heightened rationality. ‘In the long run’, he wrote, ‘nothing can withstand 
reason and experience, and the contradiction which religion offers to both is all too 
palpable. Even purified religious ideas can not escape this fate, so long as they try to 
preserve anything of the consolation of religion’.52 Freud’s ideas contributed to the spread 
of secular modernity by attempting to reduce religious belief to a psychological 
phenomenon, and by continuing the subjection of religious ideas to criticism set within 
the limits established by the Enlightenment.  
Of course not all nineteenth-century thinkers accepted the need to acquiesce to the 
demands posited by the empiricists. Kierkegaard’s existentialism, for example, recalled 
the pre-modern delimitations of reason: ‘human reason’, he cautioned, ‘has boundaries’.53 
In the face of the preoccupation with rationality Kierkegaard (1813-1855) described 
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belief as a leap and faith as a risk, claiming ‘the absurd and faith are inseparables’.54 
Kierkegaard’s conjunction of absurdity and Christian faith shares obvious parallels with 
the pairing of literary nonsense and theology, which we will be discussing in greater 
detail in the final chapter. For the present, however, it is worth noting that Kierkegaard is 
a central figure in the dispute against the universal validity of the law of non-
contradiction for the chief reason that he held paradox as a logically baffling but integral 
part of Christian faith. ‘Christianity, for Kierkegaard’, observes a contemporary 
theologian, ‘requires the passionate embrace of a paradox in a way of life that confounds 
the understanding’.55 Yet perhaps the most important nineteenth-century figure who 
railed against the narrow scope of Enlightenment rationality was Nietzsche (1844-1900), 
whose general thrust was oddly parallel to Kierkegaard, although it stemmed from 
entirely different criteria. 
Nietzsche, heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, proposed a significant and direct 
challenge to classical logic and in particular to the law of non-contradiction. In The Will 
to Power he describes the law as ‘coarse and false’.56 He states the following: ‘we are 
unable to affirm and deny one and the same thing: this is a subjective empirical law, not 
the expression of any ‘necessity’ but only of an inability’.57 As Michael Green points out, 
‘Nietzsche does not argue that the principle of noncontradiction should be abandoned. He 
does, however, argue that an acceptance of the principle is not demanded by the nature of 
the world’.58 Nietzsche provides a profound objection to the ontological validity of the 
rule of non-contradiction, urging us to recognise that the avoidance of the unity of 
contraries is a psychological desire and not a universal imperative. At a fundamental level 
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Nietzschean thought is an attack upon the stability and scope of philosophical reasoning; 
even the basic components of logical formulae such as subject, object and attribute are 
not accepted as a ‘metaphysical truth’.59 Instead, he argues, ‘these distinctions have been 
made’.60  
Nietzsche’s description of the artificiality of logic is a close echo of Hamann’s 
criticism of rational analysis as ‘nothing more than the latest fashionable cut’, and it is in 
this capacity—as an enemy to the staunch rationalists—that some recent theologians 
instead of being offended by Nietzschean atheism, have discovered that his work may be 
used to support their case. Gavin Hyman describes Nietzsche as ‘the last thinker of 
modernity or the first thinker of postmodernity’, 61 and it is particularly amongst 
postmodern theologians that Nietzschean thought has been embraced rather than rejected. 
Among others David Tracy, Graham Ward and David Deane have argued that when 
Nietzsche announced the death of God, he killed the god of modernity, the deity who 
‘could not fit what counted as rational’.62 By suggesting that human logic is not the 
ultimate arbiter of truth, postmodern theologians argue that he did not succeed in killing 
the biblical, pre-modern or Medieval deity; rather, the god that died was an idolatrous 
god.63  Thus, even though it would have to await the outworking of modernity, 
Nietzsche’s work, in spite of its author’s intentions, helped to open the way for something 
of a recovery of the Thomist and Augustinian ordering of faith and reason, where reason 
does not exercise superiority over faith. The breakdown of the sovereignty of reason had 
begun and the circumstances in the latter half of the nineteenth century were ripe for a 
less rationalistic apologetic.  
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It was in this context that figures such as G. K. Chesterton (1874-1936) were 
prompted to declare with boldness that in certain crucial ways Christian truth departs 
from what is commonly constituted as rational. ‘While we are being naturalists’ he writes, 
‘we can suppose that Christianity is all nonsense; but then, when we remember that we 
are Christians, we must admit that Christianity is true even if it is nonsense’.64 
Chesterton’s conviction has the potential to disarm the religious cynic who believes that 
once the illogicalities of faith are pointed out religion loses its credibility. What 
Chesterton reveals is that the authority of faith does not rest on man’s conception of 
rationality. This suggestion calls into question the ability of logical descriptions to convey 
the full reality of the Christian message.  
Chesterton is famed for his frequent appeal to paradox. As a result, much of his 
writing offends those rationalists who hold the law of non-contradiction as unbreakable. 
Chesterton’s use of the paradoxical is so pervasive that critics have suggested he uses 
paradox simply to shock his reader, to create humour or to shroud Christianity’s logical 
flaws in the more romantic trappings of mystery. However, Chesterton declares at the 
beginning of Orthodoxy: ‘I know nothing more contemptible as a mere paradox; a mere 
ingenious defence of the indefensible’.65  When he uses paradox he does so because he 
believes that there are instances in Christian doctrine that cannot accurately be expressed 
without deviating from the law of non-contradiction. It is not that Chesterton rejected 
common-sense logic for the sake of it; indeed, he believed that reason is central to 
theology and tells us an enormous amount about the way the world is. But he emphasised 
that reason does not tell us everything, and sometimes that which seems quite 
unreasonable might in fact be a closer representation of the truth. 
The wider context in which Chesterton was speaking was a particularly 
tumultuous time in the history of faith and reason. His sparring partners H. G. Wells and 
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George Bernard Shaw were in many ways representative of mainstream Victorian views, 
since, following the industrial revolution and the popularisation of German philosophy 
there had been an explosion of scepticism. And yet, this growth of secularism was 
juxtaposed with a fervent religious revival across the denominations. Along with 
Chesterton, one of the central figures preaching the validity of Christianity’s seeming 
‘mass of mad contradictions’66 was John Henry Newman (1801-1890). His defence in 
Grammar of Assent (completed in 1870) argued that logic did not meet the challenges of 
real life. ‘As to Logic’, he wrote, ‘its chain of conclusions hangs loose at both ends […] it 
comes short both of first principles and of concrete issues’.67 The significance of 
Newman’s work is that he not only suggested, like Kierkegaard, that faith should not be 
assessed within the boundaries of logic, but he also attempted to show the shortcomings 
of secular rationality and how religion, assessed internally, is in fact natural and plausible. 
This was in part an argument against the law of non-contradiction, since Newman, like 
Chesterton, exposed paradoxical realities and observed how reason was inadequate to 
account for such phenomena. ‘It is plain’, Newman argued, ‘that formal logical sequence 
is not in fact the method by which we are enabled to become certain of what is 
concrete’.68 In sum, the Victorian period exhibited a splintering of religious ideas due to 
the rise and respectability of agnosticism and scepticism, yet it also coincided with a 
powerful orthodox religious revival. It was in this complex and contested period that 
Lewis Carroll (1832-1898) lived and wrote. 
In the twentieth century, the writings of Darwin and Freud remained central to the 
attack on faith by reason; secularism became widespread and scientific advancement, no 
longer hindered by theological authority, gained increased prestige and importance. 
Science and religion grew further apart and yet, perhaps due to the antagonism of the 
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proceeding century, a mood of tolerance arose in certain circles and with it a strong desire 
for a more pluralist approach to knowledge. Wittgenstein’s concept of language games 
satisfied the concern for a more relativistic assessment of meaning, although this was 
simultaneously met with opposition by strong evidentialitsts such as Flew and Clifford, 
who wanted to assess all claims of faith from the presumption of atheistic values. Ronald 
Nash explains how according to Clifford ‘[i]t is always the believer’s responsibility to 
produce reasons or evidence to support his belief’.69 The effect of this extreme emphasis 
on verification via empiricism meant that for Clifford, Flew, Ayer and their followers: 
‘there is never sufficient evidence or proof to support religious belief’.70  
However, the non-religious world was by no means governed by staunch 
evidentialism. In fact, alongside the increasing popularisation of logical positivism among 
philosophers, scientists began to undercut the infallibility of the evidentialist’s claim. As 
certain aspects of theoretical physics became more advanced, greater scepticism 
accompanied its observations. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in 1927, along with 
growing evidence of in support of ‘chaos theory’, began to throw some doubt on the 
universal reliability of reason.71 The twentieth century is therefore very difficult to 
summarize in terms of a general reaction to issues of faith and reason since alongside 
evidentialism and verificationism, this period also witnessed the arrival of such things as 
pluralism, quantum theory, Dadaism and deconstructionism. 
 The end of the Second World War instigated the meltdown of a whole variety of 
conventional beliefs and standards. The basic principle of absolutism was railed against in 
a host of contexts from politics, religion and society to art, morality and science. During 
the 1960s one of the most significant figures contributing to the deconstruction of 
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absolutist ideas was Michel Foucault who challenged historical conceptions of madness 
and sought to depict unreason in a more positive light. In Madness and Civilisation 
Foucault addresses the historical ‘fear of madness’ and the ‘dread of unreason’.72 He 
traces the history of society’s response to cases of madness and insanity, and comes to the 
conclusion that madness is associated with art and can be understood as a tool or 
expression by which ‘the world is forced to question itself’.73 I shall return to this issue in 
the chapter on anarchy, in which I consider a similar function of nonsense, which, like the 
madness described by Foucault, has a marginal presence and through it I suggest we are 
able to reflect critically upon the phenomenal world. Like Foucault I examine the history 
of folly and observe a close connection between lunacy and wisdom. However, the aspect 
of Foucault’s work that is most valuable for our present discussion is his recognition of 
‘the great theme of the madness of the Cross’.74  
In Madness and Civilisation, perhaps unintentionally, Foucault provides a brief 
but brilliant Christology of madness. He coins the phrase ‘Christian unreason’75 and 
describes how Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky pave the way for its rediscovery following its 
exile by the militant seventeenth century pursuit of reason. He characterises this period as 
the wait ‘for Christ to regain the glory of his madness, for scandal to recover its power as 
revelation, for unreason to cease being merely the public shame of reason’.76 Foucault’s 
interest in the value of madness and unreason is indicative of the return to a less 
empirical-based philosophy that blossomed in second half of the twentieth century. 
Although Foucault’s focus is primarily socio-historical, his work was nevertheless 
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significant in the decline of the popularity of logical positivism and the rise of its 
philosophical nemesis: deconstructionism. 
By any account the work of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) had, and continues to 
have, a major impact on the fundamental assumptions of Western philosophy. His 
influence is pervasive and extremely controversial, and although it is possible here to give 
only a very brief and limited overview of a particular aspect of his work, his importance 
to current debates on metaphysics can hardly be over-emphasised. Thinkers such as 
Lyotard, Deleuze, Nancy and Marion are all deeply indebted to Derrida’s work, as are 
whole movements such as postmodernism and post-structuralism.77 Like Nietzsche before 
him, Derrida launched an attack on the general application of and strict adherence to the 
law of non-contradiction. However, before we consider this attack in more detail, it will 
be helpful to situate this aspect of his thought within the context of his work more 
generally, which is antagonistic of the wider metaphysical assumptions embedded in the 
history of Western thought.  
 It is of course a difficult task to propose a starting point of Derrida’s philosophy, 
given its contestation of origins, but there are several critical components to his theory of 
deconstruction with which it might be useful to begin. At base, deconstruction criticises 
the Platonic idea, perpetuated by Western metaphysics, that the essence of a thing is more 
significant than its appearance, since essence is transcendental and therefore its meaning 
is fixed and definite. In this sense, both metaphysics and language are logocentric and 
give primacy to the signified over the signifier. What Derrida refers to as ‘the absence of 
the transcendental signified’,78 however, calls into question this monolithic conception of 
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essence and attempts to destabilise binary oppositions within both metaphysics and 
language by focussing on the marginal aporias of meaning.  
Throughout his work, and particularly in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ and 
‘Dissemination’,79 Derrida demonstrates how binary oppositions are both arbitrary and 
unstable and have no fixed transcendental origin.80 Instability occurs because ‘meaning is 
nowhere punctually present in language […] it is always subject to a kind of semantic 
slippage’.81 In other words, Derrida insists that there is never a perfect unity of signifier 
and signified. Therefore metaphysical assumptions, which rely upon the stability of 
meaning, undercut themselves and meaning is set free from the security of transcendental 
attachment. It is important to note in this connection that the sign in a sense is self-
deconstructing; Derrida does not approach a text with a set of external maxims that seek 
to undo the fixed meaning. Rather, Derrida draws attention to an inherent and already 
existing instability within the system and thereby reveals the radical interdeterminacy of 
its signs.  
We are now perhaps in a better position to suggest more specifically how Derrida 
contributes to the argument against the infallibility of the law of non-contradiction. In 
order to contain the discussion, I am going to focus on two aspects of his work that 
specifically require acceptance of a ‘both/and’ logic: the trace and différance.82 When 
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Derrida refers to the ‘trace’ he is indicating ‘an absence that defines a presence’.83 
Derrida believes every present event contains traces or spectres from the past and 
anticipations of the future. ‘It is not absence instead of presence’, writes Derrida, ‘but a 
trace which replaces a presence which has never been present, an origin by means of 
which nothing has begun’.84 In other words, every experience is both its own unique 
event and at the same time present in repeatable future moments and marked by past 
occurrences. These non-present elements are, according to Derrida, in some real sense 
present, though marked by an absence—an absence which because it is nonetheless 
present confuses the law of non-contradiction. Aristotelian logic, by contrast, would 
maintain that something within an event is either present or absent—hence, there cannot 
be both presence and non-presence, as is the case with Derrida’s concept of the trace.  
Différance also defies the law of non-contradiction for Derrida insists on the 
reality of difference within identity—that is to say, that within the identity of the thing is 
also contained its difference. In Aporias he writes: ‘The identity of a language can only 
affirm itself as identity to itself by opening itself to the hospitality of a difference from 
itself or of a difference with itself’.85 Here, we see how Derrida opposes the Aristotelian 
insistence on a univocity of meaning by playing with identity and suggesting that there 
are differences within the same essence. It is important to appreciate that in speaking of 
différance Derrida is not simply opposing univocity with polysemia but suggesting that 
the singular only exists as a playful movement between multiple identities and that 
identity even within itself is polysemous.  
At this stage we can begin to see how Derrida’s ideas relate to the nonsense 
literature of Lewis Carroll. The following example from Alice Through the Looking-
Glass is a helpful clarification of the contrasting logic of différance. The White Knight 
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tells Alice the name of a song, but Carroll, in a proto-Derridean fashion, facetiously 
suggests that the identity of a song cannot be fixed by a single signifier: 
‘The name of the song is called “Haddock’s Eyes.” 
‘Oh, that’s the name of the song, is it?’ Alice said, trying to feel interested. 
‘No, you don’t understand,’ the Knight said, looking a little vexed. ‘That’s what 
the name is called. The name really is “The Aged Aged Man.”’ 
‘Then I ought to have said “That’s what the song is called?”’ Alice corrected 
herself. 
‘No you oughtn’t: that’s quite another thing! The song is called “Ways and 
Means”: but that’s only what it’s called, you know!’ 
‘Well, what is the song, then?’ said Alice who was by this time completely 
bewildered. 
‘I was coming to that,’ the Knight said. ‘The song really is “A-sitting On A 
Gate.”’86 
 
The extract seems comically to differentiate between: what the song ‘is’; what it is 
‘known as’; what it is ‘called’; and what its ‘name’ is called. These proliferating signifiers 
‘Haddock’s Eyes’, ‘The Aged Aged Man’ and so forth are ludicrously divergent, and yet 
all relate to the identity of the song and so the meaning of the song as a whole appears to 
be located playfully in the inter-relationship between the perpetually shifting signifiers. As 
with Derrida’s theory of différance, each of these names gestures to a single identity, 
which thus appears to contain within itself a multiplicity of differences, which in turn 
suggests that no signifier contains the identity uniquely, ‘A-Sitting On A Gate’, for 
example, does not encapsulate the essence of the song; it is simply another signifier. In 
this way Carroll, like Derrida, demonstrates that there is no one fixed identity and 
although Alice keeps attempting to grasp the meaning, the White Knight, playing a 
Derridean role, presents a playful proliferation of signifiers, which points towards a 
perpetually receding signified. 
 Our commentary on Derrida thus far has suggested that he may be an ally to this 
project to the extent that his ideas contest the universality of the law of non-contradiction. 
However, it is also clear that Derrida’s relationship to the theological imagination is 
somewhat hostile. He insisted, for instance, that ‘the age of the sign is essentially 
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theological’,87 and with the deconstruction of logocentricism, in many ways sought the 
undoing of Christian theology. Yet, despite his ambiguous relationship to the religious, 
for certain theologians such as John Caputo,88 Derrida opens the way for the recovery of 
pre-modern conceptions of the possible by drawing upon the impossible. Caputo states 
that ‘Deconstruction is a passion and a prayer for the impossible, a defense of the 
impossible against its critics’.89  
Here we see how Derrida might be of service to religious thinking since the critics 
against whom Derrida defends the impossible are those who perceive Enlightenment 
rationality as absolute. Derrida believes that traditional logic limits meaning to the 
confines of the possible and by doing this makes the articulation of an idea such as 
hospitality or forgiveness  not ‘worthy of the name’,90 since forgiveness, logically 
speaking, can only be applied to that which is forgivable. But for Derrida (and for 
Christianity) true forgiveness entails forgiveness of the unforgivable or it is not 
forgiveness at all, hence the only true or possible meaning of forgiveness is impossible. 
Christ’s teaching to ‘love your enemy’91 follows a similar formula; logic dictates that we 
can only love the loveable, but Christ tells us to love the unlovable. This is one of the 
reasons that Caputo seems justified in stating that ‘being impassioned by the impossible, 
is the religious, is religious passion’.92 
Whilst Derrida never described himself as a postmodern, his deconstructive 
ir(religion) has nevertheless been adopted, as we saw with Nietzsche’s philosophy, by 
postmodern theologians as a way of returning to a less secular metaphysic by embracing 
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the collapse of the onto-theological conception of God. Ian Edwards, for example, 
believes that the ‘boundary-less space’ of unknown possibilities (and impossibilities) is 
one area where Derrida and theology intersect. Edwards explains: ‘what can happen 
within a boundary-less space is unlimited. It is here where Derrida finds a kinship with 
negative theology. Both deconstruction and negative theology […] attempt to assert what 
cannot be asserted’.93 Of course we cannot simply assume that when Derrida unsettles 
certain delimitations imposed by reason this is automatically of value to faith. Yet, in a 
sense, Derrida provides a negative warrant for the present thesis by exploring and 
vindicating a territory beyond the conclusions of classical logic, which as we have seen 
throughout this introduction are often at odds with Christian beliefs. The particular merit 
of Derrida’s thought is that from a non-religious perspective he fulminates against the 
same foe as St Paul, Denys, the Medieval mystics, Luther, Kierkegaard and the other 
propagators of truth claims that carry us the other side of reason. 
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Contemporary Cognate Projects 
 
It will be helpful to conclude our brief history of the dialogue between faith and reason 
with a discussion of the various cognate contemporary projects, in order to determine to 
what extent the current thesis relates to or is distinct from adjacent and overlapping work 
in recent research. Mark Taylor’s ‘a/theology’ is an early response to Derrida’s thought 
and significant for our study since he uses postmodern philosophy to draw out and 
comment on what he sees as marginalized and subversive aspects of Christianity. Like the 
current project, Taylor begins his deconstructive theology by charting the history of 
Enlightenment thought and in particular observes how the Enlightenment brought about 
‘the renewed confidence in human reason’.94 The manner in which this is highlighted 
suggests that the author is interested in deviating from the rational security of the 
Enlightenment, and indeed fairly swiftly Taylor emphasises that his a/theology will 
‘invert established meaning and subvert everything once deemed holy. It will thus be 
utterly transgressive’.95  
With this agenda it is possible to see how Derrida’s thought could be of great 
value to Taylor’s work, since Derrida likewise approaches Christianity with the intention 
of deconstructing its established meaning. Taylor observes how ‘it is just this antithetical 
association with theology that lends deconstruction its “religious” significance for 
marginal thinkers’.96 However, for our investigation, whilst we can appreciate that an 
attempt to discuss religion through the principles of nonsense may seem like a similarly 
transgressive endeavour, the aim of this thesis is paradoxically to reveal the truly 
conservative core of such ‘transgressive’ theology. Thus, although this project is in many 
ways assisted by Taylor’s creative and counter-intuitive theology, I want to question 
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whether his programmatically ‘errant’ theologizing doesn’t end up creating its own 
boundaries, and ask if one can be both marginal and orthodox at the same time.  
The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze provides a revolutionary approach to 
metaphysics, exploring significant correlative trajectories such as the commonplace 
acceptance of Aristotelian and Husserlian logic. In particular, his book The Logic of Sense 
contains strikingly adjacent material to this project since he uses nonsense literature as a 
way of interacting with ontological concerns. What is especially interesting is that from a 
position of atheism Deleuze sees a need to speak of nonsense in order to describe reality. 
As with Nietzsche and Derrida, we find in Deleuze the suggestion that atheism is not 
coextensive with rationality, and that to speak truly of that which is one must be prepared 
at a certain point to let go of logic. 
Obviously, a comprehensive discussion of Deleuzian philosophy is beyond the 
scope of this introduction. However, an indication of his views on the subject of sense 
and nonsense will help to contextualize our concerns. There is an on-going attempt within 
Deleuze’s work to undo Russell and Frege’s assumption that truth and sense are 
necessarily conjoined and that sense provides a firm veridical basis. In The Logic of Sense 
Deleuze seeks to demonstrate the instability of sense and its co-presence with nonsense. 97 
He suggests that sense is not its own origin, but is a product of various non-sensical 
components, claiming that sense is merely one type of effect produced at random out of 
the metaphysical flux of meaning and is thus connected and stabilised by nonsense. 
‘Reason is always a region carved out of the irrational’, writes Deleuze, ‘not sheltered 
from the irrational at all, but traversed by it and only defined by a particular kind of 
relationship among irrational factors. Underneath all reason lies delirium, and drift’.98 
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Deleuze turns our basic conception of sense upside-down, implying that the very 
foundation of sense is nonsense.99 This intimate connection between sense and nonsense 
is effectively a disturbance of the law of non-contradiction and the erection of a 
paradoxical ontology in its place. Oliver Davies comes to a similar conclusion, believing 
‘Deleuze is thus able to offer a critique of the Western metaphysical tradition as a system 
of thinking’.100 Jean-Jacques Lecercle likewise identifies ‘the Deleuzean logic of unholy 
mixtures, an AND rather than an INSTEAD OF logic’,101 and it is this characteristic that 
is of obvious relevance to our concerns since it is a further demonstration that the 
inherited laws of logic do not necessarily hold in every circumstance, even before we say 
a word about God. 
Since his philosophy is launched from a position of atheism it unwittingly gives 
credence to the similar theological questioning of principles of Western logic. Deleuze’s 
own attempt at disarming staunch rationalism and scientism assists a religious endeavour 
to do the same. ‘What I’m interested in’, he writes, ‘are the relations between the arts, 
science and philosophy. There’s no order of priority among these disciplines. Each is 
creative’.102 Perhaps the ultimate significance of Deleuze for this thesis is that, like 
Schopenhauer, he attempts to show that the status of sense is not as secure as is often 
assumed, and that any accurate evaluation of reality must begin by calling this status into 
question.  
Postmodern theology, as we have seen, shares many of Deleuze’s central 
objectives and within this field the status of sense and logic is unashamedly called into 
question. John Caputo and Michael Scanlon amongst others have mounted an explicitly 
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theological inquiry into the value of unreason. They associate secularization with 
modernity and see a desecularized return to religious thinking as a product of 
postmodern, deconstructive theory. There have been significant recent advances in the 
theological recognition of the value of the non-commonsensical, or to use the language of 
Caputo and Scanlon, ‘of what the ‘old enlightenment’ declared impossible’.103 They look 
to the ‘new enlightenment […] which is given over to dreaming of the impossible’.104 
Caputo and Scanlon’s objective seems to be an important step in retrieving a pre-modern 
balance of the mystical with the evidential by allowing for the experience of ‘impossible’ 
ideas that cannot be interacted with on a purely rational level. That is not to say that the 
rational is wrong—this project does not call for the usurpation of reason, but seeks to give 
space to or to share court with alternative methods of theorizing. To this extent the task 
before us is properly postmodern in that it is not a rejection of reason, but the denial of 
reason’s universality. Vanhoozer summarises this idea by explaining ‘[i]t is not that 
postmoderns are irrational, they do not reject “reason” but “Reason”’.105 
In After the Death of God, Caputo associates the Kingdom of God with paradox, 
anarchy and Lewis Carroll, all of which play a major part in the current thesis. Although 
it is only a brief reference, mainly in response to Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, Caputo writes: 
‘the divine madness of the Kingdom of God described in the New Testament, where the 
event provokes the most sublime effects, a veritable “sacred anarchy,” whose parables 
and paradoxes are easily the match of any of the tales told by Lewis Carroll’.106 Here 
Caputo encourages in his reader the idea that the Kingdom of God might have some 
analogous connection to Lewis Carroll’s nonsense worlds. Although Caputo does not 
devote any time to exploring what is specifically entailed by this analogy, it is 
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nevertheless useful to discover such a close connection to this project within recent 
theological thought. 
Though less well known in theological circles, the concept of ‘dialetheism’ is an 
important parallel development in the field of analytical philosophy that closely 
corresponds to the breakdown of the certainty of the law of non-contradiction. Given the 
context of its emergence, it offers perhaps the most surprising challenge to the laws of 
classical reason, and in particular to the principle of non-contradiction. Dialethesism 
[literally di aletheia (two truths)]—which was coined by Graham Priest and Richard 
Routley in 1981—refers to the possibility that certain logically contradictory statements 
are accurate descriptions of reality, or as Priest himself summarises: ‘The view that the 
LNC [law of non-contradiction] fails, that some contradictions are true is called 
dialetheism’.107  
What was in the 1980s an obscure and somewhat far-out suggestion has now 
gained widespread support and respect among many leading logicians. Michael Resnik, 
for example, introduces dialetheism thus: ‘For centuries logicians have held that 
contradictions cannot be true. This has been a fundamental principle of every system of 
logic capable of expressing it or a reasonable approximation thereof […] But today, 
thanks to forceful and astute criticisms by the dialetheists, we can no longer take this 
dogma for granted’.108 Briefly, dialetheism takes its cue from ‘paraconsistent logics’,109 a 
philosophical method of determining statement veracity that allows for inconsistency-
tolerant conditions and is able to support a sentence whose negation and affirmation both 
hold true.110 The significance of the dialetheist’s challenge to the dialogue between faith 
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and reason is that dialetheism comes from within the analytical tradition known for its 
harsh criticism of religious statements for failing to conform to the standards of Western 
metaphysics and, like postmodernism, shows these standards to be less stable than is 
commonly assumed.  
Perhaps, therefore, it is surprising that dialetheism is seldom included in 
theological discourse.111 James Anderson mentions the concept in his treatise on religious 
paradox, but discounts its relevance, claiming ‘dialethesim only saves rationality at the 
expense of trivializing orthodoxy’.112 However, it is worth paying attention to the 
objective of Anderson’s argument, which is to support religious paradox and yet ‘avoid 
denying or revising the law of non-contradiction or any other classical rules of logic’.113 
He believes firmly that ‘the more exalted the epistemic status of Christian doctrine, the 
better equipped it will be to deal with epistemic challenges such as those raised by the 
problem of paradox’.114 Yet, as we have seen, the laws of classical epistemology are 
themselves being called into question by logicians, and in many circles adherence to the 
laws of reason is no longer considered a necessary measurement of intellectual rectitude. 
The diversity of thinkers involved in the challenge to the imperial reign of reason seems 
to demonstrate that the opposition is not simply a distortion serving the particular agenda 
of one ideology, but an important objection to heed. As we have seen, the history of 
protest belongs not only to advocates of deconstruction or nihilism, as one might 
anticipate, but also to analytical philosophers and orthodox theologians. 
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It might be assumed, given the current postmodern dissatisfaction with inherited 
conceptions of the possible, theologians would be more amenable to this movement as a 
deliverance from the imposition of non-religious standards of reason, and indeed we have 
witnessed some significant research into this area. Yet some of the strongest arguments in 
support of Aristotelian logic still come from within the field of theology, where 
rationality is often given ontological significance. This idea underlies Nicholas 
Wolterstorff’s dictum: ‘When the theist believes nonrationally, he acts in violation of the 
will of the very God in whom he believes’.115 Many theologians firmly uphold the 
principles of Western metaphysics and formulate their apologetics in accordance with 
these rules. Geisler and Brooks, for example, maintain that ‘if logic is a necessary 
precondition of all thought, then it must also be necessary for all thought about God’.116 
Despite the many attempts to show that logic is not a necessary precondition of all 
thought, the persistence of Enlightenment assumptions remains dominant in 
contemporary Christian theology, even though the resurrection it affirms is an empirical 
impossibility.  
A defence of religion reliant upon tenets of logical reasoning assumes that if 
theological precepts can be articulated in accordance with logic then religious belief can 
be insulated from rational repudiation.117 Logicians, however, rarely hold this view, and 
should they interact with theology at all will frequently use logic as a means by which 
they disparage religious belief. Anthony Kenny in his lecture series Faith and Reason 
typifies this view: ‘I conclude, then, my inquiry into the rationality of faith with the 
conclusion that faith is not, as theologians have claimed, a virtue, but a vice, unless a 
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number of conditions can be fulfilled. One of them is that the existence of God can be 
rationally justified outside faith’.118  
This reliance on logic as the arbiter of veracity has led certain thinkers, such as D. 
Z. Phillips, to seek to relocate theological inquiry outside of the type of foundational 
rationalism that Kenny insists is compulsory for belief. Phillips describes his 
dissatisfaction with the ‘post-Enlightenment conception of rationality and its notion of 
sovereign reason’ as a ‘philosophical scandal’.119 ‘We are asked to accept’, Phillips 
complains, ‘as the only appropriate philosophical method for establishing the rationality 
of religious belief, a method which actually distorts the character of religious belief’.120 
We are thus faced with a radical and seemingly incompatible divergence among 
theologians. On the one hand we are urged to uphold a logical account of faith, a ‘rational 
belief’, one ‘which does not violate our noetic obligations’.121 On the other hand, 
theologians seem to be celebrating religion as ‘the unassimilable other of Enlightenment 
modernity’.122 We find ourselves forced into a perplexing dichotomy: Christian faith, it 
seems, is either supremely rational or it transcends all rational inquiry.  
This is in many ways an unhelpful dichotomy and some theologians have 
recognised the inadequacy of this either/or approach, calling for an encounter that has a 
more paradoxical flavour, allowing for a richer combination of reason with its antithesis. 
Prompted by a dialogue between Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, in which both express a 
certain desire to ‘go beyond the impoverished Enlightenment view of reason’,123 Creston 
Davis acknowledges the need for theology to avoid creating a dichotomy between 
rationality and faith: ‘the return to the theological in our time’, Davis writes, ‘may be a 
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call, once again, to strike a balance between reason and myth, between belief and faith 
[…] and between the divine and the human’.124 One way to accomplish this is to 
synthesize faith with rationality as we have seen in Anderson’s treatise.125 An alternative 
method, however, would be to re-evaluate the status of the irrational, and rather than 
trying to circumvent or explain away moments of logical conflict within theology, one 
might instead countenance the theological validity of unreason. 
 This does not seem to be an approach that has been significantly explored.   
George Mavrodes, for example, in response to the atheist’s objection to faith on the 
grounds of irrationality suggests there are ‘three alternatives by way of setting the record 
straight’. He explains: ‘we could simply assert that the faith is rational, or we could 
produce a positive argument in support of its rationality, or we could undertake to refute 
the atheist’s argument’.126 Mavrodes doesn’t mention a fourth alternative, however, 
which this thesis proposes—and that is to agree with the atheist, but to transvaluate the 
language of unreason by demonstrating its ability to describe the nature of that which is. 
Indeed, it will be a central part of the argument of this thesis that there are certain aspects 
of reality which are best described by means of ‘nonsense’.  
On the whole, terms such as ‘irrational’, ‘absurd’ and ‘nonsense’ still belong to 
the sceptic, and form part of his arsenal. Such descriptors are rarely accepted or favoured 
by religious believers, and perhaps with good reason. Within the symbolism of 
philosophical logic, Neil Tennant explains ‘⊥ is, logically, as horrific a conclusion as one 
can possibly get. Indeed, ⊥ is so bad that, funnily enough, nothing can really follow from 
it the way the absurdity rule would otherwise maintain. ⊥ is like a logical black hole: no 
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possible thought that makes any sense could ever escape from it’.127 This thesis is 
concerned with whether there are any moments within orthodox Christian teaching which 
lead to the conclusion ⊥, and if so, whether this makes such claims redundant, or if, on the 
other hand, absurdity might in some sense itself be a revelation of truth.  
The history of faith and reason that we have sketched indicates that our normative 
ways of discerning reality are structured by the principles of logic. This manner of 
perceiving the world is both instructive and necessary, but, as we have seen, at the same 
time it also prejudices, leaves out and discounts what has become the other of logical 
discourse—the a-linear and the nonsensical. Since our intention is to explore the 
theological value of these alternative ways of interacting with and regarding the structure 
of reality, we will use nonsense literature as a point of comparison with the religious 
imagination. In Part Two of the thesis I will go into more detail about the strengths and 
weaknesses of this association, but for now I want briefly to introduce the idea that an 
artistic endeavour such as nonsense literature is in itself a kind of theology. 
Some forms of art explicitly invoke the divine such as stained glass windows, 
church music or religious poetry and one can easily appreciate the theological value of 
this type of artistic creativity. Yet art per se does not appear to have inherent religious 
relevance—for example it might seem far-fetched to look for the theology in punk music, 
tap dancing, or comic strips, and Lewis Carroll’s nonsense stories certainly fit into this 
category. However, Richard Viladesau has suggested that all art can be read as a text of 
theology. He writes: ‘art itself, precisely as art, can be seen as a mode of reflection on and 
embodiment of Christian ideas and values and, hence, as constituting a form of 
theology’.128 The concept behind Viladesau’s belief is twofold; firstly, all art is 
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theological because it is creative, it reflects God’s own creativity and utilises our God-
given capacity to design and construct. In some sense, then, the basic status of art as the 
representation of the creative imagination, contains within it more complex realities, and 
is itself a move beyond reason and logic into some other state. 
 Secondly, according to Viladesau ‘[a]rt reveals significant aspects of the 
particular human situations to which God’s word is addressed and on which theology 
must therefore reflect if it is to be relevant’.129 This second reason indicates that art can 
have a practical role in communicating the Christian message since it creates the link 
between the life of an individual and the teachings of the Church. Art can become a 
bridge by which we can meet God in a way that is unique and apposite to us. Michael 
Ward, commenting on the use of fantasy literature as a method of religious teaching, 
writes: ‘As an apologetic strategy, it only makes sense to meet people where they are. 
Where else, indeed can they be met?’130 Ward’s statement helps to indicate why exploring 
theology through nonsense literature could be a valuable pursuit; it allows us to begin by 
listening to the sceptic and ask if some measure of irrational credulity is required in order 
to accept Christian faith. Using nonsense literature as a means of exploring theology thus 
goes some way in addressing the sceptic’s perennial refrain: ‘you can’t seriously believe 
it!’131 This project is not in any way set up to discredit the innumerable, vital rational 
defenses of Christianity, but to seek a restoration of the Pauline balance of reason with a 
delight in unreason and wisdom with a reverence for folly.  
There are of course many questions to ask and qualifications to be made, but at 
this initial stage, in the view of secular misgivings about the laws of human reason, there 
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seems to be a warrant to explore the possibility that moments of logical discord within 
Christian theology are not necessarily adequate grounds for dismissal. Certainly Stenson 
means to discredit Christianity when he suggests that ‘if […] no theist can give 
satisfactory criteria for establishing the truth or falsity of such statements even in 
principle (let alone practice), then these expressions must be like Lewis Carroll’s 
nonsense verses, statements which seem to be genuine assertions, but which, like the 
Jabberwock poem, have no cognitive significance at all’.132 The question posed by the 
current thesis, however, is: what implication might it have for theology if we accepted the 
analogy Stenson makes with nonsense, but disputed the assumption that it has ‘no 
cognitive significance’? 
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Chapter One: Paradox 
 
i) Nonsense and Paradox 
 
The history of faith and reason summarily sketched recognizes that our customary ways 
of discerning reality are structured by the principles of logic. This manner of perceiving 
the world is obviously appropriate—and our normative posture—and I do not at all wish 
to deny its value or our fundamental need of it. However, it is also clear from the previous 
section that for many thinkers this approach doesn’t exhaust, and sometimes distorts, the 
nature of that which is. This thesis will therefore consider a range of a-rational ways of 
describing reality, not as an alternative to the exercise of reason, but in an attempt to 
preserve or retrieve what Enlightenment approaches often leave out or obscure.  
Having found from our survey that logic does not always lead to an accurate 
description of reality, I intend to experiment with the nonsensical to see whether in 
worlds such as Lewis Carroll’s Wonderland a faithful apprehension of the real may 
paradoxically be achieved by recourse to the surreal or anti-real. I begin by simply 
seeking to define the character of the nonsensical imagination, which will involve 
exploring central structural devices of nonsense fiction which require imaginative 
participation on the reader’s behalf. Since this project is concerned with a religious 
worldview, these key descriptors will then be brought into dialogue with Christian faith. 
In creating a connection between faith and nonsense it is important to conduct the study 
by commencing with nonsense rather than theology in order to demonstrate that our main 
areas of examination are genuinely significant features of the nonsensical imagination and 
not merely one-off instances that happen to be suggestive of theological maxims. 
Alongside the nonsense stories of Lewis Carroll I will draw these central 
characteristics from a variety of nonsense theorists. Perhaps the three most important 
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commentators on literary nonsense are: Elizabeth Sewell (1952), Wim Tigges (1986), and 
Jean-Jacques Lecercle (1994). Having already established the law of non-contradiction as 
a foundational precept of common-sense logic, I want to suggest that perhaps the most 
conspicuous contravention of this principle is the idea of paradox—a contradiction that is 
true. The idea that paradox is a consistent and important dimension of nonsense literature 
is recognised by Sewell as the ‘the game of nonsense’, which she describes as ‘the mind’s 
employing its tendency towards order to engage its contrary tendency towards disorder’.1 
Tigges defines literary nonsense as ‘a genre of narrative literature which balances a 
multiplicity of meaning with a simultaneous absence of meaning’.2 And Lecercle argues 
‘the genre is structured by the contradiction […] in terms of a dialectic, between over-
structuring and de-structuring, subversion and support’.3 Each of these thinkers insists 
upon the presence of contradiction and dialectic as fundamental to literary nonsense. 4   
Paradox is a central feature of Lewis Carroll’s fictional worlds. Peter Heath in 
The Philosopher’s Alice provides excellent commentary on the logical inconsistencies of 
Wonderland. Referring to the absurd Caucus race in which the Dodo declares: 
‘Everybody has won, and all must have prizes’,5 Heath describes this as a paradox in 
breach of the law of non-contradiction since ‘winning logically entails that some 
contestants do better than others’.6 Either somebody has won or they have all drawn; the 
contestants cannot both draw and not draw as the Dodo proposes. Cases, then, where the 
law of non-contradiction appears to be breached will be accepted as instances of 
nonsensical paradox. It may be helpful, however, to distinguish three separate types of 
paradox in which the majority of all nonsense contradictions find root: paradoxes of 
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speech; paradoxes of sense; and paradoxes of time. I will begin with a summary of the 
paradox of speech. 
The first type—linguistic paradox—involves an apparent contradiction, which is 
utilized to comic effect by nonsense writers. Lecercle summarizes it as follows: ‘I speak 
language, in other words I am master of the instrument which allows me to communicate 
with others, and yet it is a language that speaks: I am constrained by the language I 
inhabit to such an extent that I am inhabited or possessed by it’.7 Carroll delighted in this 
linguistic paradox, and a prominent cause of nonsensical wit in the Alice books centres 
around the problem that words aren’t entirely in our control and often fail to convey what 
the speaker means.  
Through the character of Humpty Dumpty, Carroll demonstrates the resultant 
nonsense of attempting to avoid encountering the paradox of speech. In the following 
well-known extract Alice tries to engage sensibly in Humpty Dumpty’s absurd reasoning, 
which results in her complete bewilderment: 
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just 
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different 
things.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master—that’s all.’ 
Alice was too puzzled to say anything; so after a minute Humpty Dumpty began 
again. ‘They’ve a temper, some of them—particularly verbs: they’re the proudest—
adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs—however, I can manage the 
whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That’s what I say!’ 
‘Would you tell me, please,’ said Alice, ‘what that means?’ 
‘Now you talk like a reasonable child,’ said Humpty Dumpty, looking very much 
pleased. ‘I meant by “impenetrability” that we’ve had enough of that subject, and it 
would be just as well if you’d mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose you 
don’t mean to stop here all the rest of your life’.8 
 
This exchange seems to suggest, contrary to Humpty Dumpty’s approach, that true 
mastery of language involves relinquishing the desire for total control over meaning. 
Effective communication seems to have to acknowledge the imprecision of language but 
speaks as if it were precise. To use the formula of non-contradiction, this paradox reveals 
                                                     
7
 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy of Nonsense, p. 25. 
8
 Lewis Carroll, Alice Through the Looking-Glass, pp. 162-3. 
  
45 
that in one sentence an individual can both say and not say precisely what he intends. In 
everyday use, this is for the most part a dormant paradox; we tend to know what is meant 
even if the words are approximate. However, as Derrida insists, language is capable of 
saying ‘more, less, or something other than what [we] mean’,9 and this is what the 
nonsense author brings gently and playfully into view, provoking the reader to recognise 
the subversive and ungovernable feature of his own speech. 
The second main type of nonsense paradox involves the co-dependency of 
nonsense and sense, an idea particularly associated with Deleuze. In the introduction to 
The Logic of Sense he outlines why paradox is intricately linked to a discussion of both 
sense and nonsense: ‘we present here a series of paradoxes which form the theory of 
sense. It is easy to explain why this theory is inseparable from paradoxes: sense is a 
nonexisting entity, and, in fact, maintains very special relations with nonsense’.10 Perhaps 
we should not be surprised at this feature of the Alice narratives, given Carroll’s strange 
dual life as an Oxford logician and nonsense writer. Good nonsense, it seems, is reliant 
upon strict sense. In fact, it is Carroll’s brilliant logic that gives birth to some of his most 
ingenious moments of nonsense. Lecercle observes a similar phenomenon: ‘Lack of sense 
here is always compensated by excess or proliferation of sense there. This […] is the 
central paradox or contradiction of the genre’.11 It is paradoxical because one would 
anticipate that the more strictly one adheres to sense, the more it should correspond to 
sound reason, yet as literary nonsense reveals, it is sometimes the very strictness of the 
adherence to logic that results in absurdity. As the following dialogue demonstrates, 
much of the Hare and Hatter’s nonsense is derived from their pedantic demand for clarity.  
‘I’m glad they've begun asking riddles.—I believe I can guess that,’ she added 
aloud. 
‘Do you mean that you think you can find out the answer to it?’ said the March 
Hare. 
‘Exactly so,’ said Alice. 
                                                     
9
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 158. 
10
 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, Introduction, ix. 
11
 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy of Nonsense, p. 31. 
  
46 
‘Then you should say what you mean,’ the March Hare went on. 
‘I do,’ Alice hastily replied; ‘at least—at least I mean what I say—that’s the same 
thing, you know.’ 
‘Not the same thing a bit!’ said the Hatter. ‘You might just as well say that “I see 
what I eat” is the same thing as “I eat what I see”!’12 
 
G. K. Chesterton in Orthodoxy dedicates a chapter to ‘The Maniac’, whom he describes 
as possessing ‘the combination of an expansive and exhaustive reason with a contracted 
common sense’.13 This indeed seems to be an accurate description of the Hare and Hatter 
in their conversation with Alice, as they demonstrate a sort of unreasonable logic in 
exhibiting a concern for precision that is out of all proportion; indeed, we might say they 
have lost everything except their reason. The law of non-contradiction tells us that if 
something is fully irrational it cannot also be rational, but as we have seen it is not the 
Hare and Hatter’s irrationality but their strict rationality that renders their dialogue 
nonsensical.  
Such nonsense reveals to us that in everyday communication sense and nonsense 
flow into one another and that the staunchest sense touches the strictest nonsense. What 
we take to be ‘sensible’ Carroll reveals to be the happy balance of sense and nonsense, as 
opposed to strict reason, which often results in absurdity. Such an example can be found 
in the ludicrous judicial system of Looking-Glass land. As Alice admits, there is nothing 
exactly at fault with the Queen’s logic, and yet the conclusion is supremely unreasonable: 
‘There’s the King’s Messenger. He’s in prison now, being punished: and the trial 
doesn’t even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last of all.’ 
‘Suppose he never commits the crime?’ said Alice. 
‘That would be all the better, wouldn’t it?’ the Queen said 
[…] Alice felt there was no denying that. ‘Of course it would be all the better,’ she 
said: ‘but it wouldn’t be all the better his being punished.’ 
‘You’re wrong there, at any rate,’ said the Queen. ‘Were you ever punished?’ 
‘Only for faults,’ said Alice. 
‘And you were all the better for it, I know!’ the Queen said triumphantly. 
‘Yes, but then I had done the things I was punished for,’ said Alice: ‘that makes all 
the difference.’ 
‘But if you hadn’t done them,’ the Queen said, ‘that would have been better 
still’.14 
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The steps of the Queen’s argument are perfectly legitimate but the contention is still 
irrational; it is all sense and no meaning. Nonsense logic, as we can see here, often 
produces a perversion of sense via a perfection of reason and it is this second type of 
paradox that creates much literary nonsense wit. 
The third type of paradox dominant in nonsense literature concerns time. Susan 
Stewart in Aspects of Intertextuality describes how literary nonsense ‘stands in direct 
contradiction to the remaining three laws of Husserl’s “lived experiences of time”’. These 
include: ‘That different times can never be conjoint; that their relation is a 
nonsimultaneous one; and that there is transitivity, that to every time belongs an earlier 
and a later’.15 It is easy to find a multitude of nonsense examples that flout Husserl’s laws 
and give way to paradoxical expressions of temporality. In Carroll’s worlds, several days 
come at once;16 time can stand still for a few individuals whilst speeding up for others;17 
and the ordinary sequence of events is distorted so that future events can take place in the 
past or present.18 
 The three different types of paradoxes identified testify to the extensiveness of 
Carroll’s usage of contrary logic. His paradoxes are temporal and also spatial; they are 
concerned with reason and speech, personal identity and imaginary objects; they are 
physical, literal, moral and metaphysical. Alice is herself even described as possessing a 
paradoxical character, according to Nina Auerbach, who ascribes to her opposing roles: 
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‘simultaneously Wonderland’s slave and its queen, its creator and destroyer as well as its 
victim’.19 The law of non-contradiction would dictate that Alice is either slave or queen; 
she cannot be both slave and not slave, as Auerbach argues. Having established that 
paradox is indeed a pervasive theme in Carroll’s nonsense we can now ask what is the 
effect or significance of such paradoxes. 
 Within the sphere of the imagination, one of the effects of this type of 
paradoxical play is that it nurtures a cognitive flexibility. The presence of paradox within 
nonsense requires the imagination to perform the critical role of envisaging the 
‘impossible’ or thinking outside the parameters of logic. We know that days come one 
after another, and yet Carroll prompts us to conceive of the event of having several 
Tuesdays at once. This activity of imaginatively overstepping the boundaries of the 
possible resonates with the various theological deviations from Aristotelian logic that 
were chartered in the historical survey of the relationship between faith and reason. 
Garrett Green explains how followers of the Kantian tradition ‘hesitate to use the term 
imagination to describe religion, even though it would seem appropriate. To modern ears 
it simply sounds too much like admitting that religious belief is imaginary’.20 However, if 
we are dissatisfied with the Kantian limitation of religion ‘within the bounds of reason 
alone’, then the imagination, and in particular the nonsensical imagination with its 
flagrant defiance of the rational, could become a force for the theology of ‘the new 
enlightenment’.  
 Interestingly, the nonsense activity of playfully rearranging the limits of the 
possible in some ways seems to have more in common with postmodern theology than 
with neighbouring literary genres. There is not much that we would expect Thomas 
Gradgrind to have to say to the Mad Hatter, but there is equally little that Frodo Baggins 
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and the March Hare have in common. Although both Carroll and Tolkien require from 
their reader an imaginative acceptance of the impossible, the nonsensical imagination 
seems to demand the persistent practice of accepting impossibilities in contrast to the 
initial acceptance required in order to enter a world such as Middle Earth, which, once 
inside, functions systematically and obeys its own rules in a consistent fashion—dragons 
have the property of flight, but it would be ludicrous to suggest that a dwarf might. 
Whereas Carroll’s nonsense—where stones transform into cakes and babies morph into 
pigs—requires the reader to imagine ‘six impossible things before breakfast’ and many 
more throughout the day. Hence, nonsense paradox entailing ‘both/and’ collisions is 
logically problematic in the way that Gandalf’s wizardry is not.  
 We have begun to explore the idea that the imaginative traversing of logical 
boundaries may have a theological significance and I want now to develop this by 
considering whether like nonsense literature, Christian theology includes paradox as an 
integral component. 
 
ii) Christianity and Paradox 
 
With reference to the title of his book Sense and Nonsense in Religion, Sten Stenson 
explains ‘the word “nonsense” is meant to direct our attention to […] the patent self-
contradictions, the logical paradoxicality, of religious language’.21 What Stenson’s 
proposition steers us towards is the indication that nonsense and theology share some 
commonality via paradox. Such a proposal raises several questions: is paradox a real and 
central aspect of the Christian faith? Or is it a misleading association altogether? Does 
paradox have the same meaning in literary nonsense and theology? Might there be some 
link via the paradoxical imagination between literary nonsense and religious faith? The 
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last two questions will be considered following a detailed investigation into the presence 
of paradox in the Christian faith.  
In his book Christianity and Paradox, Ronald Hepburn uses paradox to describe 
some central tenets of the Christian faith, such as the belief that God is both one and fully 
triune. He accepts that the doctrine of the Trinity appears as an impossible belief, but 
claims that ‘paradoxical language is the staple of accounts of God’s nature and is not 
confined to rhetorical extravaganzas’.22 Hepburn imagines the response of the unbeliever 
to the Christian profession of paradox:  
Talking with you is impossible. No matter what absurdity, inconsistency, 
incoherence I locate in your theology, you will (verbally, that is) transform it into 
a new exhibition of divine ‘otherness’. You don’t even recoil when I accuse you 
of using language without meaning; for, you say, God can use our nonsense as 
the vehicle of his revelation.’ The argument, he feels, has become altogether 
unreal.23 
 
There is certainly something unsettling, or at least curious, in the idea that Christianity 
does not seek to avoid the claim of ‘absurdity, inconsistency [and] incoherence’. Freud’s 
proposal that belief in God provides ‘answers to the riddles that tempt the curiosity of 
man’24 seems to make much more sense than Hepburn’s assertion that ‘the theologian 
calmly admits […] all these contradictions […] and has no intention of abandoning his 
theology because of their presence’. If, as Freud supposes, ‘man creates God in his 
image’,25 it seems odd that he would create, or at least invest faith in, a doctrine full of 
glaring inconsistencies and impossible riddles.  
Of course, it may be that this language of impossibility and absurdity is being 
misapplied. Perhaps, as Hepburn’s unbeliever might protest, ‘paradox is too optimistic 
and too solemn a word for all this. It would be more honest to call it a language of 
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contradiction’.26 This is indeed Hume’s position. He suggests that Christianity willingly 
presents itself as paradoxical and rests securely in its semantic contradictions. Given the 
general desire in the eighteenth century to purge religion of superstition and to bring it in 
line with rational empiricism, it is not surprising that Hume disparages the Christian 
appeal to mystery: 
One may safely affirm, that all popular theology [...] has a kind of appetite for 
absurdity and contradiction. If that theology went not beyond reason and common 
sense, her doctrines would appear too easy and familiar. Amazement must of 
necessity be raised: Mystery affected: Darkness and obscurity sought after: And a 
foundation of merit afforded to the devout votaries, who desire an opportunity of 
subduing their rebellious reason by the belief of the most unintelligible 
sophisms.27  
 
Hume gives the impression here that the mystery and absurdity of theological doctrines is 
a rhetorical strategy merely designed to repel contradiction. Hume is in agreement that 
the paradoxes of theology go against Aristotelian logic; he maintains, however, that this is 
a deliberate contravention manufactured from empty premises.  
In contrast to Hume’s opinion, Henri de Lubac argues that far from believing 
absurdity and contradiction to be a desirable quality in religious teaching, many 
theologians exhibit an Enlightenment fear that religious belief may seem implausible if it 
involves maxims that defy rational or reasonable limits. As a result de Lubac contends 
that vital paradoxes of faith have been significantly underemphasized. ‘We are too 
desirous of being set at ease’, de Lubac writes, ‘and we do not consent to being taken out 
of our usual element. That is why we make a petty religion for ourselves and seek a petty 
salvation of our own petty proportions’.28 De Lubac views the avoidance of religious 
paradox as a weakened version of orthodox faith, a sentiment that is reiterated by Ben 
Quash and Michael Ward in their recent book on Heresies, in which they remind us that 
heresies often come about as a result of the attempt to circumvent paradox. Quash 
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explains: ‘Heretics have often been shy of the full radicalness of orthodox Christianity, 
such that their alternatives have been almost rather common-sensical by comparison’.29 
By associating heresies with a more common-sense interpretation of faith, Quash seems 
to reinforce the apparent connection between nonsense and orthodox faith. 
At this point, it will be helpful to clarify the options canvassed so far. The 
prevalence of paradox in Christian doctrine can be explained in three ways. Firstly, as 
suggested by Freud, doctrinal ‘paradoxes’ are not an impossible breach with rational 
thought since man has mentally created the God he desires. Paradox in this case is a 
rhetorical trope and should thus be viewed either poetically, if it is helpful to the 
individual, or dismissed as a deception, if it is unhelpful. Secondly, based on Hume’s 
account of Christianity, paradox may be a device used to deflect attention away from an 
empty premise to inspire a false sense of awe. The third alternative, adumbrated by de 
Lubac, Hepburn and Stenson, is that paradox is in fact an accurate description of a 
doctrine, which does not merely pertain to the order of language, but is rather an attempt 
to signify that which seems to be of its nature paradoxical. My main concern in this 
chapter is not to prove that what is deemed paradoxical is right, but to consider how 
accurately such a description reflects Christian doctrine.30 
Before proceeding, however, a general caveat is necessary. The study of paradox 
within religion is inevitably approached from the perspective of man, since it would be 
impossible to speculate on a theocentric understanding of the inner workings of the 
Trinity. De Lubac is of the opinion that ‘paradox is the reverse of what, properly 
perceived, would be synthesis. But, proper view always eludes us’.31 This is an important 
point to bear in mind, for in thinking theologically, we never possess an ultimate or 
                                                     
29
 Heresies and How to Avoid Them, Ben Quash and Michael Ward (London: SPCK, 2007), p. 7. 
30
 This trilogy of distinctions is not in reality so clear-cut. One might have legitimate grounds for 
asking how easy it is to draw the line between linguistic and ontological paradox. For example, if 
Christians are not expected to believe that a camel can really pass through the eye of a needle, it is 
arguably not immediately obvious that they should insist upon the seriousness of God’s Triunity. 
31
 Henri de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, p. 9. 
  
53 
exhaustive perspective. What de Lubac seems to be saying is not that paradox is therefore 
a false conclusion—indeed, he maintains it is in our present state the most accurate way 
of expressing certain theological truths. Rather, de Lubac is referring to the fact that 
Christians conceive of reality as both partial and provisional. However it is within this 
scope of partial understanding that Christians are prepared for and receive intimations of 
God’s ultimate reality. The language of paradox therefore gestures towards this reality, 
but is inevitably inadequate to express it fully.  
It is important to emphasise that this does not constitute an exemption from or a 
way around the language of illogicality and nonsense. By claiming that paradox is not an 
ultimate property of Christian dogma, many theologians seek to avoid the charges of 
irrationality. As I have already indicated, James Anderson’s work on paradox 
concentrates on the appearance of contradiction enabling him to put forward his rational 
defence of theological paradox. ‘Paradoxical doctrines’, he states, ‘do not involve real 
contradiction, that is, they do not posit logically impossible states of affairs. Rather, they 
are instances of merely apparent contradiction’.32 De Lubac’s approach is different, 
though, because he focuses on the significance of the apparent contradiction and conducts 
his theology from what appears to be the case within our limited conceptions of the real. 
Anderson, by contrast, seeks to start immediately from the eschatological and thereby 
reassures himself and the reader that absurdity plays no part in theological paradox.  
This desire to achieve logical credibility is not limited to Anderson’s treatise. 
Two promising essays in a collection on Kierkegaard entitled ‘Christianity and Nonsense’ 
and ‘Kierkegaard: “Paradox” and Irrationalism’ both seek to undo the charge that 
Kierkegaardian theology contains elements of the absurd and the nonsensical. Like 
Anderson, moments of unreason are rejected as insignificant on the basis that they are not 
ultimately unreasonable: ‘Kierkegaard’s position is that even those claims which appear 
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to unbelief as absurd or contradictory are not essentially, permanently, and incorrigibly 
so’.33 Be that as it may, there are also modern theologians supporting de Lubac who want 
to acknowledge that the appearance of absurdity is itself of consequence. John Milbank, 
for example, recognises the importance of de Lubac’s central concern with paradox whilst 
also maintaining a belief in the ultimate harmony of God’s Kingdom. ‘Paradox’, writes 
Milbank, rejecting Žižek’s dialectic resolution, ‘affirms the full reality of the impossible 
and the contradictory’.34 Here, Milbank establishes the importance of observing the 
paradoxical dimension of Christian theology not because he believes the contradictory 
contains within itself any essential permanence, but rather, because paradox enables the 
possibility of theological reflection from our current fallen situation. In other words, the 
employment of paradox gives theology a language through which it can represent 
‘impossible and contradictory’ realities. 
The desire to overstep the ‘full reality of the impossible’ and focus only on the 
projected reality of ultimate resolution in many ways offers an impoverished account of 
Christian theology and can carry religious descriptions away from any recognizable view 
of reality. By contrast, the language of nonsense and paradox has the potential to address 
the ‘full reality’ of life as it is conceived by Christianity— at once reconciled and yet still 
fallen. Faith, conceived as a matter of hope,35 always begins with the openness to a reality 
which is beyond formal certainty, and to this extent one would at some point expect there 
to be a crucial and problematic correspondence between language and reality, experience 
and truth. Perhaps an approach that incorporates the need at times to venture the other 
side of reason might in the end turn out to be a more rational path to the place of 
permanent reconciliation. Thus we are essentially asking whether we should conduct 
theology from a position of ultimate harmony or begin within the current state of fallen 
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confusion. My proposal is that both are necessary and neither perspective can be negated 
without distortion. This in itself requires a type of paradoxical imagining as the 
proposition, ‘the world is and is not fallen’ establishes a sort of theological paradox about 
paradox—that the ‘impossible and the contradictory’ both is and is not a full reality.  
We are now in a position to respond to the question: what role, if any, do 
paradoxes assume in Christian dogma? Outlined in what follows are six central tenets of 
orthodox Christianity that will be examined to discover if they entail full logical paradox. 
The more general connection between Christian faith and the nonsensical imagination 
will then be explored in the chapter’s conclusion. 
 
 
 
Doctrinal Paradox 
 
 
iii) Knowledge: veiled and disclosed 
 
We can begin our investigation by considering the apparent contradiction in the Christian 
teaching that God both reveals himself and remains transcendent, even within his 
immanent self-disclosure. Is this, however, a paradox? At first glance, it seems as if there 
is no actual paradox. I can, for example, know certain things about a friend without 
possessing an entirely comprehensive knowledge of that person. Surely, the same might 
be true of our relationship with God? We can know him in certain ways comprehensible 
to us, the attributes he has chosen to make known, whilst still accepting that other 
characteristics belong to a supremely transcendent nature. This appears to accord with St 
Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, in which he tells them: ‘for now we see in a mirror dimly, 
but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully’.36 It seems therefore 
that there is no need to apply the term paradox in this situation, as it is clear that the 
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current condition of man’s knowledge of the divine is limited to some extent. This 
conclusion does not breach the law of non-contradiction since it accepts that God is in 
part immanently knowable and in part uniquely transcendent.  
However, Paul complicates his own statement in the very same letter by 
describing a supreme unity between the believer and God’s inmost Spirit. He writes:  
these things God has revealed to us through the Spirit. For the Spirit searches 
everything even the depths of God. For who knows a person’s thoughts except the 
spirit of that person, which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of 
God except the spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the word, but 
the Spirit who is from God, that we might understand the things freely given us by 
God. And we impart this in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the 
Spirit […] we have the mind of Christ.37  
 
Here, Paul presents knowledge of God as a union with the ‘mind of Christ’ and the 
Spirit of God, which is God himself. Paul believes Christians inherit this Spirit of 
true comprehension, albeit subject to the limitations of the finite mind, which 
presents us with a very different reality to the previous description of seeing through 
the mirror dimly. What can we make of this? One possibility is that Paul is mistaken 
in one or both of the accounts. Another option though is that taken together they 
point towards a reality, which individually they are inadequate to express. This of 
course is the logic of paradox. Paul seems to be holding in tension two opposing 
ideas, neither of which Christian teaching appears willing to relinquish. 
 These twin aspects emerge later as a split between Eastern and Western 
traditions—of which Aquinas and Palamas may be taken as respective 
representatives—although both traditions reveal a paradoxical core at the centre of 
the question of God’s knowability. Thus, Aquinas teaches that although man’s 
knowledge of God is limited, through grace humanity can be raised to an intellectual 
vision of the divine essence itself, whereas Palamas corresponding to a traditionally 
Eastern approach—conceives of supreme unknowability as an exclusive property of 
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divinity. As we shall see below, Palamas believes that we can participate in and 
know God through his energies (the outward expression of his internal essence), 
whilst upholding an impenetrable barrier between God’s infinite essence and man’s 
finite comprehension.   
 Both perspectives teach that knowledge of God in some sense or of some kind is 
possible. Let us consider the differences in more detail in order to ascertain how the 
accounts differ, why there is a paradoxical tension in uniting them, and if this act of 
unification is a necessary one. At this stage, I am concerned solely with Christianity’s 
presentation of how God is known by man, I do not seek to promote one perspective 
above the other, merely to explore whether it is essential for an accurate depiction of 
Christian theology to uphold an element of its paradoxical character. 
 
a) Aquinas: Graced Intellect 
Whoever has seen me has seen the Father 
John 14:9 
 
‘It must be absolutely granted’, states Aquinas, ‘that the blessed see the essence of 
God’.38 In order to understand Aquinas’ position, we must begin, as he does, from 
Augustine’s premise that ‘God is truly and absolutely simple’.39 Aquinas develops the 
doctrine of simplicity to emphasise that God’s properties are identical with who he is. So, 
for example, God does not merely have love, but he is love. As a consequence of this 
belief, Aquinas observes, ‘His nature does not differ from His “suppositum”; nor His 
essence from His existence […] Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is 
altogether simple’.40 The corollary of this proposal is that man cannot think of God in 
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part, as God is not composed of parts. In God, all attributes are united because he is 
simple. This implies that to posit God at all is to posit God entirely, and as man has a 
composite nature and discursive reason, it would seem that it is impossible for him to 
comprehend infinite simplicity. The problem as presented by Aquinas seems to be that if 
God cannot be known in his essence, he cannot be known at all because his essence is his 
existence. Aquinas thus acknowledges ‘it is impossible for any created intellect to see the 
essence of God by its own natural power’,41 though he proceeds to suggest that ‘to see the 
essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace’.42 
According to the Thomist emphasis, then, it is accurate to state that man can 
know God’s essential nature if God grants an individual the gift of graced intelligibility. 
An important aspect of Aquinas’ description is that unintelligibility in relation to the 
divine is to do with the inborn fallen capacity of man’s intellect, rather than any 
inscrutability within God’s nature. Fundamentally, Aquinas insists, ‘Since everything is 
knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of 
potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable’.43  
 
b) Palamas: Essential Inaccessibility 
 No one has ever seen God  
John 1: 18 
 
Palamas distinguishes between God’s energies and his essence and believes it is possible 
to establish certain positive predicates of God’s essential being whilst insisting that these 
predicates stem from God’s energies and not the divine essence itself. ‘The Holy Fathers,’ 
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he writes, ‘affirm unanimously that it is impossible to find a name to manifest the nature 
of the uncreated Trinity, but that the names belong to the energies’.44 Palamas, like 
Aquinas, is cautious to retain God’s integral unity by explaining that ‘God complete is 
present in each of the divine energies’,45 but unlike Aquinas, he insists that unknowability 
is an indissoluble property of divine nature. This creates a somewhat paradoxical 
expression: ‘God is entirely present in each of the divine energies […] although it is clear 
that He transcends all of them’.46  
 Palamas seems to be insisting that God’s energies both manifest and preserve his 
unknowable essence. He tells us that God is both beyond his creation and intimately 
accessible through it. Palamas’ theory of knowledge of the divine combines concealment 
with disclosure, insisting that God’s essence is unknowable, but is nonetheless directly 
experienced through his energies. Like Aquinas, Palamas believes the experience of God 
is related to an individual’s state of grace. 
 To summarise: Aquinas stipulates that if God is known, he is known in his essential 
simplicity, whilst maintaining that humanity lacks the noetic faculty to comprehend God, 
hence the necessary elevation of the intellect through grace. Palamas on the other hand 
states that God can give himself to be known in some sense via his energies, whilst 
remaining eminently transcendent. Put simply and formulated according to the principal 
of non-contradiction, Aquinas states ‘we think of God and yet we cannot think of God’. 
Palamas, however, proposes ‘we can think of God and yet God cannot be thought of’. 
The first is an epistemological problem concerned with how man relates to God (since 
through the grace of God in revelation, man is able to comprehend the incomprehensible). 
The second is concerned with the category of revelation, according to which Palamas 
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maintains God is both within his self-disclosure and yet remains distinct from it. We may 
identify the underlying continuity of these views with reference to a third perspective. 
 
c) Denys: Beyond Unknowing 
 
Both Aquinas and Palamas are concerned with the question of knowability—how can we 
comprehend an ineffable God? Denys approaches the question by asking the reverse—
how can we not comprehend God? He writes, ‘[t]here is nothing in the world without a 
share in the Beautiful and the Good’.47 This is a reflection of Paul’s assertion that 
‘[God’s] invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature have been 
clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. 
So men are without excuse’.48 Denys seems to celebrate the paradoxical dynamism of 
knowledge of God. He writes: ‘it says of the One who is present in all things and who 
may be discovered from all things that he is ungraspable and inscrutable’.49 This claim is 
based on a latter part of the same Pauline epistle in which its author professes: ‘Oh, the 
depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his 
judgments and how inscrutable his ways!’50   
In identifying God as a being ‘who may be discovered from all things’ and who 
yet remains ‘inscrutable’, Denys affirms, like Aquinas, the division between God’s 
simple being and human discursive understanding while maintaining a Palamite emphasis 
of kataphatic self-disclosure through cosmic expressions. This is why Denys praises God 
in the tongue of paradox proclaiming him the source of all, as every name and yet above 
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any name and as the nameless one.51 This suggests that from a Christian perspective it is 
proper, and indeed praiseworthy, that God cannot be known and cannot not be known. 
 We began by identifying the logical problem present in a Christian account of 
knowledge of God and it is this: God gives himself to be known and yet he remains 
simultaneously unknown. We described how the gap between created things and their 
creator both is and is not absolute; it is traversed both ‘positively’ according to Aquinas 
and ‘negatively’ by Palamas. Important to both is the unique combination of presence and 
eminence which reveals a God who is ‘not only beyond all affirmations but all negations 
too’.52 
 Thus, we are left in an orthodox theological space—whether that orthodoxy is 
defined from an Eastern or Western point of view—and yet it is also a space that troubles 
the law of non-contradiction, for although Christians believe that ‘God is beyond 
understanding and reason’, they simultaneously maintain that he is ‘beyond every 
denial’.53 It seems in this instance that Christianity accepts the contravention of the law of 
non-contradiction as the most accurate way of describing reality in order to allow for ‘the 
paradoxical coincidence of God’s transcendence and immanence’.54  The theologians 
discussed in this section seem to praise mystery and paradox as the commendable attempt 
to speak of God and the joyous inevitability of falling short of supreme clarity, as if the 
partial is itself a proper expression of divine majesty. A paradoxical account of 
knowledge of God—which advertises a conceptual inadequacy in pointing towards a 
complex reality—therefore seems to be both more workable and a more accurate 
reflection of that which is the case (in spite of its contradictions) than a purely ‘rational’ 
resolution.  
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iv) Incarnation: divine and human 
 
The logical conflict involved in the doctrine of the Incarnation pertains to the belief that 
Christ exists as a single hypostasis with two natures, which are united and yet remain 
distinct. The definition agreed on at Chalcedon states the following: ‘we all with one 
accord teach men to acknowledge one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, at once 
complete in Godhead and complete in manhood, truly God and truly man’.55 An inherent 
property of being human is not to be divine and the same would seem to be true of the 
reverse. Framing the point as a matter of logic, Aristotle has informed us ‘it is not 
possible that it should be simultaneously true to say that the same thing is a man and is 
not a man’.56 Yet this appears to be the affirmation of Chalcedon. Christ is properly a man 
insofar as he is fully human and he is by definition not a man because he is fully divine. 
The breach with the law of non-contradiction is explicit, as one contemporary philosopher 
summarises: ‘This is called the Absolute Paradox at which Reason can only stand 
appalled’.57  
How can we even begin a rational discussion of what seems such a rationally 
indefensible idea? Michael Goulder expresses the view that, ‘Paradoxes are a sign that we 
have to stop thinking anthropomorphically; and they are a tool for thinking theologically 
about the one who cannot be comprehended with clear-cut univocal terms’.58 It is clear 
that in discussing the Incarnation we are trying to overcome some of the limits of 
univocal expression by contemplating one being who is ‘truly God and truly man’. We 
need to find some manner of simultaneous identification, as it is the simultaneity of both 
God and man that seems to be central to any discussion of the Incarnation. In seeking a 
departure from ‘clear-cut univocal terms’ perhaps an artistic depiction could prove 
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helpful, since visual expression may have the potential to outwit the sequential tendencies 
of language by juxtaposing images in a single frame and thus preserving the call within 
Christian theology to have things ‘both ways’.  Jeremy Begbie has pointed out how music 
provides a useful analogy for the Incarnation in the way that two notes can 
simultaneously occupy the same space and interpenetrate each other without losing or 
altering their identity: ‘we are reminded that we are not dealing with two realities vying 
for the same space, but with God interacting with the world intimately, without violating 
it or merging with it, liberating it to be more fully itself’.59 Similarly, an appeal to artistic 
interpretations of the Incarnation might assist the attempt to find out whether what 
appears prima facie as a logical contradiction is actually as paradoxical as it seems. 
It may not be immediately obvious that the ruling of Chalcedon represents the 
best possible description of the Incarnation, and this has been evidenced by the many 
‘heresies’ within the history of Christianity that seek to avoid encountering paradox in the 
person of Christ. Arianism, for example, denies Christ’s full divinity claiming that God 
the Father created Christ his human son, who was not previously existent. We can see in 
Tristán de Escamilla’s painting, ‘The Adoration of the Shepherds’,60 that Christ has the 
potential to be mistaken for an Arian portrayal. In particular, the exposure of Christ’s 
genitalia twinned with Mary’s maternal attitude acts to emphasise his humanity. 
Additionally, there is a clear depiction of God the Father, with a banner proclaiming his 
majesty, but the light from heaven is dispersed by the time it reaches the child in the 
manger and we are left with a God in heaven and a baby on earth, but no definite link 
between them. This illustrates the underlying problem of Arianism, since Christ is not 
identified as a true member of the Trinity; he is neither co-eternal nor co-equal with the 
Father, which therefore shatters God’s triunity. 
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 The heresy of Docetism, conversely, holds that Christ was human in form, but his 
nature was solely divine. During the fourth century, Apollinarius of Laodicea (c. 310-
c.390) argued that Christ had neither a human mind nor soul. This became known as the 
heresy of Apollinarianism and was ruled as heterodox by the Council of Constantinople 
in 381. Geertgen tot Sint Jans’ painting ‘The Nativity at Night’61 could be considered as 
the presentation of a Docetic Christ, who lacks true identification with humanity. In this 
case, the Christ-child appears alone in the centre detached from any physical affection. 
This gives him an unearthly appearance, which makes it difficult to recognise him as the 
Son of Man. Mary does not assume a maternal or nurturing pose (as we see with Tristán) 
but an attitude of worship. This makes the crib symbolic of an altar with the angels 
surrounding it adopting a similar pose. Notably, the front of the crib is left open inviting 
the viewer to approach the picture in a likewise reverent manner. Geertgen thus shows us 
a picture of God on earth who does not appear incognito as the Son. The solemnity of 
Mary, twinned with equally sombre angels, identifies Jesus as God’s son but not Mary’s. 
It is this lack of unity which is problematic in the Docetic heresy.  
 Nestorianism entails a different divisive heresy in the claim that Christ existed as 
two separate persons, not as a single unified hypostasis. The antithesis of Nestorianism is 
the heresy of Eutychianism, which mingles the two natures of Christ to the extent of 
claiming that Christ is a single subsistence with one nature. Although the various 
deviations from Chalcedon outlined above are considered heterodox, they reveal that the 
paradoxical status of the Incarnation is not always accepted. Today, the more common 
challenge Christians face is the inadvertent slipping into heretical patterns of thought by 
over-emphasising one or other of Christ’s twin natures. 
The significance of the decision reached by Chalcedon is of great importance for 
the doctrine of Salvation, which asserts that only a man could be the sacrificial substitute 
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for the sin of man whilst also insisting that only God could be the perfect unblemished 
sacrifice to reconcile a fallen world. By asserting that Christ is fully God and fully man, 
Christianity is able to state that Christ alone is distinctive in his enhypostatic existence, 
and as a sinless being is unique in his salvific capacity, and yet as man he is able to take 
the place of everyman. Let us examine these two poles further to determine why Christian 
teaching seems to require such an oxymoronic conjunction. 
 
a) Only God could be the perfect, sinless sacrifice for sin. 
And being made perfect he became the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him. 
Hebrews 5:9 
 
The author of Hebrews locates the all-sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice in his divinity: ‘For 
Christ has entered […] into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God on our 
behalf’.62 Here it is clear that Christ’s offering as a sacrifice for the sin of man is of 
another order to the sacrifices made by the high priests in the earthly tabernacle; Christ 
presents himself on the divine altar as a divine sacrifice. Karl Barth stipulates that the 
world needed to be redeemed by God, for God, and therefore agrees that only a divine 
sacrifice could be sufficient. Barth relatedly proposes that the one sent must also be the 
sender: one essence, in a triune mode. He writes: ‘His divine unity consists in the fact that 
in Himself He is both the one who is obeyed and Another who obeys’.63 By maintaining 
the importance of ‘divine unity’, Barth tells us that Christ is fully divine and in full unison 
with the divine essence. 
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b) Only man could be the penal substitute for everyman. 
But when the fullness of time had come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under 
the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons. 
 
Galatians 4:4-5 
 
The acceptance that Jesus Christ is fully divine begs an important question concerning 
how divinity can ‘stand in’ for humanity. Logic would appear to dictate that if it is man 
who has fallen then it must be man who atones. The author who describes Christ as ‘the 
exact imprint’64 of divine nature also stipulates that ‘he had to be made like his brothers in 
every respect, so that he might […] make propitiation for the sins of the people’.65 
Propitiation here designates a satisfactory sacrifice, effecting atonement on behalf of the 
one(s) for whom the sacrifice was made. On this point, Paul is clear: ‘For as by the one 
man’s disobedience the many were made sinners, so by the one man’s obedience the 
many will be made righteous’.66 In order for Christ’s propitiation to be redemptive for 
humanity, his mode as man must not simply be an appearance, but a full participation in 
the essence of ‘man-ness’. The apostles are told in the book of Acts ‘this Jesus, who was 
taken up from you into heaven, will come in the same way as you saw him go into 
heaven’.67 In other words, Christians believe that Christ will retain his humanity even 
after his ascension, in perpetuity. Hence, insofar as Christ is man, his human mode is the 
manifestation of his soteriological mission presently, historically and eternally. 
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c) The supreme mediator 
For there is one God, and there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ 
Jesus. 
 
1 Timothy 2:5  
 
Something of the careful balancing of the above two poles can be seen in Guido Reni’s 
painting, ‘The Adoration of the Shepherds’.68 Reni depicts light spilling from heaven, 
which illuminates and enhances earth. This portrayal seems to merge the divinity of 
Geertgen’s painting with the humanity of Tristán’s. On the one hand, Reni’s shepherds 
are gathered around the child, cradled by his mother. In this sense, the observer can relate 
to Christ as the Son of Man. Yet, at the same time, the child is illumined by celestial light 
from above. The stable is otherwise dark (unlike Trisatán’s stable where the divine light 
is almost superfluous to the brightness of the painting), which gives the luminescent child 
a sense of the other-worldly. Reni thus effectively communicates Christ’s divine presence 
and his human status by depicting the tension between Christ’s manhood and his divinity 
in a single frame. 
R. T. Herbert preserves the paradoxical status of the Incarnation in his reflection 
upon the logical unintelligibility of the doctrine with reference to Kierkegaard’s 
employment of the term ‘God-man’. He concludes, ‘whether it was written inadvertently 
in confusion or intentionally in moments of great clarity is here a question that need not 
concern us [...] the idea is absurd; it does involve contradiction; it is a breach with all 
thinking; it is unintelligible’.69 The ‘breach with all thinking’ is the proclamation that 
Christ has, in the words of Anselm, ‘assumed a human being into the unity of his person, 
so that the two natures, namely, the divine and the human, are one person’.70 These two 
natures, according to the Chalcedonian definition are fully united and remain fully 
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distinct, a single subsistence existent both in time and not in time, dying whilst never-
ceasing.  
So we are left once again with a proposition that appears to carry us ‘beyond and 
above the light of the law and reason’: one plus one equals one (and two). From a secular 
perspective, it would seem that man cannot meaningfully engage with such an absurd 
concept. Yet Christianity claims not to promote a fantasy of hypostatic insanity but 
instead regards the dual natures of Christ as a necessity for entering into a salvific 
relationship with God. And the paradoxical formulation of the doctrine of the Incarnation 
seems to be the most precise and perhaps even the only way of holding onto all aspects of 
this complex reality. The Chalcedonian definition is therefore not a matter of mere 
rhetoric, but a meaningful and indispensable articulation of orthodox Christian teaching, 
by virtue and not in spite of its non-compliance with the law of non-contradiction. 
 
v)  Trinity: plurality and unity 
 
The doctrine of the Trinity is, from a purely rational perspective, one of the most overtly 
baffling beliefs of the Christian religion. The central problem is that the doctrine defies 
the logical principle that something numerically one cannot also be numerically three. 
The Athanasian Creed states: ‘the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is 
God; and yet they are not three Gods, but one God’.71 The Creed seems to affirm the 
impossible that one God is contained in three separate hypostases, which are permanently 
interwoven and uniquely distinct: ‘neither confounding the persons nor dividing the 
substance’.72 At the heart of triune being, according to the Creed, is the co-existence of 
unity and distinction, where the unity is without uniformity and the distinctions exist 
without division. 
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We need first to establish if it is vital for Christian faith that the believer 
subscribes to the rigid Athanasian description of the Trinity. It is not immediately clear 
that strict adherence is necessary, particularly since there is no explicit reference to ‘the 
Trinity’ within Scripture.73 As such, the paradoxical account of three persons united in 
one substance was deeply contested in the early church, chiefly by Sabellius (c. early 3rd 
Century) and Arius (c. 256-336). Sabellius offered a resolution to the conflict by 
describing the Father, Son and Spirit as different appearances or manifestations of one 
deity. Sabellius sought to stress God’s supreme singularity, and did so by denying his 
diversity. This departs from the Athanasian account because it denies the permanent 
embodiment of these expressions. The Creed, however, requires the belief that the Father, 
Son and Spirit are eternal incarnations and not merely historical appearances. 
An alternative divergence from the Athanasian Creed that also avoids a 
paradoxical understanding of the Trinity is the denial of divine homoousios (one 
substance) and the description of God as homoiousios (like substance). This is the 
position of Arianism. Allison FitzSimons explains: ‘He [Arius] thought that the unity of 
God could be preserved only by excluding all distinctions from within the divine nature, 
making Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit into two inferior deities’.74 Arianism seems on 
the one hand to make sense of certain biblical passages that testify to a hierarchy within 
the godhead, for example, Christ’s admission: ‘the Father is greater than I’.75 But 
Arianism encounters a problem with conflicting statements such as Christ’s testimony 
that ‘I and the Father are one’.76 A further attempt to dissolve the apparent logical 
contradiction of the Trinity is the account of Tritheism, which overemphasises the 
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distinction between the persons of the Trinity to the point of espousing a belief in three 
separate deities. 
However, Richard of St Victor (1112-1173) maintained that a paradoxical view of 
the Triune God is a matter of the utmost theological significance, even though the internal 
coherence of the Trinity goes beyond human comprehension. Perhaps the foremost reason 
why Richard affirms the importance of the Athanasian account of the Trinity concerns his 
emphasis on the perfection of divine love. He believes that ‘sharing of love cannot exist 
among any less than three persons’, concluding therefore ‘in Divinity it is impossible for 
two persons not to be united to a third’.77 The vital tensions of this paradox outlined by 
Richard are unity and plurality,78 which will be explored individually to establish whether 
the paradoxical character of the Trinity is a necessary, accidental or merely apparent 
feature of the Christian doctrine. 
 
a) Unity of Substance  
But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is all one, the glory 
equal, the majesty coeternal. 
 
Athanasian Creed 
 
 
Richard describes the importance of expressing true unity of substance within the Trinity 
as ‘the overwhelming indivisibility of that oneness of God within which all things are 
banded together as one in the possession of a transcendent unity’.79 A ‘transcendent unity’ 
in Richard’s account affirms, in line with the Creed, that the persons of the Trinity are co-
equal, co-eternal and in essence identical. He writes, ‘Not only is what each person is 
completely the same; but each one is what each other is. And so, supreme simplicity is in 
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each; true and supreme unity is in all together’.80 Richard’s view of co-equality at the 
transcendental level consists in identicality. At a human level co-equality equates to 
mutual similitude, but not necessarily identicality. Yet at the divine level if equality does 
not amount to sameness then, as Richard demonstrates, equality cannot be correctly 
applied, since their perfection requires a symmetry of pre-eminence. 
A similar argument applies to the assertion of co-eternality: the triune attribute of 
eternity must be identical as eternality has no degrees. As Richard affirms, ‘[t]here no one 
is greater than another, no one is less than another; there no one is before another; no one 
is after another’.81 Further, since Christianity holds that God is immutable, it is 
fundamental for Richard to emphasise that the divine persons exist co-eternally, as there 
is ‘no variation or shadow due to change’82 in the triune God. There is nothing in the 
assertion of God’s unity of substance that is by itself strikingly paradoxical, but we must 
now turn to the other side of the tension, the plurality of persons in the Trinity, whilst 
keeping in mind the necessity of his unity. 
 
b) Plurality of Persons 
For there is one person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Spirit. 
 
Athanasian Creed 
 
 
Richard balances his account of absolute unity by also affirming in imperative terms the 
true plurality of God. He starts from the premise that God is supreme perfection and 
supreme goodness and then claims that charity is a necessary part of goodness and 
therefore infers that God is fully charitable. Supreme charity for Richard is contingent 
upon the presence of reciprocal and co-equal persons on whom to bestow charity, and 
from whom to receive. Richard asserts that God’s aseity is such that he cannot rely on 
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created beings to respond to divine charity, since this situates the divine nature in 
potentiality, relying on created beings to articulate his fullness. As a result, Richard 
contends, there must be a plurality of persons, who are equal in majesty and eternally 
distinct in order to partake in infinite, supreme charity.  
Richard’s account of the Trinity thus confirms the utter oneness of a thing that is 
numerically plural. To accept both poles of this statement is a logical paradox because the 
two premises held together contradict each other. Allison phrases the paradox of the 
Trinity as a question to which he can give no rational answer: ‘it is clear that the New 
Testament teaches nothing of three gods, it is equally clear that there are significant 
distinctions between Father, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit. They are distinct, they are 
related, they are one. How can this be so?’83  Despite the fact that the coherence of the 
immanent Trinity surpasses human comprehension, Allison and Richard both agree with 
the Creed that both the utter unity and complete diversity of God is a necessary paradox. 
Although, as we have noted, the particular word ‘Trinity’ is not a biblical 
expression, there are, however, numerous examples affirming both unity and diversity 
within Scripture. When asked what is the most important commandment Christ answers: 
‘Hear O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one’.84 This is held in tension with the 
designation of Christ himself as ‘Lord’ and ‘God’.85 In ‘The Great Commission’ Christ 
testifies to the union and the diversity of the Trinity by instructing the apostles to ‘make 
disciples of the nations baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the 
Holy Spirit’.86 What is significant here is that Christ refers to the ‘name’ of the three 
persons as a singular appellation. These three distinctions are elsewhere shown to be 
eternally existent, as Christ claims that the Father loved him ‘before the foundation of the 
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world’87 and that there was (and is) a mutual indwelling and relationship between the 
Father and the Son prior to the existence of creation.88 This suggests that Sabellianism 
and Arianism are not wholly satisfactory representations of Christian belief. 
Karl Rahner writes that ‘the Dogma of the Trinity is an absolute mystery which 
we do not understand even after it has been revealed’.89 Richard suggests that although 
we cannot understand the mystery of the Trinity, we can know (through grace) that the 
Trinity is a mysterious unity of plurality. He believes that spiritual encounters enable 
humanity to sense the immanent Trinity and that Scripture facilitates participation in the 
economic Trinity. Richard insists upon upholding the paradoxical components of the 
Creed because to dispense with either God’s unity or his plurality lessens the supremacy 
of his love.  
In his use of paradox, Richard is presenting what he sees as the best description of 
reality. He does not seem to be putting forward a logical paradox in order to confuse or 
mystify, but because without it he believes we lose the full understanding of divine love. 
In the introduction to Richard’s works, Grover Zinn explores the idea that if true trinity is 
abandoned then love in its purest sense and most perfect sense is no longer a 
characteristic we can attribute to God. Echoing Richard’s imperative language Zinn 
writes: ‘in reflecting on the nature of divine perfection and the presence of charity, he 
[Richard] shows that not only are two persons necessary for love, but three are necessary 
for the fullest of all loves, charity’.90  
To conclude: Richard represents the view of orthodox Christianity when he 
outlines the Trinity: ‘individuality in persons and unity in substance and equality in 
majesty’.91 The account of God’s triunity expressed by Richard and the Athanasian Creed 
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thus appears to be a precise and necessary description, although it is paradoxical and to a 
certain degree unintelligible. Zinn agrees that Richard’s account of the Trinity is in many 
ways an ‘unreasonable’ doctrine, explaining ‘there is an absence of any proof from 
experience or an a priori demonstration by reasoning; it is also the case that once known, 
the Trinity is not something that is “reasonable”’.92 However, perhaps the expression 
‘God is love’ helps to explain why Christianity insists on holding onto a paradoxical that 
defies the boundaries of rational discourse. To maintain that love is who God is and not 
merely an attribute contingent upon creation requires, as we have seen, the belief in a true 
diversity of persons within supreme singularity. Hence, for believers, the significance of 
the paradoxical status of the Trinity is that it allows Christians to describe God as the one, 
true, Supreme Being without diminishing the perfection of his love.  
 
 
vi) The Will of Man: bound and free 
 
The conflict surrounding the Christian description of the will revolves around the 
insistence that salvation rests upon man’s autonomous choice to follow God and the 
simultaneous teaching that this ‘choice’ is fully reliant on God’s grace. On the one hand, 
the Bible indicates that justification is ‘through faith […] for all who believe’,93 whilst on 
the other hand it makes clear that salvation is achieved solely ‘by grace [which] is not 
your own doing; it is the gift of God’.94 A logical problem arises from the conflicting 
descriptions of the status of the will prior to salvation: man is both captive by sin95 and 
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dead in his transgressions96 but is somehow required actively to repent and turn away97 
from the deadness and imprisonment that is his own antecedent nature. 
In considering whether the foregoing conflict is in fact a paradox—rather than a 
contradiction arising from the deficiency of language—I shall appeal to a range of 
poetical works, alongside theoretical explanations, that attempt an articulation of the 
struggle between autonomy and grace, and autonomy and sin. This is once again because 
art is perhaps better equipped to signify ‘impossible’ combinations than propositional 
discourse, since it is not bound by the constraints of logic, but is instead free to speak 
ambiguously and polysemously. Poetry may therefore signify a state that seems both 
inconsistent and true without needing to justify rationally how or why this is the case.  
As in previous sections, in order to test the validity of my contention—that central 
tenets of Christian doctrine involve real and not merely apparent paradox—I shall begin 
by considering the ‘sed contra’—in this case, the possibility that there is no paradoxical 
dimension to the Christian conception of the will as argued by, for example, Calvin, who 
would not recognise the tensions of this paradox. Although we must of course allow for 
confessional differences, as a general principle Calvinism suggests that to maintain a 
concept of radical free will is to deny God’s omniscience, since it considers that God’s 
supreme foreknowledge limits the potentiality of human choice. Calvin writes: ‘[God] 
foresees future events only by reason of the fact that he decreed that they take place’.98 
Within Calvin’s account of soteriology, there is no real paradox between human willing 
and divine grace, since the believer who seeks God’s grace is already pre-destined to do 
so; likewise, those who choose to sin are not in that moment free to choose, but are 
determined to turn away from God. 
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In contrast to Calvin’s position, Augustine holds that God’s foreknowledge does 
not force the future to happen.99 Rather, his foreknowledge perfectly reflects and initiates 
the causal order in which human wills operate freely. And yet there is still a sense in 
which God’s involvement in the world initiates the created order and also brings about all 
second-order, or intra-creational causes. Hence, Christianity appears to be claiming that 
divine causation and human causation paradoxically coincide; God can—
incomprehensibly—cause man’s free actions and yet allow them to remain entirely 
volitional. 
Augustine argued against seeking a ‘solution’ to this contradiction by refusing to 
enter into what he believed was Cicero’s false dichotomy: ‘He [Cicero] constrains the 
religious soul to this dilemma, forcing it to choose between two propositions: either there 
is some scope for our will, or there is foreknowledge. He thinks that both cannot be true; 
to affirm one is to deny the other. If we choose foreknowledge, free will is annihilated; if 
we choose free will, prescience is abolished’.100 Anselm supported Augustine’s embrace 
of the co-existence of both poles and described the will of man as ‘both slave and free’.101 
He explains: ‘because it cannot return from sin, it is a slave; because it cannot be robbed 
of rectitude it is free’.102 We can now discern the poles that constitute the paradox of 
man’s will: on the one hand, his freedom to turn to God and the grace which compels 
him; and on the other his freedom to turn away from God and the sin that binds him. The 
central questions to be asked are: to what extent is man responsible for his own salvation? 
And is sin ever a choice? 
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a)  Turning to God 
Man shall not quite be lost, but sav'd who will, 
Yet not of will in him, but grace in me. 103 
 
As Milton’s God announces, a tension exists between the fallen nature of man and the 
Christian account of salvation, which considers man’s free will as imperative in order to 
turn from his sinful nature to receive God’s grace. The quotation tells us that only he who 
wills shall be saved, but emphasises the necessity and perhaps the primacy of God’s 
grace. It is the moment of turning that seems to be paradoxical, since relationship with 
God is an apparently autonomous decision, yet it is only desired and further, only made 
possible, through God’s prevenient grace. Anselm describes the logical problem of the 
Christian account of salvation: ‘no one preserves this received uprightness without 
willing it. But no one can will it without having it. And no one can have it at all accept by 
grace’.104 ‘The question arises’, Anselm acknowledges, ‘from the fact that the Bible 
speaks at times as if that grace alone seems to avail for salvation and free choice not at 
all, but at other times as though our salvation entirely depends on free choice’.105 
Repentance (μετανοέω) means to change one’s mind, to turn actively away from, 
and this, it would seem, requires a re-orientation of the will. Repent is an active verb 
suggesting that the individual is not being acted upon from without, but is internally 
motivated: ‘Repent therefore, and turn again, that your sins may be blotted out’.106 Here 
Peter’s address demands action on behalf of the listeners. Paul’s letter to the Romans 
likewise insists that righteousness comes ‘through faith in Jesus Christ for all who 
believe’.107 As with Milton’s God, Paul recognizes that man is ‘sav’d who will’, thus 
making it clear that man is responsible for his own salvation. 
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 Whilst there is clarity in the plain assertion that metanoia is contingent on the will 
of the individual, we cannot ignore the second half of Milton’s couplet: ‘Yet not of will in 
him, but grace in me’. This begs the question—is the Christian concept of grace 
incompatible with free will? ‘For by grace you have been saved’, Paul writes to the 
Ephesians, ‘And this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God’.108 This would seem to 
suggest that God’s role in salvation is sovereign and that man is fully reliant on his grace. 
The idea of salvation as a gift is a recurrent description in the Bible and carries the 
implicit connotation that the will of man is the latent recipient of divine graciousness, 
rather than an active, enabling force. The real force or the catalyst of salvific action is 
Christ, who acts on behalf of mankind. Paul tells the Romans, ‘all have sinned and fall 
short of the glory of God, and are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption 
that is in Christ Jesus’.109 In this quotation we can identify God as the instigator and gift-
giver, Christ as the catalyst, and man as the recipient. Again, there is internal coherence 
within this description if we leave aside the earlier evidence that Christianity preaches the 
significance of personal choice. 
Yet, to add a further complication, we need to take account of Paul’s observation 
that ‘all have sinned’ and as a result depend on God’s gift of grace to save man from 
himself. R. A. Markus, commenting on Augustinian theology, describes the post-
lapsarian condition as ‘a massa damnationis from which no one can escape save by the 
divine gift of grace that cannot be requested’.110 Markus appears to imply that man’s free 
will is not free outside of relationship with God. The notion that sin might work against 
man’s freedom creates an additional conundrum: do we sin volitionally or are we 
determined by our fallen impulses? 
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b) Turning away from God 
Oh wearisome condition of Humanity! 
Borne under one Law, to another bound: 
Vainely begot, and yet forbidden vanity, 
Created sicke, commanded to be sound. 111  
 
Brooke’s lament at the seemingly impossible situation of humanity articulates the 
confusion over the role of man’s will in turning away from God, or in ‘choosing’ to sin. 
He describes the Fall as being born under the law of sin, of being bound to its disposition 
by inheritance, an idea that is given particular emphasis by using the poetic form. The 
rhyme scheme Brooke employs acts to impress his theological concern upon the reader; 
the link between ‘humanity’ and its innate condition of ‘vanity’ is uniquely brought to the 
surface in this poem as the rhyme and meter enhance the relationship between the two 
words. Augustine writes on a similar theme: ‘even when we do see what is right and will 
to do it, we cannot do it because of the unruliness of our mortal inheritance’,112 thus 
indicating that cupiditas operates apart from the will and corrupts the decision to strive 
for what is pure. However, this same unruliness, according to Anselm, is itself the 
product of radical human freedom. ‘The human race’, he writes, ‘fell into this 
helplessness precisely because it freely abandoned the state of justice’.113 Hence, there 
seems to be a contradiction developing: through our free will we sin, and through sin we 
forfeit our free will. 
In certain parts of the Bible one can find definite evidence to support the contention 
that man is not enslaved by sin, and his free will enables him to turn away from iniquity. 
Paul, for example, warns the Galatians, ‘do not use your freedom as an opportunity for 
the flesh’,114 which suggests that sin is a choice. Augustine likewise proposes that man’s 
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fallen nature and his subsequent inordinate desire testifies that the will is indeed free. He 
writes: ‘Only its own will and free choice can make the mind a companion of cupidity’.115 
Augustine lists lust, greed and anger as examples of inordinate desires; man can be said to 
be acting out of cupidity when he surrenders to these impulses. One could suggest that 
these are external determining factors, corrupting the rational mind from outside. 
Augustine counters this attack on human autonomy though, arguing, ‘nothing can make 
the mind a slave to inordinate desire except its own will’,116 endorsing the belief that man 
has a real choice to seek what is good or to embrace his cupidity. How, then, do we 
respond to the following passage? 
 And you were dead in the trespasses and sins in which you once walked, following 
the course of this world, following the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that 
is now at work in the sons of disobedience—among whom we all once lived in the 
passions of our flesh, carrying out the desires of the body and the mind, and were by 
nature children of wrath, like the rest of mankind. But God, being rich in mercy, 
because of the great love with which he loved us, even when we were dead in our 
trespasses, made us alive together with Christ—by grace you have been saved.117 
 
The problem seems to be that there is no motivation prior to the receipt of grace for man 
to turn towards God and away from the course of the world. If it is the case that outside of 
salvation man is in submission to a ‘yoke of slavery’118 and held ‘captive’119 by ‘the law 
of sin and death’,120 how is it that he is free to choose to contradict his own ‘sicke’ nature 
and turn to God? Again we find an unlikely dual emphasis that on the one hand man has 
the opportunity to choose to follow God,121 and on the other hand that man is chosen by 
God to be his follower.122 Man is somehow required to choose to follow God’s path when 
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he is already on another course, a choice that God has predestined but from which man 
can turn away. 
It is not enough simply to conclude that free choice often coexists and co-operates 
with grace. Nor is soteriology purely linear in the sense that man, using first his will must 
turn to God, who only then pours out his grace. Instead, it seems necessary for 
Christianity to affirm that both free will and grace co-exist within the nature of man, and 
although there is an element of contrary logic in the suggestion that fallen man, with 
inordinate intent would desire grace, before knowing grace, this contradiction seems 
indispensable. Anselm remains emphatic that ‘grace always aids one’s innate free 
choice’.123 Here, Anselm understands grace as both the path to and the destination of 
relationship with God.  
John Donne’s ‘Holy Sonnet’ contains strong language of contradiction and 
rapture, conveying the sensation that true freedom is born of a sort of divine ‘bondage’: 
‘Take me to you, imprison mee, for I / Except you’enthrall mee, never shall be free, / Nor 
ever chast, except you ravish mee’.124 The Bible testifies to this paradoxical sentiment. 
Paul, for example, speaks of being ‘set free from sin, [to] become slaves of 
righteousness’,125 and declares he is ‘going to Jerusalem, constrained by the Spirit’.126 
This use of the verb ‘constrained’—(deõ) meaning ‘to bind, tie or constrain’—is similar 
in its overtones to Donne’s experience of rapture, a baffling freedom in chains through 
God’s grace that is resistible and ineluctable. It would seem, then, that the Christian 
understanding of man’s will as at once both bound and free is indeed a paradox, in which 
man freely wills what his fallen nature prevents.  
To summarise our discussion, we have witnessed two paradoxes that emerge in a 
faithful examination of Christian teachings on the will. Firstly, we noted how the Bible 
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insists that sin is always a choice, whilst Paul also acknowledges the ineluctable pull of 
cupiditas. Secondly, we observed the tension that exists between God’s overwhelming, 
irresistible grace and the importance attached to salvation as a free and personal choice. 
Given the central significance of both sin and salvation in Christian doctrine, we are 
dealing with vital tensions for the believer, not merely meaningless contradictions which 
could be solved if we were to relinquish one side of the paradox. To override the 
contradictory status one must either downplay the reality of sin or negate the sovereign 
force of grace, neither option of which Christianity appears to endorse. There seems to be 
no alternative which satisfies both classical logic and orthodox Christianity, thus by virtue 
of its deviance from the law of non-contradiction, the Christian notion of the will is most 
accurately described in paradoxical terms. 
 
vii) Space: Everywhere and Nowhere 
 
The depiction of space in Christian theology is another area that seems to involve several 
logically incompatible aspects. Firstly, there is the belief that God is the extrinsic author 
of space, who remains external to the dimension whilst also dwelling within it. Secondly, 
that the same God, who abides nowhere and everywhere, entered and embodied human 
space in the specific incarnate form of Christ. And thirdly, Christianity endorses the belief 
that one can choose to enter into God’s presence and at the same time acknowledge his 
inescapable omnipresence. As in our previous examples, the breach with the law of non-
contradiction seems explicit and ‘incorrigibly so’. The claim is less rationally problematic 
if the Bible is viewed entirely poetically, the event of the Cross symbolically, and the 
Holy Spirit as a purely imaginative aid. However, the case for paradox surfaces if one 
insists, as many Christian traditions do, on God’s actual physical presence, be it in the 
Eucharist, the person of Christ or the heart of an individual. The primary question that 
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these apparently paradoxical statements about divine space provoke fixes on the location 
of God: where is he?  
The Bible speaks at times of God’s spatial transcendence—‘The LORD is exalted 
for he dwells on high’127—and at other times of his immanent relationship with creation, 
‘Behold, the dwelling place of God is with man’.128 If either one of these aspects is under-
emphasised it becomes possible to dispense with the paradoxical character of divine 
space. If, however, the duality is upheld, then Christianity would seem to be claiming that 
God as Christ appeared in human space, whilst as creator, God exists in no space, and 
simultaneously, as Spirit he inhabits in every space. The paradox of divine spaces thus 
appears to be threefold, and for the sake of clarity I will deal with each instance 
individually. 
 
a) God is outside space and inside space 
 
God as the creator is described in Genesis as producing ‘an expanse’129 from an absence 
of form, and causing earth to emerge and situate itself from out of the void. From this we 
understand that God is the cause of all space and as such he is prior to space; that is to say 
he has existence independent of the dimension, and exceeds even heaven, insofar as it is 
conceived of as spatial. When speaking of the Christian God, we therefore understand this 
to be a God whom ‘heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain’,130 who is ‘Most High’ 
and ‘does not dwell in houses made by hands’.131  
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On the other hand, if we consider God as creator in relation to his creation, it 
would seem that his involvement is necessarily intimate and imminent. In a panentheistic 
sense God is ‘excessively’ spatial insofar as every grain of creation is completely full of 
godliness, even though his presence exceeds it. Catherine Pickstock helpfully explains 
that ‘although God is not in a place for He is infinite, He is not non-spatial, for He 
situates sites themselves. And therefore He is the eminent (or pre-eminent) space of 
preoccupation which gives space its job in advance of itself’.132 From this we learn that it 
is proper to speak of God’s spatial identity in his continual situation of space and the 
ineluctable imprint of the Creator upon his creation.  
Perhaps, then, we are speaking of a God who is supra-spatial, who through the act 
of creation has embedded himself in every space and yet, as the Scriptures assert, is not 
contained within any space? This conception is complicated further if we bear in mind 
that his involvement in created space is not only as the abstract force behind creation and 
as the invisible occupant of all space, but also as the personal God who enters into 
covenants with his creation. God, the Bible seems to affirm, dwells nowhere, everywhere, 
and uniquely with man: ‘Behold, the dwelling place of God is with man. He will dwell 
with them, and they will be his people, and God himself will be with them as their 
God’.133 We witness in this verse God’s promise to situate himself in a personal way 
within the creation which he both transcends and immaterially dwells within. 
 
b) God who is everywhere and nowhere is incarnate in the specific person of Christ. 
 
 
Within Christian theology, God’s promise to dwell with man has the additional 
paradoxical dimension of dwelling as man: ‘For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells 
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bodily’.134 Here, and as we saw earlier, the New Testament makes clear that the 
Incarnation does not simply involve a part of the transcendent divine Spirit becoming 
temporarily involved in humanity, but rather the ‘whole fullness of deity’ eternally 
incarnate. This leads to the teaching that the Incarnation has eternal standing, without 
subtracting from the complete divinity of God as creator. Augustine describes the paradox 
thus: ‘He didn’t depart from heaven, when he came down to us from there; nor did he 
depart from us, when he ascended into heaven again. I mean, he was still there while he 
was here’.135 The logical problem of Christological space seems to have emerged as a 
matter of the modality of presence. Christianity, as noted previously, succumbs to 
Arianism if it denies the spatial existence of the divine nature in the person of Christ, but 
at the same time Christians continue to worship God in his transcendent Spirit-mode. 
Something of this logical contradiction is staged in Southwell’s poem ‘New 
Heaven, New Warre’: ‘Come kiss the maunger where he lies / This is your bliss above the 
skies’.136 ‘This is your bliss’ writes Southwell, emphasising that the Christ child is no 
mere representation but divine bliss itself. Southwell’s poetic description involves the 
surreal stretching of the deitic ‘this’ to encompass an infinity at once elsewhere, ‘above 
the clouds’ and present in the manger. It is a vivid and precise dramatisation of the 
paradox, which refuses to play down either the divinity of the incarnate Christ or the 
immanent transcendence of the creator, who as Augustine reminds us was ‘there whilst he 
was here’.  
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c) It is possible to enter into the presence of an omnipresent God 
 
In addition to divine space understood as both a specific incarnation and as a transcendent 
beyond, Christians also believe that God has omnipresence in the world. This means there 
is no space that is outside God. The psalmist describes the inescapability of God’s 
omnipresence:  
Where shall I go from your Spirit? 
Or where shall I flee from your presence? 
If I ascend to heaven, you are there! 
If I make my bed in Sheol, you are there!137 
 
In these lines the believer describes God’s omnipresence as sovereign no matter where 
the individual is (both in a physical and a spiritual sense). This would indicate that there 
are no degrees of God’s nearness and that there is no qualitative distinction in his spatial 
extension. This in turn appears to suggest that God is equally present in the saint as in the 
sinner. Nevertheless, Paul’s prayer for the Ephesians is that they ‘may be filled with all 
the fullness of God’,138 thus suggesting that it is indeed possible to experience different 
gradations of God’s presence. Paul reminds the Ephesians they ‘were separated from 
Christ, alienated from the commonwealth of Israel and strangers to the covenants of 
promise, having no hope and without God in the world’. He explains how ‘in Christ’ 
those ‘who once were far off have been brought near’.139 The varying distances between 
man and God dominate his language. It may of course be the case that Paul is simply 
describing a spiritual distance using the metaphorical language of physical distance. 
However, could it also be that there is some metaphysical correlate between the 
dimensions of spirit and space? This begs the further question, is the spiritual realm in 
any sense spatial? 
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Certainly, orthodox Christianity distances itself from gnosticism by insisting that 
the physical body is a dwelling place for the spirit of God.140 Hence, when talking about 
human spiritual nearness there is some warrant to suggest that this entails physical 
involvement. Hopkins depicts something of the spiritual occupation of physical space in 
his poem, ‘As Kingfishers Catch Fire’: ‘For Christ plays in ten thousand places, / Lovely 
in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his’.141  Once more, we find an emphasis on the physical 
presence of God’s Spirit. Hopkins’ depiction of Christ ‘playing’ in human limbs connotes 
movement and vitality; there is a sense of both Puck and Ariel in Hopkins’ Christ, a sort 
of elemental spirit, who is at once both an ‘airy spirit’142 and a ‘merry wanderer’.143 A 
close reading of Hopkins’ poem might also pick up on the absent or elided copula in the 
phrase ‘lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his’. ‘Lovely’, as an adjective, implies a 
missing ‘he is’ and in the omission of the copulative verb, the lines stage a passing over 
from ‘plays’ to an inferred but unsignified ‘is’. One of the effects of this literary device is 
that it subtly figures a mode of presence ‘without being’. This reading complicates what 
perhaps at first glance seems like Christ acting as a puppeteer, giving the illusion of life in 
otherwise motionless limbs. For, by eliding the predicative verb, Hopkins invests Christ 
with a more subtle presence in the lives of individuals, participating in and sharing their 
experience, whilst in some sense simultaneously remaining beyond them, rather than 
dominating or controlling their motion. 
However we interpret the nuances of Hopkins’ imagery, the poem ultimately 
illustrates the biblical teaching that God is crucially involved in particular space and 
dwells with man and in man. Yet, this is only one aspect of the Christian description of 
divine space for, as we have seen, the multifarious portrayals in the Bible suggest that it is 
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possible to ‘come into [the] presence’144 of a god who ‘fill[s] heaven and earth’.145 The 
Scriptures tell us we can be separated from God and yet we cannot escape him; that he 
dwells fully beyond heaven and completely within man; and that as pure spirit he sustains 
us physically. 
As with the preceding instances, I am not making the case that God’s extension in 
the universe is an ultimate paradox. Rather, I am saying that from an anthropocentric 
perspective the Christian depiction of divine space inevitably has this appearance. 
Catherine Pickstock helpfully identifies ‘apparently oxymoronic combinations’ as ‘a 
definitive feature of liturgical space’.146 She describes the goal of the liturgical journey as 
‘simultaneously attained and postponed, before and after, within and without, ‘to hand’ 
and distant’. Pickstock does not present this as a logical problem that needs to be solved, 
but rather as the ‘radiant and excessive structure of divine space’, which she believes 
‘defamiliarize[s] mundane topologies’.147 I think the word ‘defamiliarize’ is vital here, as 
it suggests that when considering how our conception of space corresponds to aspects of 
divinity, it is necessary to accept that human perspective and human understanding is 
limited, and not to assume that our customary perspective is the ultimate or exhaustive 
viewpoint.   
Paradox, as we have seen, is a necessary description of divine space if we are to 
speak of the multi-faceted spatial depictions of God without sidelining or over-
emphasising certain aspects. Perhaps Christianity, more so than any other religion, cannot 
avoid encountering tensions when considering God’s manifestation in the universe 
because of the affirmation that the same God who is transcendent spirit has become God 
incarnate. Trevor Hart forcefully affirms that central to the Christian message is that ‘God 
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has “taken flesh” and given himself to be known in faith’.148 That is to say, God has given 
himself to be known in space and in corpus. He is named Immanuel, meaning God ‘with’ 
or ‘in the midst’ of us. When Christ ascends to the heavenly realm he assures his disciples 
‘I am always with you, to the end of the age’,149 whilst affirming that at the same time he 
is seated at the right hand of the Father. 
Drawing this section to a close, we have identified three main areas of spatial 
complexity and discussed in greater depth why Christianity insists on retaining positions 
that seem to contradict each other. The Bible testifies to God’s presence both in the world 
and outside the world, both in Christ and in man. These tensions importantly allow 
Christians to speak of God’s transcendence and his immanence. Hence, when Christians 
describe entering God’s presence the expression is more than just figurative, the 
Incarnation testifies to a physical God, one who dwells fully in the human body of Christ, 
one who enters into, and animates his creation whilst not being intrinsically spatial or 
limited to any co-ordinate. Pickstock’s account of the liturgy’s figuring of a perspective 
outside our quotidian conception of space indicates the limitations of the human vantage 
point and this has prompted us to suggest that our sense of spatial possibility is a 
provisional, this-worldly perspective. That is not to say it is wrong, merely that it is 
necessary to acknowledge a difference between God’s ultimate vantage point and our 
limited one. To return to de Lubac we might conclude that this dichotomy follows 
inevitably from the belief that ‘proper view always eludes us’.150 To assume, as logic 
dictates, that the regulative principles of space governing our experience must apply 
absolutely and in all instances would lead to the restriction of God’s omnipresent spirit 
and the sacrifice of several of God’s integral manifest modes. Christians must therefore 
be prepared to suggest that our common-sense comprehension of spatial properties does 
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not provide an exhaustive perspective, and that in some instances paradoxical both/and 
expressions come closer to an accurate to representation of divine reality.  
 
 
viii) The Kingdom: Already and Not Yet 
 
The final significant example of Christian doctrine that presents what seems to be an 
impossible combination of contraries concerns the institution of the Kingdom of God. 
The New Testament teaches, on the one hand, that God’s sovereignty is already manifest, 
and on the other hand that the full establishment of God’s supreme reign is yet to come. 
The paradox of the Kingdom of God also involves the conviction that through salvation 
Christians participate both in the already and in the not yet. This is expressed by 
Kierkegaard in his assertion that ‘man is [...] a synthesis of the temporal and the 
eternal’.151 Having just addressed the central spatial paradoxes of Christianity, the now 
and not-yet status of the Kingdom can be understood in some sense as the principal 
temporal paradox.  
It might be possible to avoid logical difficulties if we describe the parallel 
existence of two separate time frames, one in which the Kingdom of God is established 
‘now’ and one in which it is ‘yet to come’. This is not so much a paradoxical temporality, 
rather a co-existent duality. C. S. Lewis expresses such an idea analogically in his Narnia 
chronicles. Lucy observes: ‘However long we seemed to have lived in Narnia, when we 
got back through the wardrobe it seemed to have taken no time at all [...] once you’re out 
of Narnia, you have no idea how Narnian time is passing’.152 This depicts a reality where 
there are two distinct temporal dimensions that exist in parallel, sometimes the children 
participate in one, sometimes the other. However, this analogy is not quite accurate 
because the children can only be in one or the other at any given time. If we heed 
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Kierkegaard’s description of man as a ‘synthesis of the temporal and the eternal’, it would 
seem that the Christian participates in both time frames simultaneously, experiencing the 
not-yet within the already. 
 In a similar manner, we could speculate on a duality of kingdoms and suggest that 
the Kingdom of God exists in its own eternal realm, but is ‘not yet’ manifest on earth. 
The theological problem encountered with a sole emphasis on the other-worldly nature of 
the Kingdom, is that it confines the eternal Kingdom to a perpetual ‘not yet’. This 
construal enters into the same linguistic trap articulated by White Queen in Through the 
Looking-Glass when she offers Alice ‘jam every other day’. ‘“It must come sometimes 
‘jam to-day,’” Alice objected. “No, it ca’n’t,” said the Queen. “It’s jam every other day: 
to-day isn’t any other day, you know”’.153 Roger Holmes both affirms and opposes the 
Queen’s staunch denial that jam can ever arrive. He explains ‘by its nature tomorrow 
must come, also by its very definition it can never come. The Queen promises Alice jam, 
but tells her in the same words that she can never have it! Here is one of the famous 
paradoxes connected with time’.154 ‘Can we ever have jam in the todayness of 
tomorrow?’ Holmes asks, and answers both yes and no. Similarly, the paradox phrased in 
theological terms asks: ‘Can we ever have the Kingdom of God in the not-yetness of 
today?’ Likewise, the answer appears to be both affirmative and negative, hence we are 
dealing with a unity of two distinct time-frames, situated both in the world and not in the 
world. Let us now take each component of the paradox separately in order to see if either 
aspect can dispensed with or de-emphasised. 
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a) The Kingdom of God is now 
 
The Bible appears to speak patently of the arrival and actual presence of the Kingdom of 
heaven manifest presently on earth. Jesus describes God’s Kingdom as not only ‘near’155 
but also ‘at hand’156 and as already ‘come upon’157 those whom he has healed. Christians 
claim that the supreme reign of the Kingdom of God is experienced now, even before the 
event of the Parousia. The belief that Christians already share in the awaited vision is not 
dressed up in the language of gnosticism but seen as a real immanent manifestation.158 
‘We therefore have to understand’, urges Moltmann, ‘the liberating activity of God as the 
immanence of the eschatological kingdom of God, and the coming of the kingdom as the 
transcendence of the present lordship of God’.159 One of the most significant verses in 
support of this describes the situation of the Kingdom as having already arrived, unseen, 
‘in the midst’ of man: ‘Being asked by the Pharisees when the kingdom of God would 
come, he answered them ‘The kingdom of God is not coming with signs to be observed, 
nor will they say, “Look, here it is!” or “There!” for behold, the kingdom of God is in the 
midst of you’.160 
 
b) The Kingdom of God is not yet 
 
Whilst it is has been shown that the Bible speaks at times as if the Kingdom of heaven is 
already constituted on earth, there seems to be equal stress given to the contrary claim 
that the consummation of the Kingdom is still a future event, and that it is an 
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eschatological glory, not yet visible in its fullness. ‘Then comes the end,’ Paul writes, 
‘when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father after destroying every rule, every 
authority and power’.161 Reinforcing this, Christians may point to the continuance of 
poverty, illness, death and war as evidence that the Kingdom of God is not yet 
established, since the Bible promises the end of all these sufferings. Perhaps most 
significantly, Christ instructs his followers in the Lord’s Prayer which includes the 
phrase: ‘your kingdom come, your will be done, on earth at it is in heaven’.162 Here, we 
see again a demarcation between how things will be and how things currently are, a 
schism, it seems, between the Kingdom of heaven and the kingdom of earth, 
demonstrating that the richness and vitality of God’s Kingdom has yet to come.  
The teachings concerning the shape of the Kingdom of God also have paradoxical 
character,163 for they reverse or invert commonplace assumptions concerning human 
ideas of precedence.164 For example, Christ’s caution: ‘Whoever finds his life will lose it, 
and whoever loses his life for my sake will find it’.165 In reference to the salvation of 
man, this is the suggestion that the losing of life is not a temporal instant but a perpetual 
sinking into eternity and rising again into the midst of linear time. The conflation of time 
and eternity is intrinsically Christological in the sense that ‘time is the form chosen by 
Christ (and thus adequate) for manifesting the true eternity’.166 Therefore, if the Kingdom 
of God is experienced as ‘already and not yet’, so too is the belief in salvation: man is 
already saved, but the fullness of his salvation is awaited eschatologically. Man, it seems, 
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is saved from this world, in order to take his place in that same world, just as God’s 
Kingdom is ‘not of this world’,167 and at the same time ‘in the midst’168 of it.  
This paradox is summarised in the declaration that the heavenly Kingdom has 
thus arrived in full and yet remains veiled, and Christians in a state of constant rejoicing 
and simultaneous anticipation. The Kingdom yet to come is frequently anticipated as 
arriving from without, and whilst this is in some sense an accurate depiction, it has also 
emerged that this ultimate vision will come from within, as a centrifugal force, in a world 
created and sustained by God, but fallen in every respect. Moltmann writes: ‘The Gospel 
does not merely bring the kingdom of God to the poor; it also discovers the kingdom of 
the poor which is God’s kingdom’.169 From this perspective, the Kingdom of heaven 
illumines what is already on earth, which further emphasises the paradoxical character of 
the ‘already’ and ‘not-yet’ world.  
The conclusion of this section can be summarised by Moltmann’s description of 
‘this last of days’ as ‘also the dawn of the new creation’,170 a dawn that rises on the old 
creation, illuminating the old and dispelling darkness so that the city of man is 
transformed into the Kingdom of God both from within and without. As we have seen, 
Christians claim a current access to these future spiritual gifts, further testifying that the 
church preaches the ‘already’ in what is still a ‘not yet’ world. To speak of God’s 
Kingdom in non-contradictory terms seems to involve covering up or skirting around a 
multiplicity of biblical passages, which are in tension with one another. Aristotelian logic 
tells us that either the Kingdom has come, or it has not—it cannot both be present and 
absent as this paradox maintains. Yet, as we have seen, Christians believe that through 
Christ they gain access to a recovered paradise whilst recognising that at the same time 
they live in a fallen world and as such are under the many limitations to that beatific 
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vision. Therefore a faithful articulation of the Kingdom of God involves a departure from 
common-sense temporality and an acceptance of a paradoxical both/and timeframe 
whereby one can hold the ‘already’ together with the ‘not yet’. 
 
Conclusion: The Wait for Synthesis 
 
It seems, from the foregoing discussion, that paradox is necessary and central to a faithful 
account of Christian doctrine. In each case, it was shown that the paradox was not a 
poetic description, or linguistic contradiction, but rather an attempt to hold together two 
contrary ideas. We may thus legitimately endorse Stenson’s claim that ‘paradox 
characterizes the language of religion’,171 and affirm that the law of non-contradiction 
does not always hold in theological territory. This leaves us with several options. Firstly, 
we could conclude that Aristotelian logic is true in all instances, and believe therefore that 
Christianity is false since it transgresses important logical maxims. Secondly, we might 
determine that the laws of logic are wrong and ought to be overturned in the face of the 
existence of central theological paradoxes. As a third alternative, we could propose that 
both the law of non-contradiction and Christianity are true and suggest that paradoxes 
demonstrate not that Aristotelian logic or Christian teachings are wrong, but that human 
understanding is partial and limited. 
 This third possibility would be accepted by de Lubac who describes paradox as 
‘the search or wait for synthesis’, this, he believes, is ‘the provisional expression of a 
view which remains incomplete, but whose orientation is towards fullness’.172 As we 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the emphasis on future completion suggests 
that religious paradox is an attempt to express faithfully the inexpressible, accepting that 
the ‘dark glass’ of perception is sufficient for now, because of the promise of a future 
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unveiled relationship.173 Paradox can thus be seen as a celebration of what is presently 
known and a testimony that there is more to come.  
Such a conclusion might in some ways seem unsatisfactory given the human 
impulse for certainty and immediate understanding; nevertheless, it seems in many ways 
an accurate reflection of the current human condition. Paul describes our situation as a 
‘groaning’ after synthesis.174 He explains that although we ‘groan inwardly’ we must 
‘wait eagerly’ for the hope that is promised. This characterises the paradoxical nature of 
Christian reality in which we and the whole creation are groaning after a synthesis which 
has in one sense been made though is still yet to come. Therefore, the affirmation of 
paradox in Christianity is a sign of trust in the continual revelation of God’s plan for 
mankind.  
An overarching concern in this chapter has been to discredit the assumption that 
the Christian ought to cover up or modify logically problematic elements of faith on the 
basis that logical credibility is the only measure of truth. By viewing paradox as the most 
accurate way to express truths that remain partly veiled, we do not have to negate the 
validity of logic, in fact, if we hold the law of non-contradiction in tension with Christian 
paradoxes, this disconnect becomes its own signpost testifying that ‘the synthesis of the 
world has not been made’.175 We are thus accepting that paradoxes transgress the 
boundary of logical conceivability, but suggesting that paradox is nevertheless the best 
way we can understand on earth certain harmonies of the Kingdom of heaven, which for 
now we see darkly and must therefore await an eschatological light. 
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Chapter Two: The Anarchic 
 
 
The preceding chapter on paradox revealed a particular tendency within literary nonsense 
to defy the law of non-contradiction by uniting opposites and transgressing logical 
principles. This act of transgression gestures towards a strong element of conflict present 
within the nonsensical. Jeffrey Stern describes Carroll’s frequent recourse to opposition 
and contradiction as a ‘rebellious framework’. Stern gestures to the barefaced conflict of 
‘nonsense against sense, the dream against the mundane, Wonderland against Victorian 
England, and so on’.1 Stern’s proposal that the basic framework of the Alice books is 
structured by rebellion invites us to consider the prevalence of this theme.The fact that 
both stories end with Alice’s revolt against the prevailing power supports the theory that 
there is a significant sense of rebellion or anarchy present in the narrative structure of 
both stories.2 
 
i) Nonsense and Anarchy 
 
 
How can we characterize this theme of conflict and defiance? Donald Gray observes that 
there is ‘now an orthodox interest of twentieth-century readers in the subversive and 
anarchic qualities of [Carroll’s] writing’.3 Similarly, Donald Rackin’s extensive study of 
the Alice novels has led him to promote the anarchic as a central concept. Rackin 
describes the ‘literal anarchy of Alice’s adventures and the metaphysical and moral 
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anarchy they encapsulate’.4 At face value, the word ‘anarchy’ seems to capture something 
of nonsensical conflict and rebellion, but is this a precise and accurate usage? 
The word ‘anarchy’ derives from the Greek  ‘without’ and  meaning 
‘leader’ or ‘ruler’. Peter Marshall in A History of Anarchism defines the modern usage of 
the term in accordance with the original Greek: ‘to describe the condition of a people 
living without any constituted authority’.5 The idea that authority is un-constituted seems 
to convey accurately how power works in Alice’s worlds. It is not that she encounters a 
lack of authority figures,6 but rather that she finds those in the possession of power 
frequently have their authority undercut, mocked or deconstructed.7 It would seem, then, 
that Carroll’s nonsense worlds are anarchic in a literal sense, in that they consistently 
disestablish the constituted power of those in authority.  
Yet it is not only in relation to the characters and narrative that the Alice stories 
involve anarchy. There also seems to be a case for suggesting that the reader experiences 
a type of imaginative anarchy in the willed suspension of conventional logic. Robert 
Polhemus believes that a governing principle of Carroll’s fantasy worlds involves 
‘considering things from the very opposite of the conventional point of view’.8 This 
diversion from convention is further emphasised by Cohen when he addresses the 
question of what, if anything, the Alice books mean and concludes: ‘To understand what 
they mean, we have to realize that Wonderland and the world behind the looking-glass 
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are mysterious places where characters do not live by conventional rules and that 
meaning does not play a conventional role. Even the laws of nature, the law of gravity for 
instance, do not work as they should’.9 The reader, like Alice, has to imagine how to pass 
a cake round first and cut it up afterwards.  
The point here is simply that fundamental to the reading of the stories is the 
reader’s capacity to think in terms that contradict or unsettle the governing principles of 
the familiar world. The reader must walk with Alice in the opposite direction to her 
destination in order to arrive there. Unlike many other fantasies where there is a single 
instance of suspension of everyday logic, Carroll’s stories require the reader to enter into 
an enchanted world, whose narrative authority is recurrently disrupted. With a sudden jolt 
Alice is transported from a shop to a rowing boat. Once this activity is established ‘the 
oars, and the boat, and the river, had vanished all in a moment and she was back again in 
the little dark shop’.10 We can find no constituted norms that govern her adventures; a pig 
could turn into a baby, but then again it might not. Rackin believes that Alice pines for 
‘some familiar signposts of intelligible order’,11 but this is denied her. There is ‘no telos, 
no final goal or ultimate “meaning” […] their games are essentially ruleless, circular, and 
without end—games undoubtedly for “mad people”’.12 This radical degree of instability 
supports the description of the stories as having an anarchic character in the sense that her 
encounters are without any permanent or discernible authority and the reader too, like 
Alice, must try to adjust to a world without any ‘intelligible order’.  
At this point we find that nonsense literature has challenged fundamental 
empirical assumptions such as ‘I can trust my senses’ or ‘I can verify what is real’. In 
Tigges’ anthology of nonsense, Lisa Ede makes a similar case for an anarchic 
interpretation of nonsense literature on the basis that ‘because the nonsense world is a 
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play world, it exists apart from society […] yet, it sometimes even questions the “reality” 
of the “real” world itself’.13 The anarchy involved in questioning the reality of the real 
world seems to resemble certain aspects of Christian belief which dispute established 
claims about the nature of reality, such as: death is the end of life and humans cannot 
walk on water. Indeed, Robert Polhemus has suggested that ‘Lewis Carroll’s words and 
images are to the formulation of a comic faith what Jesus’s parables are to Christian 
doctrine: they create a fiction so radical that it can bring its audience to look with fresh 
wonder at the structure and meaning of experience’.14 In this chapter, I want to explore 
whether Christian teaching does in fact unsettle constitutional norms and provoke its 
followers to question the nature of the real as it appears to us. Before doing so, however, 
we first need to consider in detail whether anarchy is in any sense an apposite theological 
descriptor, for this language of riot and rebellion whilst suited to nonsense might seem to 
some to be the very antithesis of Christian faith. 
 
ii) Christianity and Anarchy 
 
There is undoubtedly a sense of incongruity elicited by the conjunction of the words 
‘Christianity’ and ‘anarchism’. The familiar anarchist slogan encapsulates this discord: 
‘Neither God nor Master’.15 The apparent inconsonance derives from the assumption that 
Christianity is about observing rules and anarchism is about breaking them. The 
traditional depiction of God as an authoritarian father-figure is anathema to many 
anarchists. Equally, anarchism is often seen as disorderly and aggressive, which is 
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removed from a Christian view of compassionate citizenship and the hierarchical order of 
heaven.  
Whilst this sense of incongruity is obviously not without foundation, there are 
nevertheless a variety of thinkers for whom the union of Christianity and anarchism is 
both fitting and significant. The Christian anarchist Jacques Ellul explains: ‘The more I 
understood seriously the Biblical message in its entirety [...] the more I came to see how 
impossible it is to give simple obedience to the state and how there is in the Bible the 
orientation to a certain anarchism’.16 Peter Marshall, likewise, points out that ‘Christian 
anarchism is not an attempt to synthesize two systems of thought but rather an attempt to 
realize the message of the Gospels’.17 My aim in this chapter is to explore whether there 
is any biblical support for suggesting that Christianity exhibits the type of anarchy 
identified in Carroll’s nonsense—an unsettling of common-place assumptions about the 
nature of the real.  
A similar sense of unsettling common-place assumptions can be found in the 
writing of the Russian Christian anarchist Nicholas Berdyaev (1874-1948). In this chapter 
I do not attempt to prove or oppose Berdyaev’s theology; instead, my aim is to find out 
whether Berdyaev’s model of anarchism is in accord with orthodox Christianity. 
Berdyaev’s view that Christianity has a fundamental association with anarchy stems from 
his belief that there is a dynamic rivalry between the realm of Spirit and the realm of 
Caesar,18 which he sees as two antagonistic competing powers that cannot be conjoined.  
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iii) The Two Realms 
My kingdom is not of this realm 
John 18:36 
 
a) Carroll’s Two Realms: Sense and Nonsense 
 
 
If we begin by comparing our experience of reality to the insane worlds behind the 
looking-glass and underground, it is obvious that the two different grammars contain 
irreconcilable differences. Alice observes frequently how the world she left behind 
operated under very different circumstances: ‘in our country […] you’d generally get to 
somewhere else—if you ran very fast for a long time’.19 Or, as she remarks to a speaking 
insect: ‘none of them ever talk where I come from’.20 Alice insists that the rules of her 
familiar world remain authoritative even though a number of fundamental laws of time 
and logic are flouted in Looking-Glass Land. In fact, the creatures Alice meets in the 
nonsense worlds react to her with a similar response, suggesting that her assumptions 
about the mechanics of universe are absurd or silly. Alice explains to the Queen in 
Looking-Glass land: ‘In our country […] there’s only one day at a time’ to which the Red 
Queen scornfully retorts: ‘That’s a poor thin way of doing things’.21 
Nonsense humour is often located at the point of conflict between these 
competing ontologies. As we shall see, in the work of Nicholas Berdyaev there is 
constant reference to a two-realm antagonism: the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of 
Caesar. I will begin by exploring the nature of the dichotomy established by Berdyaev, 
asking whether it is orthodox to speak of a conflict between the Kingdom of God and the 
kingdom of man in this way and if this equivocal dialectic can be described as anarchy. I 
will then look specifically at the Incarnation, the Church, and the role of the disciple as 
concrete examples of this anarchic tension. 
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b) Berdyaev’s Two Realms: Spirit and Caesar 
 
Perhaps the most obvious and fundamental principle upon which Berdyaev’s anarchism is 
founded is his militant claim: ‘Until the end of time, there will always be two kingdoms 
[…] a struggle of the Spirit against Caesar’.22 This gives the impression of a perpetual 
opposition and attempts no reconciliation between the Kingdom of God and the kingdom 
of man, although for Berdyaev the result is already established even as the struggle goes 
on. Berdyaev recognises the invisible authority of Spirit and the powerlessness of Caesar, 
and claims that Christianity situates itself in the anarchic limbo between Caesar’s defeat 
and Christ’s return. We can see how this relates to the definition of anarchism as ‘the 
condition of living without constituted authority’, since Christianity challenges the 
legitimacy of Caesar’s reign, whilst acknowledging Caesar’s continued presence in 
human history.  
This conception of anarchy has a direct connection to the final paradox addressed 
in the previous chapter—the now and not-yet reality of the Kingdom of God—in which it 
was stated that the authorities of death, sin and of secular government have been 
overcome by Christ, even though the constitution of his divine authority is still held in 
abeyance; which is to say, the rule of the Kingdom of God has not yet arrived in the 
fullness of its anticipated supremacy.  
Berdyaev’s theology is persistent in preaching a radical, antagonistic dichotomy 
between the realm of Spirit and the realm of Caesar. He concludes perhaps his most well-
known text—Freedom and the Spirit—with the following words: ‘Two conflicting ways 
of life are to be found here below; there is the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of this 
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world, and it is essential to make a real spiritual distinction between them’.23 Our task 
now is to consider whether this position is orthodox.  
A possible objection, which could collapse Berdyaev’s carefully maintained 
dialectic, is the suggestion that there should be a resolution between the two realms, 
rather than an overcoming. Perhaps the Christian can adopt a less dramatic position by 
holding that governmental authority ought not to be obeyed blindly, but can be reformed 
through a democratic morality influenced by Christian sentiments. As Vernard Eller 
suggests, ‘The Christian is to live above the law, and when the law would require him to 
do something contrary to the will of God he is to defy that particular law’.24 This position 
could imply that secular government is not in aggressive antagonism to the realm of 
Spirit, but that authority must be to God first. If this view can be upheld as orthodox 
Christian teaching, it would counter Berdyaev’s more radical stance that political rule is 
not only misguided but ‘has poison within itself’.25  
The case for Berdyaev’s Christian anarchism, and the reason that Christians may 
react against Eller’s suggestion, hinges on the identification of Christ as an anarchist and 
not as a political activist. Jesus’ prayer for his disciples seems to support Berdyaev’s 
belief that Christ and his followers are separated from political activism by maintaining 
that the authority of Caesar’s reign has already been overcome.26 According to John’s 
gospel, Jesus says his disciples ‘are not of the world, just as I am not of the world […] As 
you sent me into the world, so I have sent them into the world’.27 Although Christ entered 
into the world, he did not belong to it in the way that a political activist must. For 
instance, he remained silent when asked to defend himself in the political trial in front of 
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Pilate. In doing this, argues Jacques Ellul, Jesus effectively extracts himself from 
submitting to the grammar of political judgment.28 This explanation suggests that Christ’s 
silence is the only possible response from a non-political perspective. Ellul’s 
interpretation, therefore, seems to complement Berdyaev’s two-realm theory in his 
proclamation that ‘there never was and there never can be such things as a Christian state, 
a Christian economy’.29 
Jonathan Bartley in his recent book, Faith and Politics After Christendom: The 
Church as a Movement for Anarchy, makes the relevant point that ‘secular government is 
“secular” not in the sense that it is irreligious but in the sense that its role is confined to 
this age (in Latin, saeculum) that is passing away. It does not and cannot in any way 
represent the promise of the new age that comes in with Christ’.30 This supports 
Berdyaev’s stance that Christianity establishes genuinely new and revolutionary 
principles of government, which are not contained within the grammar of a secular 
system. ‘The higher spiritual world’, he writes, ‘ought never to be thought of on the 
analogy of the State, that is of power and authority’.31 The realm of Christ is moreover 
consistent with a biblical account of leadership which deflects personal achievement and 
insists instead upon the sovereignty of God’s will thereby identifying forgiveness and 
sacrifice as central rather than power or status. To this extent secular government does not 
appear to fit comfortably into a theocratic system. Even so, one might suggest that 
Berdyaev’s and Bartley’s rigid separation between divine and secular territory seems to 
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raise the secular economy to the status of dialectic rival. Perhaps a more anarchic 
opposition to the realm of Caesar would stress the ‘alreadyness’ of the conquest of the 
Spirit. 
 In this light, the response of the Christian to the realm of Caesar might be more 
accurately considered as a sort of compassionate detachment rather than the aggressive 
opposition articulated by Berdyaev and Bartley, which seems to assume a timelessness of 
‘the state’. Yet, whilst Berdyaev might appear to go too far in establishing the dichotomy 
of Spirit and Caesar, he at least exposes the radical element of the gospel message—the 
Christ presented in the Bible calls for a whole new way of living—a call that is often 
clouded by the integration of Church into state.  
The word ‘anarchy’ in connection to Christianity could help to communicate to 
non-believers the radical, revolutionary aspect of New Testament teaching that is often 
hidden beneath stereotypes of Christians as law-abiding and rule-orientated. At the same 
time, associating anarchy with Christianity might direct Christians to see the authority of 
secular government as provisional. There is certainly an attitude of ‘non-attachment’ to 
worldly endeavour that we can locate in Scripture. Christ preaches: ‘do not be anxious, 
saying, “What shall we eat?” or “What shall we drink?” or “What shall we wear?” For the 
pagans seek after all these things, and your heavenly Father knows that you need them all. 
But seek first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things will be 
added to you’.32 Here the idea of non-attachment is manifest in the contrast between the 
attitude of the Christian and the pagan to physical concerns.  
Christ’s teaching has an anarchic implication because it seeks to detach the 
believer from a this-worldly fixation, which is the chief concern of governments. I am of 
course not suggesting that Christ is indifferent to physical needs—indeed, a major portion 
of his miracles are bodily healings, and the feeding of the five thousand is obviously a 
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response to the this-worldly anxiety of what to eat. What I am proposing is that Christ 
preaches a freedom from the preoccupation with the physical and an elevation of this-
worldly concerns, which is the primary concern of the secular state. The freedom from 
the anxiety of worldly existence is, according to Berdyaev, emphatically rooted in the 
realm of Spirit and not in Caesar. Whilst this does maintain the supreme distinction 
between living with the belief in the unseen reign of Spirit and living under the apparent 
rule of Caesar, the distinction does not need to give way to aggressive antagonism, but the 
description ‘anarchist’ could be helpful as an indicator that for the Christian a wholly new 
way of thinking politically is called for.  
Highlighting the need for an anarchic stance against the regime of secular 
government, Berdyaev identifies Caesar as the symbol of human authority and the lust for 
power. ‘Render unto Caesar’, he argues, ‘does not mean a religious definition of Caesar 
and his realm; it does not imply evaluation at all. This is merely distinguishing between 
two different spheres which cannot be combined one with the other’.33 Berdyaev argues 
that this reveals Christ’s non-political identity: ‘Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s’ he says, 
and then, arguably in a whole new grammar preaches ‘Give to God what is God’s’. 
Berdyaev believes that in this exchange Christ exposes the impermanence of Caesar’s 
kingdom and enters into an ‘as if’ relationship to worldly powers, which reiterates the 
anarchic formula whereby the Spirit rules as if in being, and Caesar is in being as if 
ruling.34 
A similar rendering of the impermanence of Caesar’s governance occurs in 
Christ’s explanation to Pilate: ‘My kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of 
this world, then my servants would be fighting so that I would not be handed over to the 
Jews; but as it is, my kingdom is not of this realm’.35 There seems to be an anarchic 
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connotation in the undercutting of the political sphere and the disciples’ allegiance to an 
unconstituted authority. Christ not only proclaims the reality of another, higher kingdom, 
but also his sovereignty over it. Similarly, in the name of Christ, Paul articulates the 
power of God’s sovereignty in absentia. He challenges the Corinthians writing: ‘For 
though absent in body, I am present in spirit; and as if present I have already pronounced 
judgment’.36 Paul’s use of ‘as if’ contradicts the secular preoccupation with a tangible 
display of power and claims instead that spiritual presence, though invisible, has 
authority. This supports Berdyaev’s proposal that even prior to the Parousia, allegiance 
must be to God alone and that modern Christians, like the Corinthians, ought to act as if 
God’s authority were tangible. We might therefore understand the ‘as if’ as operative in a 
dual directive—the world of Caesar as if it is not and the Kingdom of God as if it is. 
It is consequently necessary for Berdyaev to highlight the division between the 
two realms in order to convey a sense of the radical difference and shattering newness 
that is ushered in with God’s Kingdom. Berdyaev believes that the rule of the Spirit 
‘concerns something much greater than a new society. What is involved is a new 
cosmos’.37  Only a type of apophatic anarchism can come close to describing the 
difference between the reign of Caesar and the sovereignty of the Spirit.38 In a similar 
way, the association of Christianity with nonsense might help to communicate something 
of the radically alternative mentality required for a genuine acceptance of the paradoxes 
of Christianity. To assert that Christ was raised from the dead more than just disagrees 
with modern empiricism, for many it is a statement on par with the Mad Hatter’s insane 
utterances and thereby fundamentally demarcates religious faith from secular thought. An 
entirely new way of thinking is called for. ‘The coming of a new aeon’, writes Berdyaev, 
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‘presupposes a change in the human mind’.39 Ultimately what Berdyaev teaches is that 
there is no way of modifying the realm of Caesar to establish or resemble the realm of 
Spirit and his paradigm of oppositional realms identifies effectively the irreconcilability 
between divine and secular rule. In order to demonstrate this, I will look at three 
significant exemplary cases: the Incarnation, the Church and the disciple. In each of 
these, something of the anarchic sense of opposition is manifest. They all announce that 
there is an alternative reality which challenges the authority of the secular world. 
 
The Incarnation 
 
The previous chapter on paradox affirmed that orthodox Christianity upholds the 
complete divinity of the fully human Christ. We are now in a position to explore the 
Incarnation as an anarchic embodiment of the tension between the two realms. John 
Caputo distinguishes two logics rather than two realms when he describes a similar 
fundamental duality between God’s Kingdom and the world’s. More precisely, he 
discriminates between ‘the logic of the mundane constituted economies and the logic of 
the event’. He explains: ‘I see in Jesus of Nazareth an exemplary embodiment of the logic 
or paralogic of the gift, who told paradoxical parables about and who was himself a 
parable of the kingdom of God, which he opposed to the economy of the “world”’.40 In 
this quotation Caputo locates within the person of Christ a force that overturns the logic 
of the world. It is a point of conflict in which a paradoxical logic triumphs over ‘the logic 
of the mundane’ and to this end it would seem that Christ’s Incarnation can be viewed 
symbolically as the herald of an anarchic age. 
It should be noted that the reason Berdyaev considers the event of God becoming 
man anarchic is not because of any internal struggle between the divine and human 
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natures within the hypostatic union, but rather because it announces the defeat of Caesar, 
sin and death. Christians might legitimately term this anarchic because such a claim 
displaces the governing authority but is not recognized by those in power. Christ affirms 
‘I have overcome the world’, and yet still warns his disciples, ‘in the world you will have 
tribulation’.41 
 It is once again necessary to highlight the paradoxical aspect of this statement. 
From a heavenly perspective the realm of Caesar is already defeated; however, from the 
point of view of human history, soteriology has a linear appearance. This would suggest 
that if anarchy is an apposite descriptor at all, it refers to the current epoch. It is in his 
incarnate form that Christ announces the powerlessness of secular government whilst 
proclaiming the not-yetness of the heavenly Kingdom. Christ’s earthly existence 
contradicts and shatters the expectations of the world’s standard; the King of kings is 
born in a manger, the long-awaited Messiah enters Jerusalem on a colt. The Incarnation 
inverts the common conception of power and wealth. By dwelling with man and as man, 
Christ represents an anarchic disturbance not only in his words but also in his person. 
Karl Barth encapsulates this idea in his statement that Christ ‘overcomes the flesh in 
becoming flesh’.42 Barth understands Christ’s enfleshment as his victory and his person 
as his mission.   
 In this regard, it could be suggested that Barth shares a Berdyaevean emphasis in 
his view that the Incarnation both brings about redemption and opens the way for man to 
participate in its salvific effect. This participation is made possible insofar as in entering 
humanity God has taken on the very essence of manhood. For Berdyaev, this is an 
important theme, as he sees Christ’s birth ultimately as the birth of all, and indeed as the 
perpetual birth of man in Christ and Christ in man. In Freedom and the Spirit he states: 
‘through the Son we return to the bosom of the Father. With Him a new race of human 
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beings begins, the race of Christ, born and regenerated in the Spirit. Christ is in man and 
man is in Christ’.43 Depicted in this light, the Incarnation is not only an announcement of 
what is to come but also acts as the analogical bond of reconciliation between man and 
God, which disturbs and overcomes the sovereignty of sin.  
Significantly, this kenotic suspension enables Christ’s analogous embodiment of 
man’s situation. Kenosis is a letting go of divinity that corresponds to man’s condition in 
the ‘not-yet’ manifestation of divine sovereignty. In giving himself to be known, Christ 
‘preposterously’ announces the future state of his own eternal rule44 whilst 
simultaneously opposing the authority of Caesar, thus bringing about a state without 
constituted authority; the condition of . It was noted in the previous chapter that 
the kenosis is radically localised and temporalised, elevating the significance Christians 
attach to the status of the Church as Christ’s resurrected body. The New Testament 
proclaims the guarantee of the unfailing presence of the Spirit to the Church and in this 
sense the anarchic epoch is not simply about awaiting salvation, but concerns an active 
carrying-out of future promise. It is to this ecclesial manifestation that we now turn. 
 
The Church 
 
In ultimate terms, Berdyaev sees in the moment of Incarnation the unification of the 
invisible with the visible. ‘Incarnation’, he writes, ‘is symbolization; the visible Church is 
the symbolization of the Church invisible, the earthly hierarchy of the heavenly’.45 
Berdyaev is articulating the belief that Christ is the image of the invisible God and at 
once the ascended and invisible ruler of the visible Church. Hence, Church for Berdyaev 
is holy territory—it is demarcated off from Caesar’s reign in a manner evocative of the 
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Celtic monastic tradition. In Celtic times the territory of the monasteria was physically 
separated by the vallum (a ditch surrounding the monastery), which Ian Bradley explains 
‘delineated an area that was to be regarded as sacred and in which the values of the 
Kingdom of God rather than the world of humankind would prevail’.46 Berdyaev’s 
account of the clash between the two realms captures something of this ancient sense of 
holy separateness. He writes that there is ‘an eternal conflict between Christ the God-
Man, and Caesar the man-god’, and then suggests that this entails that ‘Christianity 
cannot be reconciled to the sovereignty of any kind of earthly authority’.47 
Ultimately, what is evident here is that the rule of Spirit contains within it the 
non-rule of Caesar and the Church occupies this in-between space, announcing and 
preparing the way for the full arrival of that which is but which is also yet to come. Christ 
ordains this lacuna by establishing the Church, which through the sacraments demonstrate 
the already within the not-yet, providing visible signs of invisible authority. This liberates 
the Church to practice ‘weakness’ and charity as the revelation of the counter-cultural 
strength of the anarchic order of the Spirit. In Christ there is both a rejection of the 
authority of visible powers and a participatory celebration in the unseen conquest. By 
accepting the eternal significance of the Incarnation, the Church is not beset with 
eschatological insecurity, but is liberated to experience in the present the salvific 
assurance of the future.  
 
The Disciple 
 
 
We have now described two vital manifestations of Berdyaev’s two-realm theory. The 
Incarnation was discussed as the herald of the Spirit triumphant and the Church was 
considered as the visible and present instantiation of the invisible, future reign. The third 
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dimension demarcating the realm of Spirit from the realm of Caesar is the witness of the 
disciple.  
We have already acknowledged that from a heavenly perspective the ‘conflict’ 
between the two realms is not a struggle in the sense that the sovereignty is undecided. 
Yet, Berdyaev wants at the same time to emphasize that Christ’s sovereign relinquishing 
of the perspective of the Father gives him a radical identification with humanity, which 
creates an example that his followers can emulate.48 Through Christ the individual is 
connected to the eschatological Kingdom and participates in this alternate reality. Whilst 
on earth Christ leaves his disciples with the gift of peace: ‘my peace I give to you. Not as 
the world gives do I give to you. Let not your hearts be troubled, neither let them be 
afraid’.27  This phrase demonstrates how Christ invites his disciples to partake in the 
eschatological security of the triumph of the Spirit, which he acknowledges is neither 
given nor received according to the rules of this world. 
It is important to understand that the concept of discipleship is not solely a matter 
of metaphysical awareness of Christ’s sovereignty, but it also seems to entail a disruptive 
political dimension. In Luke’s gospel Christ professes that his followers ‘will be brought 
before kings and governors because of my name’, but emphasises that ‘not a hair […] 
will perish’.49 This indicates that the communication of Christ’s message will necessarily 
aggravate those in authority, suggesting that the disciple’s task is subversive of 
conventional powers. One of the reasons why Berdyaev’s association of Christianity with 
anarchism seems to work is because its extremity is consistent with Christ’s teaching of 
radical division between the disciples and the world. John 15:19 states: ‘If you were of 
the world, the world would love its own; but because you are not of the world, but I chose 
you out of the world, because of this the world hates you’.50  
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The estrangement between Christ’s followers and the rest of the world is further 
emphasised in Christ’s command to be holy. ‘Just as he who called you is holy, so be 
holy in all you do; for it is written “Be holy, because I am holy”’.51 The initial command 
in Leviticus uses the Hebrew word for holy ((שודק which also means ‘separateness’. 
Accordingly, the obligation for the Christian is to be set apart from the ideals, values and 
methods of the world’s politics.52 It is a command to anarchism, where anarchism is 
identified as an elected separateness deriving from faith in an unseen power. Christ 
explains to his disciples that he will cease to be visible in the world but will retain his 
rulership over it: ‘I am going to the Father and you will see me no longer […] I have 
conquered the world’.53 Belief in this statement suggests that it might be helpful to define 
the Christian imagination as anarchic in the sense that being a disciple of Christ requires 
the mental agility to ‘overaccept’54 earthly signs which oppose the reality of Christ’s 
eternal conquest. In doing so, Berdyaev believes the Christian participates in the unseen 
reality of the not-yet Kingdom.  
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iv) Theological Estrangement 
 
Put to death all that is earthly in you 
 
Colossians 3:5 
 
 
We began this chapter by discussing how a basic prerequisite for engaging with nonsense 
literature is the willingness to unsettle quotidian norms. Like Berdyaev’s account of the 
two rival kingdoms, Carroll’s Wonderland also encompasses two conflicting realms—
sense and nonsense. We observed how this tension has provoked nonsense critics and 
theologians alike to utilise the word ‘anarchism’ in order to describe how their respective 
dualities fuel an antagonistic conflict. In nonsense literature we witnessed the rebellion 
against the world of conventional logic and described how Alice’s introduction to 
nonsense principles causes her to question the reliability of her preconceived norms.55 
Having already gestured to the idea that Christ’s triumph disturbs and unsettles the 
governing principles in the realm of Caesar, we can now explore how the believer 
disassociates himself from the visible kingdom of Caesar in order to submit to the 
invisible rule of the Spirit. Or, in the words of Coleridge, how we can ‘awake[n] the 
mind’s attention from the lethargy of custom and direc[t] it to the loveliness and the 
wonders of the world before us’.56 To apply anarchy in a Christian context, therefore, we 
must first look at the theory and practice of revelatory disturbance. 
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a) The Theory of Revelatory Disturbance 
 
 
An American contemporary of Berdyaev, William James, writing at the end of the 
nineteenth century claimed: ‘the greatest revolution of our generation is the discovery that 
human beings, by changing the inner attitude of their minds can change the outer aspects 
of their lives’.57 The idea that the imagination has outward transformative power is a 
sentiment articulated in the Bible,58 and recognised by Berdyaev.59 In the succeeding 
section I will be considering the constructive aspect of this transformation, but before that 
we need to address its disturbance, which for Berdyaev begins with the imaginative 
deconstruction of its constituted authority.  
Like Christ in the ‘far country’, his followers are instructed to assume the role of 
stranger and not seek rest or satisfaction in the realm of Caesar.60 This conviction looks a 
lot like anarchism from the perspective of the state, since it actively denounces 
conformity to the conventional powers. Whilst it will be important to recognise the 
practical implications of seeking the role of stranger within a secular polis, I want to 
argue that it is in the imagination that the mental stimulus for such action takes root. The 
imagination is commonly understood within nonsense literature as the portal by which an 
individual can enter or access alternative worlds. However, one might argue that the act 
of imagining different worlds has the effect of detaching the individual from the familiar 
and inviting a critical assessment of their everyday existence. This idea is supported by 
the authors of Tales for Little Rebels who believe that engaging in fantasy stories 
‘teach[es] the young that the world constructed by their elders is an artificial thing’.61 
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Following the biblical outline of faith, the primary step to imagining an alternative reality 
is creatively to abstract oneself from the seen reality. Since the function of the 
imagination as a means of conscious alienation from society is a prominent element in the 
theory and work of Bertolt Brecht, it may be instructive to consider his concept of 
Verfremdungseffekt.62 
 This might seem a deeply incongruous approach given Brecht’s deep-rooted 
dislike and mistrust of all religious systems, particularly Christianity, which he viewed as 
a corrupt and oppressive force. Yet, if we focus on the anarchic component of the 
Christian imagination we find a surprising overlap between Brechtian socio-political 
satire and Berdyaev’s Christian anarchism. Much of Brecht’s writing, like Berdyaev’s 
was extremely subversive in his own political climate. For example, during the premier of 
his play The Rise and Fall of the City Mahogany in 1930, Nazis in the audience rioted in 
protest. By 1929 Brecht had already embraced communism and was significantly 
influenced by Marx’s Das Kapital. From this period, Brecht not only satirised capitalist 
ideas and public figures, but also encouraged his audience to sympathise with his Marxist 
ideology. Douglas Kellner explains, ‘He wanted his spectators […] to participate in an 
active process of critical thought that would provide insights into the workings of society, 
and to see the need for and to implement radical social change’.63 This same sentiment 
could be applied to Berdyaev’s writing, which overtly promoted both Marxism and 
anarchism.64  
Among other devices, Brecht’s ‘epic theatre’ used montage and tableaux to depict 
social injustice. These contributed to his primary theatrical interest of creating the 
Verfremdungseffekt. Kellner explains that ‘this was intended to “estrange” or “distance” 
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the spectator and thus prevent empathy and identification with the situation and the 
characters and allow the adoption of a critical attitude toward the actions in the play’.65 
Brecht was resolute that in order to achieve this degree of analytical political observation, 
an imaginative detachment was required. The audience was supposed to be critically 
aware and not entranced, since Brecht wanted to remind them that they were watching a 
piece of theatre. This he achieved in many ways, such as keeping the auditorium lit, 
having the actors direct their speech to the audience and employing the ‘play within a 
play’ technique.  
We can begin to sense some similarities with an anarchic account of Christianity, 
which, likewise, desires to exhibit the world as a counter-reality and to provoke its 
‘audience’ to engage critically in the unfolding of the global drama and approach it from 
a detached perspective. According to Alison Milbank, ‘we need estranging techniques if 
we are to shock people into engagement with reality, so that they may appreciate the 
religious sense and we can begin to explain the Christian faith at all’.66 Given its 
connotations of riot and rebellion, the word ‘anarchy’ is perhaps the ‘shock’ required to 
rouse individuals from ‘the lethargy of custom’ and to stimulate a desire to question 
quotidian norms. 
 Hence, in spite of their wholly secular aesthetic origins, certain aspects of 
Brecht’s theatrical technique may be helpful for explaining the scriptural notion of 
alienation, such as the command in Romans 12:2: ‘Do not be conformed to the present 
age but be transformed by the renewal of your mind’. The anarcho-theistic imagination 
considered in accordance with Romans corresponds to Brechtian practices in the sense 
that the Christian stands apart from the present age and believes in the power of mental 
transformation to re-envisage the world. This contention is mirrored in Walter 
Benjamin’s explanation that ‘the response to epic theatre should be: “Things can happen 
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this way, but they can also happen a quite different way”’.67 From this perspective 
Benjamin unintentionally seems to unite the utopic vision of Christian eschatology with 
Brechtian social satire. Benjamin brings to the surface the basic premise that Brechtian 
theatre encompasses its own two-world dialectic, where involvement in one leads to the 
disturbance of the other.  
There has been some relevant investigation into the link between religious 
eschatology and Brechtian satire. For example, Keith Dickson in Towards Utopia: A 
Study of Brecht argues that ‘the utopian is a satirist in disguise’. He continues: ‘His 
[Brecht’s] ideal commonwealth is an implicit criticism of his own society, the 
shortcomings of which can be measured against the standards of an imaginary world’.68 
This interpretation of Brechtian theatre as both critical and utopic parallels the aspect of 
revelatory disturbance in Berdyaev’s anarchism. The belief in an imaginary world 
requires a cognitive alienation comparable to the biblical advocacy of non-attachment: 
‘[let] those who deal with the world [live] as though they had no dealings with it. For the 
present form of this world is passing away’.69 Such a sentiment further emphasises both 
Berdyaev and Brecht’s belief that there is an alternative reality that requires a mental 
estrangement from what is immediately observable. It is upon this lack of satisfaction 
with the apparent reality that Berdyaev founds the anarchism of the Christian 
imagination: ‘the world does not begin and end with this condition, which is actually our 
fallen state: another condition of the world is possible and it requires another type of 
knowing’.70 Such a state of dissatisfaction is the principal goal of disturbance since 
experiencing the inadequacy of the secular approach can provide the impetus for seeking 
a spiritual alternative. 
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 Of course, the analogy between Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt and Christian 
detachment is not entirely apposite. Firstly, as Dickson notes, Brecht’s sensationalist 
undercurrent is in tension with many aspects of orthodox Christianity.71 Secondly, Brecht 
is solely concerned with the criticism and disturbance of the world, as, unlike Berdyaev, 
he does not believe in the ‘alreadiness’ of his socialist ideal. Dickson addresses this 
theme, commenting ‘writers almost invariably find the contradictions of the present world 
a much more rewarding subject than a future world in which the gulf between actuality 
and the ideal has been bridged. Brecht is no exception’.72 The focus on negation above 
transfiguration reduces the revolutionary potential of Brecht’s work, making his 
contextual political satire more of a modern romantic utopia. Efim Etkind, a great 
supporter of Brechtian technique, accepts nevertheless that Brecht’s vision has lost some 
of its revolutionary force: ‘the greatest misfortune that could have befallen Brecht was to 
become a classic. Unfortunately, this has happened. Brecht has truly become a classic’.73  
Brecht’s intention to turn theatre into propaganda, allowed him to satirize 
powerfully his own political climate, but in so doing, prevented his plays from being 
continually revolutionary. An important difference between satire and anarchism seems to 
be that in general anarchism signifies an ideology of perpetual transformation and 
opposition to all forms of constituted authority, whereas satire seems to be more targeted 
towards particular individuals or groups (although satire can of course have relevance 
beyond its particulars and anarchy can be directed to specific circumstances or states). 
The association of Christianity and anarchism thus identifies the gospel narratives with 
eternal revolution, suggesting that the gospels, unlike Brecht’s theatre, can never be set 
aside as a classic in Etkind’s sense. However, demonstrating a degree of verisimilitude 
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between Berdyaev and Brecht has been helpful to understand the theory of disturbance as 
the imaginative deconstruction of the principles of the realm of Caesar 
 
 
b) The Practice of Revelatory Disturbance 
 
 
Disturbing law and lawfulness 
 
We are now in a position to address the ramifications of the theory of revelatory 
disturbance and discuss how this helps us to understand Berdyaev’s association of 
anarchism with Christianity. Perhaps the foremost consequence of devaluing the 
principalities of this world is the legalistic implication of non-belonging, and so we will 
begin by looking at Berdyaev’s belief that faith in Christ effects a certain detachment 
from the law of Caesar. This will lead us into social and judicial territories which together 
form the second major area in which the unsettling of secular norms results in an anarchic 
deconstruction of constituted authorities.  
Christianity has always had a complex relationship with the concept of law (both 
the Mosaic Law and the law of the state). As one would expect from an anarchic writer 
like Berdyaev the contrast between freedom and law is a major concern throughout his 
work. However, as it has hopefully been made clear, law, hierarchy and order are not 
necessarily at odds with an anarchic reading of Christianity, but the terms require precise 
and careful definition if they are to accord with Christian anarchism. The philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben offers some insightful commentary on the Christian attitude to law, 
which will help us to elucidate and consolidate Berdyaev’s position. Agamben’s 
messianic narrative involves a revocation and redefinition of the authority of law, and it is 
within Agamben’s notion of ‘messianic time’ that we can locate Berdyaev’s concept of 
freedom and use this to articulate the experience of living between the two competing 
ontologies of Spirit and Caesar.  
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 We have described anarchism as an era or an epoch traversing the period between 
Christ’s defeat of Caesar and the full sovereignty of his reign. Agamben’s representation 
of messianic time likewise takes its cue from the paradox of the now and the not yet.74 
Briefly, messianic time corresponds to the anarchic era insofar as both are concerned with 
action in the moment of suspension. Agamben describes messianic time as ‘the time that 
we ourselves are, and for this very reason, is the only real time, the only time we have’.75 
For Berdyaev this era between times is the only time in which we can make a free 
decision, it is the space of immediate freedom which has been carved out of the kingdom 
of man and re-oriented to the Kingdom of God. Similarly, Agamben defines messianic 
time as ‘that part of secular time which undergoes an entirely transformative 
contraction’.76 This transformation from secular temporality reveals the stifling 
limitations of legalism and opens up the possibility of freedom and autonomy. 
 Agamben wants to understand how in the process of transformation a Christian 
can integrate the law and yet remain separate from it. Although this is not the same as 
Berdyaev’s anarchism, it nevertheless reveals a certain correspondent attitude to law as 
both writers comment on the insufficiency of the law whilst conceding the necessity of its 
presence. Agamben writes, ‘the messianic is not the destruction but the deactivation of 
the law, rendering the law inexecutable’,77 and here we can see that like Berdyaev the fact 
of the law is upheld, but the power of the law is deactivated: Caesar is in being but his 
authority has been unsettled.  
Perhaps at this stage it will be helpful to clarify what we mean by ‘law’ in a 
Christian context. In Paul’s epistle to the Romans the meaning of the word ‘law’ is 
subject to some debate. In general his references indicate that he is referring to the 
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Mosaic Law and contrasting salvation through grace with justification by adherence to 
religious rules.78 However, Paul also extends the meaning of nomos to cover a wider 
application of law in terms of the governance of sin and death. He writes: ‘I find it to be a 
law that when I want to do right, evil lies close at hand. For I delight in the law of God, in 
my inner being, but I see in my members another law waging war against the law of my 
mind and making me captive to the law of sin’.79 The Berdyaevean discrimination 
between Spirit and Caesar seems to be apparent in the division between ‘the law of God’ 
and ‘the law of sin’. Berdyaev himself refers at times to the ‘law of Christ’80 and the ‘law 
of Caesar’.81   
Using Paul’s more general application of the concept of law, it becomes evident 
that there must be dissatisfaction with the ‘law of sin’ prior to encountering messianic 
freedom.82 Yet, as Paul indicates elsewhere, life in the Spirit is also acquiescence to a law 
of a different kind: ‘For the law of the Spirit of life has set you free in Christ Jesus from 
the law of sin and death’.83 The juxtaposition of freedom through law brings us back to 
the territory of paradox where autonomy and authority ‘impossibly’ co-mingle. If God is 
understood as the source of freedom, the religious imagination can be seen as a voluntary 
submission to the wellspring of all freedom.  
The identification of Christianity with anarchism becomes particularly important 
here, since such a conjunction could help to prevent the Christian understanding of 
submission to freedom from being mistaken for a secular version of Kantian autonomy. 
Peter Marshall claims that anarchism accepts Kant’s view of autonomy as self-imposed 
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rules which have been freely taken on by the individual.84 Yet, Paul’s epistle to the 
Romans teaches that outside of relationship with Christ there are no free choices as man 
is bound by his inordinate desire.85 Agamben would likewise argue that the secular world 
has an unawareness of messianic time, which prevents participation in the moment of 
freedom from the law. A radical revolution is required to make one aware of messianic 
time, as Paul indicates: ‘by dying to what once bound us, we have been released from the 
law so that we serve in the new way of the Spirit’.86 Here we can recognise the moment 
of disturbance as a necessary precursor to following Christ. The act of ‘dying to’ or 
‘putting to death’ worldly values is perhaps the ultimate expression of theological 
estrangement, which Paul presents as a mandatory initiation in order to enter into the 
freedom of the Spirit. 
In Destiny of Man, we can find a similar pattern demanding the total dismantling 
of the principle of law prior to receiving Christ’s message: ‘the Gospel overcomes and 
abolishes the ethic of law and replaces it by another, the higher and noble ethic of love 
and freedom. Christianity opens the way to the Kingdom of God, where there is no longer 
any law’.87 That is not to say that the Kingdom of God is without order, but that ‘law’ is 
not needed where the Spirit has supreme reign. This is based on the understanding that it 
is not the law which prevents the individual from sinning, but the power of Christ’s 
Resurrection imparted through the Spirit.  
An interesting interpretation of the Christian attitude to law can be found in 
Evagrius of Pontus’ discussion on apatheia written at the end of the fourth century. 
Apatheia (translated as ‘impassability’) is, according to Evagrius, the status reached when 
one is able to combat sinful passions. He writes, ‘The one who is perfect does not practice 
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abstinence and the one who is impassible does not practice perseverance, since 
perseverance is for the person subject to the passions and abstinence for the person who is 
troubled’.88 This state of apatheia, which is in-keeping with the idea of a detached 
attitude to the physical world, provides a parallel with Paul’s teaching: ‘if you are led by 
the Spirit you are not under the law’.89 This freedom from the law once again reflects the 
conditions of anarchia, whereby the law retains a superficial ontology, but its potency has 
been comprehensively destabilised.  
 
Disturbing the social and judicial 
 
 
The deconstruction of the concept of law witnessed in the New Testament is not only 
pitched against religious halakha90 but also extends into the territory of socio-political 
laws concerning class systems and the division of power. It might therefore not come as a 
surprise that in areas of dramatic social and political injustice Christians have led some of 
the major rebellions against the state, and in modern times this attitude has led to the 
foundation of Liberation Theology. Leonardo Boff, a central figure of the movement 
currently working alongside the marginalized in Brazil, echoes Paul’s words to the 
Galatians in his own ministry. For Boff, it is a manifest truth that ‘to enter the kingdom it 
is not sufficient to do what the law ordains’. He explains: ‘the present order of things 
cannot save people from their fundamental alienation. It is order in the midst of disorder. 
A change of life is required, a complete turnabout of the old situation’.91  
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Boff considers this ‘turnabout’ to be the non-conformity to earthly authorities, 
brought about by an imaginative disturbance of secular rule. In reference to the 
sentiments revealed in the Sermon on the Mount, Boff is emphatic this demonstrates that 
‘Christ did not come to bring a more radical and severe law, nor did he preach a more 
perfect pharisaism. He preached a gospel, which signifies good news: It is not the law that 
saves but love’.92 According to both Boff and Berdyaev the supreme anarchic dimension 
to the Sermon on the Mount is its disestablishment of commonplace norms, which Boff 
believes, ‘checkmates all fetishistic and inhuman subordination to a system, be it social or 
religious’.93   
The anarchic process of disturbing the social sphere, interestingly, corresponds to 
the type of political nihilism practiced by the Russian nihilists in the 1860’s, in which 
there was an ideological revolution that sought to break down and expose elitism 
embedded in Russian society.94 The historian Riasanovsky explains: ‘The earnest young 
men and women [nihilists] of the 1860’s wanted to cut through every polite veneer, to get 
rid of all conventional sham, to get to the bottom of things’.95 This, in some sense, echoes 
the agenda of theologians such as Boff and Berdyaev, but more fundamentally it shares in 
the basic sentiment of the gospels that God’s grace cannot be bought, earned or won by 
social status. 
One could perhaps recognise a nihilistic dimension to the Christian teaching of 
righteousness through faith. In Paul’s letter to the Romans he echoes the despondent 
words of the Psalmist: ‘None is righteous, no, not one […] all have turned aside; together 
they have become worthless; no one does good, not even one’.96 This moment of all-
encompassing negation of human righteousness is in one sense an echo of the nihilistic 
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belief that all human pretension to honour and virtue is baseless. Of course within 
Christianity this anarcho-nihilistic sentiment is offered alongside the jubilatory 
proclamation that through Christ we can attain righteousness and worth. However, the 
sense of jubilation is only so rich and joyous because of the contemplation of the 
desperate situation of man’s inability to redeem himself. So, although an anarcho-
nihilistic stance on the universe is not at all an accurate depiction of Christian belief,97 the 
association with nihilism, like anarchism, nevertheless communicates the ineffectual 
nature of all worldly systems of righteousness, echoing Paul’s claim: ‘all have sinned and 
fall short of the glory of God’.98 Hence, the abandonment of faith in humanity’s system of 
valuation shared by the anarchist and nihilist is perhaps closer to the message of Salvation 
than the attempt to justify oneself through obeying a set of rules or conformity to a model 
of social acceptability.  
A further reason Berdyaev gives for seeking to undermine the validity of secular 
justice is that it ignores the divine authorship of its moral standard. He believes that one 
of the central problems of secular government consists in its failure to recognise that 
‘good’ has a divine ontology and that this denial reveals the ultimate rebellion against the 
authority of the Kingdom of God. According to Berdyaev, ‘the concepts of good and evil 
incarnate in customs, depend on society, on the social whole, but good and evil 
themselves do not; on the contrary, society depends upon good and evil, upon their 
ontology’.99 Berdyaev reacts against the secular attempt to section off ontology from 
legality as he sees it as resistance to the permeation of the Spirit in the realm of Caesar 
and as a form of authoritarianism subjecting people to judgment whilst failing to account 
for the ontology of their measurement of justice. Berdyaev’s message remains relevant in 
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the current secular world where governments implement moral standards without 
recognition of a spiritual foundation. The application of Christian anarchism in this 
context seeks to unsettle the secular system in order to reveal the theological basis of 
moral discourse. Berdyaev believes that aspects of the Spirit are shackled within Caesar’s 
reign, and teaches that a radical stripping away of its secular trappings is required.  
A final, practical ramification of associating Christianity with an anarchic 
disturbance is the ability to communicate dissatisfaction with the basic concept of secular 
government. Peter Marshall reminds us: ‘anarchists believe not only that power corrupts, 
and power corrupts absolutely, but that power destroys both the executioner and victim of 
power’.100 From the perspective of Christianity, the victim of political power is not only 
the man who is wronged by bureaucracy, but also the man who feels a sense of moral 
satisfaction in his lawful abiding. It is easy for the law-keeping atheist to harbour an 
apathetic approach to divine Salvation, having experienced an impression of justification 
and righteousness through the law. The Christian endorsement of secular morality can 
additionally generate the common misconception that Christianity is about redemption 
through works and observing rules. Berdyaev’s concatenation of anarchy and Christianity 
prevents the spread of this fallacy and promotes an imaginative undoing of the values, 
practices and goals of the kingdom of Caesar.  
Accordingly, it seems appropriate for the Christian to use Berdyaev’s dramatic 
language to respond to the command to overcome the world in light of the conviction of 
things to come. Working from the conclusions reached regarding the distinction between 
the two realms and the effect of living in the freedom of messianic time, it follows that 
orthodox Christian thought is in line with Berdyaev’s conviction that the coming of God’s 
Kingdom terminates the authority of the kingdom of man. The book of Revelation 
declares ‘the former things have passed away’,101 until this is fully constituted Christians 
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seem called imaginatively to transcend the authority of sin, death and secular government 
in order to fulfil the command: ‘Put to death all that is earthly in you’.102 
 
 
v) Constructive Disturbance 
Behold the kingdom of God is in the midst of you  
Luke 17:21 
 
When we think of political anarchy, we tend to imagine an ideology which breaks, defies 
or deconstructs, and would not normally perhaps conceive of a restorative or 
reconstructive dimension to anarchy. Whilst it is clear that the type of socio-political 
disturbance discussed above is indeed a vital anarchic component, Berdyaev advances the 
idea that Christian anarchy also transforms and restores the world it has deconstructed. 
‘The new aeon’, he observes, ‘does not simply belong to the other world, to the other side 
of the grave, it is not something entirely different. It is also our world enlightened and 
transfigured and which has become creatively free’.103 Although this might appear to be 
an unlikely aspect of anarchy, Marshall has indicated that anarchy is not simply the 
moment of defiance, but the on-going ‘condition of a people living’. Anarchy does break, 
but for Berdyaev it is in order to rebuild; it is defiant, but so that it can reclaim; it 
intentionally unsettles, but always with the desire to transform.  
 This process of disturbing in order to recreate has something in common with 
Tolkien’s description of fairy-tales, which he believes follows the pattern of ‘escape, 
recovery and consolation’.104 In her essay, ‘Apologetics and the Imagination: Making 
Strange’ Alison Milbank discusses the first two aspects of Tolkien’s three-fold definition, 
explaining: ‘Escape speaks to our desire to burst the limits of our ordinary experience 
[…] The second function, recovery, returns us to our own world but seen in a new 
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way’.105 This pattern of disturbing the ordinary in order to accomplish its creative re-
vision, as we will see, is a close echo of Berdyaev’s account of Christian anarchy, which, 
having ‘burst the limits’ of the conventional, then seeks to restore and reveal the holy 
within the everyday.   
Tolkien’s model—in particular the aspect of recovery—can also help to convey 
the effect of the end of the Alice stories upon the reader’s imagination. We have discussed 
how the Alice narratives both culminate in revolt. Without wanting to undercut this 
violent climax it would be misleading to leave the discussion there, since in neither book 
is the end of Alice’s adventures the close of the story. The aim of recovery, Tolkien 
concludes, is to free the mundane ‘from the drab blur of triteness or familiarity’.106 In a 
similar way, Carroll closes both stories by appealing to dream and memory which, as 
before, disturbs the world of sense, but this time in order to awaken an appreciation of the 
marvellous within the commonplace rather than simply overturning or undermining its 
governing principles. We might allude to Coleridge’s description of Wordsworth’s poetry 
as representative of literature’s transformative potential, and endeavour to find out if 
Carroll’s nonsense has the same ability: ‘to give the charm of novelty to things of every 
day, and to excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural’.107 
In the first book Alice wakes from the dream-world and relays the dream to her 
sister. This affects the sister’s experience of the real world, which becomes oddly 
enchanted by Alice’s tale. Carroll tells us the sister ‘began dreaming after a fashion [...] 
the whole place around her became alive with the strange creatures of her little sister’s 
dream’.108 There is confusion here between dream and reality—her senses appear 
bewitched as she experiences aspects of Alice’s adventures for herself in a semi-
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conscious state where fantasy and dream crossover into the commonplace.109 Still, the 
idea of transformation in the first novel is somewhat limited, for although the sister ‘half 
believed herself in Wonderland’ she anticipates that when she opens her eyes ‘all would 
change to dull reality—the grass would be only rustling in the wind […] the rattling 
teacups would change to tinkling sheep-bells’.110 Nevertheless, despite the return to the 
quotidian, Alice’s nonsense tale has brought, albeit fleetingly, a ‘charm of novelty to 
things of every day’.  
By the close of Through the Looking-Glass, however, the transformation of the 
commonplace has been intensified and Carroll never fixedly establishes the demarcation 
between the dream world and reality. The book ends with a poem that not only reflects on 
a distant fantasy but draws the past into his present. Carroll acknowledges on the one 
hand that his reality has returned to the mundane: ‘Long had paled that sunny 
sky/Autumn frosts have slain July’. Yet he also indicates, on the other hand, that a sense 
of the wondrous lingers or returns:  
A boat beneath a sunny sky, 
Lingering onward dreamily 
In an evening of July 
 
Carroll implies that his fantasy has been disturbed and disrupted both by the waking of 
his character in the story and the adult awakening of the child, Alice Liddell. And yet 
something has lingered, July has both been slain and yet remains. Carroll accepts that in a 
temporal sense we are ‘Ever drifting down the stream’ and yet he focuses on the 
experience of ‘Lingering in the golden gleam’. Hence, the concluding poem is not simply 
nostalgia or pessimism as some scholars have indicated.111 Rather, there is a more 
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complex interpenetration of disturbance and transformation. Part of the complexity is the 
haunting experience of memory, for at the end of the story we find no certainty but both a 
presence and an absence, an anarchic paradox holding together commonplace reality with 
its simultaneous wondrous re-imagining.   
 Another way of expressing the lingering sensation of half-recollecting an 
impression of the marvelous would be to describe it as a sort of ‘homesickness’. Alison 
Milbank notes how the objective of certain fantasy writers is ‘to awaken in the reader this 
feeling of homesickness for the truth’.112 Carroll’s nonsense stories do not end with a 
feeling of ‘homesickness for the truth’, but they do invoke a sense of homesickness for 
the fantastic, a sort of yearning after the wondrous, ‘whose echoes live in memories 
yet’.113 It could be argued that the feeling of longing here is merely Carroll’s own 
wistfulness for ‘“happy summer days” gone by’,114 though he does seem to ‘excite a 
feeling analogous to the supernatural’ by transporting the reader back to their own 
childhood when the world was strange and mystical. Perhaps this is just a homesickness 
for the youth we can never recapture; however, the recollection and re-enactment of 
childhood’s sense of the fantastic can also be seen as an endeavour that endows the reader 
with the ability to conceive of an alternative version of reality—one of the foremost aims 
of Berdyaev’s theology. 
 
a) The Creation of the New: Transforming the individual  
 
The transformation of the commonplace in many ways intensifies anarchic subversion, 
since it involves a double rebellion—a subversion, that is, of the original subversion. To 
put this another way, anarchy, might not simply be an act which breaks down, but a 
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revolution that also rebuilds and re-creates. This contention will be explored by 
considering the transformation of the self and the re-creation of the world as the 
counterpart to anarchic disturbance. Within the Christian narrative, rebirth and new life 
follow naturally from the putting to death of the laws of Caesar. St. Paul explains: ‘Now 
we are released from the law, having died to that which held us captive, so that we serve 
in the new way of the Spirit and not in the old way’.115 Berdyaev’s understanding of 
spiritual revolution closely echoes this statement. We have seen anarchy’s destructive 
capacity; we turn now to its creative endeavour.  
Berdyaev’s concept of creativity has its roots in the Imago Dei. Since God is a 
creator and we are made in his image, Berdyaev believes man’s purpose is to create, and 
like God, to create ex nihilo.116 Berdyaev describes the nature of creativeness as ‘the 
making of something new that had not existed before’.117 A dominant theme in The 
Realm of Spirit and the Realm of Caesar is the creation of the new man, which I will 
discuss as the transformation of self. The connection to anarchy is still central in the 
process of transformation, since the creation of the new for Berdyaev is the ultimate goal 
of spiritual revolution. 
The principle of newness according to Berdyaev is what distinguishes spiritual 
revolution from secular revolt. He proposes that Christianity alone is revolutionary and 
that secular revolutions are revolutionary in a much weaker sense or not at all, since he 
believes that God alone is able to effect change at a fundamental level:  
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It must be said of political revolutions, even the most radical of them change man 
comparatively little. We hear much of the great difference between the bourgeois 
and the communist man, but the victorious communist, once he has got into power, 
may be inwardly and spiritually, to the very marrow of his bones, a bourgeois […] 
Only a new birth, the birth of the spiritual man […] may be the real appearance of a 
new man.118  
 
Leonardo Boff, though writing in a different century and continent, makes a very similar 
argument. He considers ‘newness’ to be a definitional characteristic of revolution that 
differentiates the reformer from the revolutionary. ‘Reformers’, Boff writes, ‘want to 
better their social and religious world. Reformers do not seek to create something 
absolutely new […] Revolutionaries, in contrast to reformers, do not merely want to 
improve the situation. They envisage the introduction of something new, the changing of 
the social and religious game rules’.119 
Consequently, for both thinkers, authentic revolution is not contained within the 
socio-political sphere, as here they see no potential to bring about the quality of genuine 
newness. ‘A political revolt’, Berdyaev writes, ‘is a reaction against the old without 
creating something new’.120  It is effectively disturbance without transformation. Garrett 
Green presses this point in his examination of Berdyaev and implies that Christianity is 
unable to accept contemporary political revolution because it is not revolutionary 
enough.121 This explains why for Berdyaev the social and political components of 
anarchism are propelled by, and only fully realized in, the Christian imagination. In 
addition to (and as a result of) the creation of the new, Berdyaev identifies the emergence 
of personality as another central aspect of spiritual revolution.  Paul preaches that the new 
man in Christ is one who has cast off his ‘old self’ and received through grace a new and 
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truer self,122 or to use Berdyaev’s terminology, he has gained, for the first time, real 
personality.  
For both Paul and Berdyaev the creation of the new man has an eternal 
dimension,123 and insofar as the kingdom of man is bound to the finite, the emergence of 
personality heralds the presence of an infinite power. ‘Personality’, Berdyaev declares, ‘is 
a break-through, a break with this world’.124 As ever, the tension between the two realms 
is evident and we have seen how this rift engenders a spiritual deconstruction of Caesar’s 
terms. Now it is becoming clear that the destruction of the old self gives way to its re-
creation. This is the same language Paul uses to communicate the radical transformation 
of the self in conversion: ‘If anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation. The old has passed 
away; behold, the new has come’.125  
A final important aspect of the creation of the new concerns the transformation of 
the will, whereby the freedom of the will imparted by the Spirit combats an individual’s 
predilection to sin. Like personality, Berdyaev defines freedom as an eruption within the 
delimitations of the realm of Caesar. ‘Freedom breaks into this world’, he writes, 
‘Freedom comes from another world: it contradicts and overthrows the law of this 
world’.126 It is clear from this that Berdyaev sees freedom as destructive, but there is also 
room for suggesting that freedom is reconstructive as it restores the creative potential of 
the Imago Dei within the individual. The interjection of freedom to the kingdom of man 
demonstrates that God is able to enter into and radically re-orient the will of individuals. 
In the scope of Berdyaev’s writing, freedom is one of the most pervasive themes. 
Berdyaev synthesizes freedom with truth. He pairs it with personality and links it to the 
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creative imagination; freedom is the foundation of both personality and newness.  Within 
Berdyaev’s anarchism, the transformation of the will also involves the baptism of the 
imagination, a phrase associated with C. S. Lewis.127 Michael Ward explains how when 
Lewis read George MacDonald’s Phantastes, it awoke  
‘[…] Lewis’s imaginative capacity for understanding “holiness”’. It led to the 
‘sanctification of all common everyday things, not by throwing them out in order 
to make room for some transcendent but alien reality, still less by replacing them 
with an irrational, fantastic never-never land, but by changing their meaning from 
the inside, transforming them, illuminating them with a different light’.128  
 
Ward summarises here the essential point of the analogy between Christianity and 
nonsense literature. We are not arguing that after reading the Alice novels we should try 
to integrate nonsense aesthetics into our picture of reality. Rather, we are suggesting that 
they may help us to recast ‘common everyday things’ in the light of something 
supernatural or wondrous. 
Alison Milbank has suggested that creative imagining has an implicitly 
theological function, and she makes the important statement that it is not only when our 
imagination is directed towards the religious that it has a theological role, but considers 
that there is something in all imaginative creativity that connects the participant to the 
divine. She writes: ‘God works in us through the imagination: it is his instrument. When 
we consciously imagine, in the sense of making art or poetry, we engage in a similar, if 
lesser, act of re-creation, seeking meaning and unity in what we experience, dissolving 
only to re-create’.129 The pursuit of reading nonsense on one level causes us to imagine in 
terms which revise the conditions of the familiar world; so a rabbit hole turns into the 
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portal to a magical world, the common horse-fly is transformed into ‘a rocking-horse fly’ 
and a regular pack of playing cards becomes an animated collection of insane characters. 
 To return to Berdyaev’s understanding of the imagination, he believes that the 
transformation from living under the conditions of Caesar to those of the Spirit is enabled 
by power of the imagination to alter the perception of the real in order to discover the 
spiritual reality of the Kingdom of God. Berdyaev explains: ‘the unseen world is not a 
reality forced upon us or compelling us; it derives from freedom of the spirit. And what 
the free spirit creates, is the most real’.130 Once the individual has been made free in 
Christ, his imagination is reborn, enabling him to see for the first time the reality that 
God’s invisible reign is already established on earth. The belief that there is an attainable 
and ideal alternative world, which has already usurped the reign of Caesar appears as 
anarchism to the secular mind. The believer’s imaginative transformation of the world of 
appearances imaginatively suspends the vision of quotidian reality and establishes the 
anarchic moment wherein the supreme reign is not visibly constituted, in a world where 
the ruling power is not actually ruling.  
It may seem, at first glance, that there is nothing unique about Christianity’s 
imaginative construction of an ideal. Indeed, recalling the earlier example of Brecht, his 
atheistic, Marxist utopia, as Dickson concedes, ‘did share the basically optimistic belief 
[…] that human society is in a state of continuous flux, incessantly striving towards 
higher forms’.131 This legitimises Dickson’s description of the utopic dimension of 
Brecht’s work and destabilises the Christian belief in the shattering newness of the 
imaginative advancement of the Kingdom of God. However, Dickson admits that 
‘[Brecht’s] vision does not seriously envisage a state of absolute perfection as a realistic 
socio-political objective’.132 This is why Brecht’s subversive writing, from Berdyaev’s 
perspective, would be considered only as a shadow of the true anarchism of Christianity. 
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‘The idea of the new man, the new Adam, or re-birth,’ emphasises Berdyaev, ‘is a 
Christian idea’.133 Hence, the transformation of the individual is not simply a dressing-up 
of the old self in new clothes, but a spiritual rebirth via the imagination effecting genuine 
change. 
 
b) The Restoration of the Old: Re-creating the world 
 
 
We have discussed transformation as a force of imaginative freedom that inspires 
individuals to seek an alternative mode of engaging with the world. Whilst it is both 
fitting and orthodox to speak of a race of new men, if we end our process of 
transformation at the level of individual restoration this could potentially lead to two 
misrepresentations of Christian anarchy: one could conceive of a spiritual race 
imaginatively elevated above the secular realm; or alternatively it might lead to the idea 
that Christians see themselves as the only remaining survivors amid the ashes of Caesar. 
Instead, however, the Bible affirms that the Kingdom of God is already transforming and 
re-creating the kingdom of man from within the historical: ‘The kingdom of God is not 
coming with signs to be observed, nor will they say “Look here it is!” or “There!” for 
behold the kingdom of God is in the midst of you’.134 Thus, what we are looking for in 
Berdyaev’s account of Christianity is evidence that anarchic disturbance gives way to a 
vivid restorative transformation of the physical and historical. We are aiming to discover 
if Berdyaev’s Christian anarchism agrees with Boff’s conviction that, ‘The Kingdom of 
God is not to be in another world but is the old world transformed into a new one’.135  
Berdyaev’s theology is sometimes criticised as gnostic and heterodox owing to 
his sympathy with hermeticism and mysticism. The American theologian Carnegie 
Samuel Calian raises a characteristic Presbyterian concern with respect to Berdyaev’s 
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theology: ‘there is within Berdyaev’s thoughts a distinct dualism which is not found in 
the biblical view of the world and which is not without its dangers. This view is the 
outspoken gnostic-dualistic devaluation of this world’.136 Critics have suggested that 
Berdyaev’s emphasis on revolution as a spiritual takeover leaves us with a gnosticised 
church and a cosmologised Caesar. This could imply that Berdyaev’s anarchism is not 
really anarchic enough, as he does not allow for a true restoration of the historical. An 
orthodox interpretation of ‘spiritual revolution’ requires a revitalisation of the world from 
within and without. Giving equal emphasis to the historical is an important demonstration 
of God’s ultimate sovereignty as it reveals God’s ability to redeem history in a way which 
both preserves historical reality and transfigures it to become the perfect reflection of 
transcendental truth.   
 There are indeed certain grounds for suggesting that Berdyaev perhaps downplays 
the internal redemption of the realm of Caesar,137 but this feature is still nonetheless 
present in his theology and to overlook it entirely as Calian does is unfair. Although 
Berdyaev defines himself as a Christian theosophist in the introduction to Freedom and 
the Spirit, in the same paragraph he emphasises: ‘my purpose is not to introduce heresy of 
any kind’.138 Berdyaev describes truth as ‘the kindling of a light within being’,139 which 
posits an eschatological revitalisation of the world. He insists that even for the unbeliever 
‘there is the experience of the meaning of history, hidden behind its meaninglessness’.140 
This concept of the hidden nature of spiritual truth contributes to its status as anarchic by 
emphasising that the change has not yet come into visible fullness, but is nevertheless 
operative in all spheres of life, including the social and historical. This unseen defeat and 
unobserved restoration can be considered as a creative form of negative positing, which 
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obliterates and simultaneously recreates the realm of Caesar under the sovereignty of 
Spirit.  
For Berdyaev, then, it would be more accurate to state that the revolutionary 
component of Christianity is not only exhibited in its destructive capacity, but also in its 
restorative power.141 He identifies the devastating effects of the victory of Christ as the 
glorious transformation of the individual, social and cosmic: ‘the Kingdom of God is the 
transfiguration of the world, the transfiguration of the individual man, but social and 
cosmic transfiguration as well’.142 This demonstrates that Berdyaev’s spiritual revolution 
is not as gnostic as it first appears. Berdyaev is concerned about the redemption of the 
historical, and although he sees the gospel as a destructive force, destruction as we have 
seen is part of the process of transfiguration.143 
Both the destruction of Caesar and the construction of Spirit coalesce in ‘the 
creative transfiguration of reality’.144 This is the dynamic, paradoxical assertion that at the 
point of the abolition of Caesar its transfiguration is taking place. Boff makes a similar 
assertion: ‘the Kingdom of God is a total, global and structural transfiguration and 
revolution of the reality of human beings; it is the cosmos purified of all evils and full of 
the reality of God’.145 Boff implies that Christianity is truly revolutionary because it is 
this world that will be, and is being, transformed. In other words, whilst the kingdom of 
man is being destroyed and impeded, it is also being enlightened and reborn. This is the 
paradoxical conclusion of the principle that ‘the kingdom is already present and 
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fermenting within the old world’.146 The transformation of the world thus involves man’s 
imaginative participation in Christ’s victory. 
The Church has an integral role in the transformation of the reality and as we 
discussed in the section on the two realms the Church is both present in the ‘old world’ 
and maintains a degree of holy separateness. The transparent language of anarchy helps to 
make the Christian understanding of allegiance clear. In reference to the status and role of 
the Church within the realm of Caesar Berdyaev writes: ‘the Church is not manifested 
and revealed in all the fullness of its being and does not realize all the possibilities 
contained within itself. Its complete actualization and Incarnation will mean the 
transfiguration of the cosmos, the coming of a new world, the setting up of the Kingdom 
of God’.147 This quotation demonstrates Berdyaev’s commitment to transformation and 
not merely disturbance by suggesting that the presence of the Church in the world has a 
transfigurative power. 
The eschatological authority of the ‘inwards church’148 is one example of the 
Christian attachment to what is not yet, which indicates that the constitution of God’s 
Kingdom is eschatological and inward. Yet, Christianity also teaches that it is equally 
important to emphasise how the eschaton is already present and manifest (albeit 
imperfectly) in the Church, the body of Christ. By upholding the already/not-yet paradox, 
the anticipation of the inwards Church is also conceived of as a present encounter 
experienced now as a different sort of ruling. So we can see how Berdyaev’s description 
of the ‘inwards church’ is not entirely divorced from its outward expression, though his 
emphasis is on an eschatological now, restoring the past and present by anticipating a 
future reality. The paradoxical status of the Church thus entails the revelatory disturbance 
of our conventional conception of time and linearity as well as a radical alteration of our 
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concept of power. This creates a direct challenge to the logic of the secular realm, 
demonstrating that the perverse rationality of Wonderland might offer valuable insight 
into the Christian attitude of living in the now and the not-yet. 
 
vi) Conclusion: ‘Embodied Twilight’149 
 
In both Christianity and nonsense we have witnessed a lifting of ‘the film of 
familiarity’150 through an imaginative process of the disturbance and transformation of 
the commonplace. Our discussion of the anarchic dimension to the Alice books concluded 
by demonstrating how there is a crossover between disturbance and transformation—
whilst the dream-world is subverted by the intrusion of reality, remnants of the fantastic 
linger on and enchant the real-world. Carroll closes his book by asking: ‘Life, what is it 
but a dream?’ prompting the reader to question the distinction between sense perception 
and imagination.  
This is also an important theme emerging in Berdyaev’s work; it is particularly 
central in his philosophical autobiography, Dream and Reality. Contrary to modern 
empiricism, Berdyaev believes dream is the objective realm of Caesar, while reality 
concerns the Kingdom of God. The imagination is therefore critical in facilitating the 
transformation of the world of appearances and a re-envisioning of the secular realm 
under a divine rule, which is both present and eschatological. Christianity, as we have 
seen, does not teach that the Kingdom of God is unrelated to this world, but neither does 
it claim that it has arrived in full. The era of anarchy is not final; it is a temporary 
measure describing the current ‘now and not yet’ condition of the world where God is 
still to be revealed in his fullness. To return to our conclusion from the chapter on 
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paradox, describing Christianity as anarchic is a further realisation of de Lubac’s 
pronouncement that ‘the synthesis of the world has not been made’. 
The anarchic aspect of the Christian imagination thus seems to be in-keeping with 
the paradoxical as it involves a blend of incompatible pairs; rebellion and submission; 
human freedom and divine law; integral engagement and absolute detachment. Berdyaev 
insists on the tension of man’s existence, describing the human condition as ‘at the 
border-line between two worlds’.151 It might therefore be helpful to conceive of the 
interplay between Spirit and Caesar in terms of twilight. The Christian, as we have seen, 
is called to not lose sight of the vision of God, nor to abandon the broken world. He is 
twixt-light or tween-light;152 ‘a being belonging to two worlds’;153 in the world but not of 
the world; preaching a message which destroys and re-builds. Chesterton uses similar 
language to describe the state of humanity: ‘The ordinary man has always been sane 
because the ordinary man has always been a mystic. He has permitted twilight. He has 
always had one foot in earth and the other in fairyland’.154 From our analysis of 
Berdyaev’s theology it has become apparent that the mental straddling of the two 
kingdoms requires an imagination of contrary states: a perpetual noetic twilight.  
Accordingly, Christianity finds itself in the anarchic era of transition between 
‘Christianity this side of the end, to eschatological Christianity, which foreshadows the 
end of this spell-bound world of ours’.155 Berdyaev insists that ‘this is not a period of fear, 
inertia and frustration, but one of daring and creative endeavour’.156 The imagination 
therefore performs a vital role in advancing the Kingdom of God through a corrective 
disordering or an anarchic re-envisaging of the world in the light of the resurrection 
claim. 
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Life under the sovereignty of Spirit brings with it a necessary estrangement from 
the familiar, which is a pattern that as we have seen occurs in nonsense literature where 
the appearance of things is often misleading.157 Man’s creative capacity to envisage the 
world contrary to how it seems ‘requires’, as Berdyaev writes, ‘another type of 
knowing’.158 This ‘type of knowing’, I want to suggest, is more akin to nonsense 
narratives than modern rationality, since both Christianity and literary nonsense demand a 
cognitive reversal of the conventional perspective. Nonsense signals that the given-ness 
of reality as it appears to us can be questioned. Christianity believes that because there is 
a post-lapsarian distance between how things look and the ontological ‘real’, the outward 
face of the world should be questioned. Whilst acknowledging, as ever, the manifold 
differences between nonsense and Christianity, the following two quotations testify to the 
aptness of this association. One quotation describes the anarchic element of literary 
nonsense; the other presents the anarchic dimension to Christianity. Without consulting 
the footnotes, it is not at all clear which refers to which: 
 
[X] sets out to question received wisdom and in the process it stimulates 
new ways of thinking. This makes it highly effective for writers who 
want to comment on, and so affect society, and those who propose new 
ways of representing culture. 
 
 
[X provides] liberation from the bonds of the present system of living. 
[X] takes place by playing games […] We discover with a laugh that 
things need not at all be as they are and as we have been told they have 
to be. 
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The first is a commentary by a secular critic referring to the purpose of nonsense in 
children’s literature;159 the second is Jürgen Moltmann’s description of the Christian 
attitude to the world in the light of the resurrection claim.160 In both cases X could be 
substituted for either nonsense or Christianity, although neither writer intended to describe 
the other. 
Anarchy and nonsense thus appear to be analogous in the preaching of non-
conformity in a non-conformist mode. The correlation between religious faith and the 
anarchic aspect of the nonsensical imagination ultimately consists in the participant’s 
capacity to think in terms that contradict a secular interpretation of the familiar world. 
This apparently inadvertent link might tell us something significant about the nature of 
both nonsense and Christianity. Perhaps literary nonsense could be helpfully used in 
dialogue between believers and atheists to explain some aspects of Christian faith. Perhaps 
a more thorough inquiry into the potential ontological significance of nonsense might 
offer a new and illuminating method of approaching criticism of literary nonsense. I will 
return to consider these ideas following our examination of the third and final component 
of the nonsensical imagination: namely, the childlike. 
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Chapter Three: The Childlike 
 
i) Nonsense and the Childlike 
 
Twenty years after the publication of the first Alice story in 1865 Carroll reflects in a 
letter: ‘The germ of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland was an extempore story, told in a 
boat to 3 children of Dean Liddell: it was afterwards, at the request of Miss Alice Liddell, 
written out for her’.1 For many literary critics, anxious to unearth Wonderland’s hidden 
meaning, there almost seems to be a disappointment at the story’s apparent spontaneity, 
as if its whimsical origin is somehow problematic for serious study. Juliet Dusinberre 
believes: ‘Since Alice has become accepted into the cannon of adult literature it is partly 
as an excuse for this new attitude that critics have tried so hard to prove that Dodgson 
meant very much more by his two stories than light-hearted amusement for children’.2 
Dusinberre appears to be articulating a sense of embarrassment attached to the adult 
enjoyment of a story meant for children and the need felt by many critics to invest the tale 
with some deeper significance. John Pudney, consulting Duckworth’s diaries, emphasises 
that ‘Duckworth testified the tale’s spontaneity: ‘I rowed stroke and he rowed bow […] 
and the story was actually composed and spoken over my shoulder for the benefit of Alice 
Liddell’.3 Moreover, Duckworth’s report coincides with Alice Liddell’s own recollection 
of the event: 
Nearly all of Alice’s Adventures Underground was told to us on that blazing 
summer afternoon […] on the next day I started to pester him to write down the 
story for me […] It was due to my ‘going on’ and importunity that, after saying 
he would think about it, he eventually gave the hesitating promise which started 
him writing it down at all. This he referred to in a letter written in 1883 in which 
he writes of me as the ‘one without whose infant patronage it might possibly 
have never had written at all’.4 
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We have little reason, then, to doubt testimony of the story’s ‘germ’, and it is important 
that we establish this as we approach the third strand of the nonsensical imagination: the 
childlike. In our treatment of the Alice stories so far, we have deduced little from the fact 
of Alice. By this, I mean two things; firstly, as we have seen the creation of Wonderland 
came about as an attempt to entertain the real Alice. Secondly, the reader experiences the 
stories through Alice—we journey at her pace and witness Wonderland via her thoughts 
and her encounters.5   
 Twenty-five years after the famous boating trip and following the immense 
success of the two Alice stories, Carroll still thinks the original circumstance important to 
emphasise. In an article written on the adaptation of Alice for the stage, Carroll again 
recalls the tale’s foundation: ‘And so, to please a child I loved (I don’t remember any 
other motive), I printed in manuscript, and illustrated with my own crude designs’.6 And 
yet, as Michael Hancher observes, ‘whatever his original intentions, by 1890 Carroll had 
accepted the fact that adults enjoyed his children’s books’.7 Moreover, Hancher 
emphasises, ‘no other children’s book has been so thoroughly appropriated by adults’.8 
So, without denying that the reader may well be an adult, we still have to deal with the 
fact that the child is the central character and also the intended audience and ask if this 
has particular significance for the reader’s imagination.  
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Carroll’s acceptance that adults enjoyed his books does nothing to alter the 
centrality of the child, but, rather, Carroll believes, reveals something childlike in the 
adult reader. In a letter to a grown-up admirer of the books, Carroll writes: ‘that children 
love the book is a very precious thought to me, and next to their love I value the 
sympathy of those who come with a child’s heart to what I have tried to write about a 
child’s thoughts’.9 This allows us legitimately to expand ‘the fact of Alice’ to the 
category of ‘child’.10 Carroll, after all, refers to Alice as ‘child of my dreams’11 and it is 
this element of child, or the childlikeness of Alice, that Carroll recalls in a letter to the 
grown-up Alice Liddell. He refers to her as ‘one who was, through so many years, my 
ideal child-friend’.12  
Carroll concludes Wonderland’s prefatory poem by entreating his muse: ‘Alice! A 
childish story take’.13 Here, ‘child’ has become an adjective. ‘A childish story’ introduces 
the idea of child, not only as audience and character, but as a primary descriptor of the 
story’s genre. At this point we can return to Lecercle, who concludes his Philosophy of 
Nonsense by suggesting that the child is at the core of his theory of nonsense. ‘It will 
come as no surprise to the reader if I say that the content of the myth is the figure of the 
child (nonsense as a genre is a modern version of the great Romantic myth of the 
child)’.14 The conjunction of the child and nonsense would certainly come as no surprise 
to Chesterton, who begins his ‘Defence of Nonsense’ from the premise that the ‘sense of 
the abiding childhood of the world [is found] in the literature of nonsense’.15  
Chesterton describes the world as having the characteristic of childhood. 
Likewise, in offering nonsense as a genre (not merely a word-game) Lecercle introduces 
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the figure of the child as a property of the genre. But perhaps the most transparent 
emphasis on the unavoidable connection between nonsense and the child comes from 
Elizabeth Sewell, who believes: ‘child shall be that which in each of us, regardless of age, 
responds to Nonsense verse; Nonsense shall be that to which this child responds’.16 What 
Sewell is exploring here is the idea that there is something about nonsense which is 
inherently childlike, that is to say it is both suitable for children, and exercises some 
deeper childlike nature in the imagination of the adult. Walter De La Mare identifies this 
element resonant in Carrollian nonsense, believing that it is in the imagination that the 
adult reader is able to ‘come with a child’s heart’ to experience this story for children. He 
writes: ‘It is the child that is left in us who tastes the sweetest honey and laves its 
imagination in the clearest waters to be found in the Alices’.17  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the degree to which the presence of the 
childlike in Carroll’s nonsense literature corresponds to Christian conceptions of the 
childlike. This will be done by identifying four central childlike qualities that Alice 
displays—simplicity, wonder, trust and an aptitude for make-believe—and deciding to 
what extent (if at all) they correlate with religious ideas. In-keeping with the overarching 
aims of the thesis I am interested in considering the ways in which the reader’s encounter 
with the childlike affects the imagination. Let us commence then, by trying to understand 
what precisely it means to approach nonsense literature ‘with a child’s heart’.  
Daniel F. Kirk in his treatise Charles Dodgson Semiotician begins from a similar 
starting point: ‘In short’, he writes, ‘to visit happily in the land of the Duchess and the 
Red King, one must surrender the attachments to familiar language thinking patterns he 
strove so hard to form when he was young, for he must assume, once again, the eager 
simplicity of a child’.18 In this quotation we can identify a link between the anarchic 
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element of the nonsensical imagination and the idea of the childlike discussed thus far. 
Kirk seems to imply that the authority of established patterns of thought need to be 
overthrown, or at least held in abeyance in order to enter the realm of nonsense. 
Accordingly, the narrative of nonsensical imagining seems to require an anarchic 
disturbance of the familiar followed by a childlike re-envisioning of events. This 
‘disturbance’ may be equally described as a matter of happily accepting the nonsensical 
appearance or suggestion of things, but however we interpret the revision of the familiar 
it is the child within the adult that conducts the imagination when the world is made 
strange. 
Edmund Wilson believes that Carroll understands the child within the adult or 
‘the more primitive elements of the mind of maturity’ because ‘[he] is in touch with the 
real mind of childhood’.19 Critics have suggested that Carroll’s sensitivity to the child’s 
mind is a consequence of his failure to grow-up. Perhaps the capacity for imagining in 
nonsensical terms, past childhood, is a manifestation of the reader’s own resistance to 
maturity. John Skinner, speaking from a psychoanalytical perspective, proposes that the 
childlike elements in Carrollian nonsense arise from the fact ‘that Lewis Carroll remained 
at a childish level in his emotional life’.20 He concludes, ‘Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, 
who did not dare become an adult […] remained the eternal child’.21 From this 
perspective, it would seem that the Alice stories offer adult readers a means of escape 
from the real world; a retreat into the world of nonsense, the realm of the child. This 
implies that to think in childlike terms is a turning away from reality.  
However, even if this is a correct account of childlike imagining, it does not 
appear to be an accurate understanding of Carroll’s perspective. His biographer Cohen 
explains: ‘they [the children] more than any other force, fired his imagination, and he 
found, like Blake, that they saw into the heart of complex truths more clearly and 
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perceptively than weary adults’.22 Cohen’s insight reverses the psychoanalytic position 
and offers instead the belief that the child opens up (rather than shuts down) our vision of 
reality.23 
The suggestion that imagining in childlike terms illumines rather than conceals 
the real begs certain questions—such as, what is unique about the child’s mind? And, 
why place such significance on childlike imagining? If we look closely at moments where 
Carroll extolls his love of the child, it is noticeable that his adulation is often intriguingly 
connected to his religious faith: ‘The why of the books cannot, and need not, be put into 
words. Those for whom a child’s mind is a sealed book, and see no divinity in a child’s 
smile would read such words in vain’.24 Carroll further tells us that ‘the true child [is] a 
spirit fresh from God’s hands’,25 ‘that ‘tête-à-tête intercourse with children [is] very 
healthy and helpful to one’s own spiritual life’,26 and that the child is in some sense 
‘purer, and nearer to God, than one feels oneself to be’.27  
These quotations indicate that for Carroll there is an important connection 
between the holy and the child. Although Carroll believes that nonsense should be 
consciously put aside when considering theological matters, if, as Carroll supposes, 
nonsense and divinity are connected to the child, then it seems legitimate to conceive that 
nonsense and divinity are connected through the child. If this is the case, then despite 
Carroll’s desire to separate nonsense from theological contemplation, the two may prove 
to be intimately related. It is this possibility that the chapter will explore. 
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ii) Christianity and the Childlike 
 
The suggestion that religious thinking is childlike might seem like the allegation of 
the sceptic rather than the viewpoint of the Christian. Alongside associations of purity 
and innocence, the childlike, as Skinner is keen to observe, has connotations of 
naivety, immaturity and blinkered idealism. Charles Taylor in A Secular Age 
explains: ‘A very common objection of unbelief to Christianity has been that it offers 
a childishly benign view of human life, where everything will come right in the end, 
something which the really mature person cannot believe, and is willing to do 
without, having the courage to face reality as it is’.28 Unless, therefore, we can 
discover a coherent scriptural warrant for confronting the world ‘with a child’s heart’, 
it may be advisable for Christianity to avoid association with the term.  
Let us begin with a consideration of the idea of the childlike in Scripture. In each 
of the gospels, Jesus calls his disciples to become like a child, and on each occasion, this 
command is coupled with the doctrine of Salvation. In canonical order the references are: 
Matthew 18:3, ‘Unless you change and become like little children you will never enter 
the kingdom of heaven’. Mark 10:15, ‘Whoever does not receive the kingdom of God as 
a little child will never enter it’. Luke 8:17, ‘Truly I tell you, whoever does not receive 
the kingdom of God as a little child will never receive it’. John 3:3, ‘Very truly, I tell 
you, no one can see the kingdom of God without being born from above’.29 In each case, 
the injunction is emphatically expressed as a negative syllogism (if not p then not q). 
This suggests that the childlike is a more than an analogy of peripheral significance to 
Christianity. 
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Nevertheless, it could be argued in his first letter to the Corinthians that Paul 
gainsays this command to be childlike. Instead, Paul seems to encourage the Corinthians 
to grow out of their childness and become adults in their faith. He writes: ‘When I was a 
child, I spoke like a child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child; when I became an 
adult, I put an end to childish ways’.30 However, Paul’s reproach to the Corinthians can 
only be seen to contradict Christ’s commandment if ‘become like children’ is taken to 
mean ‘become children’. It is necessary for the Christian to observe that Christ instructs 
his disciples to become ‘as’ or ‘like’ a child. In this sense, John’s gospel helps to qualify 
the other three references by demonstrating that Jesus is not commanding a physical 
reversion to childhood, but describing a childlike quality. How essential, though, is such a 
quality? 
In the gospels, this childlike quality seems to be presented as a prerequisite for 
salvation. The evidence of its necessity can be found in the connective propositions 
inherent within the gospel commands. In the Greek, both Matthew and John use the 
conditional conjunction  meaning ‘if’. Mark and Luke use  as an alternative, 
which, although without a direct English translation, denotes an aspect of contingency, 
whereby the action of the sentence is similarly dependant upon the circumstance of the 
verb. In all four cases  is present, which not only introduces a negative statement, but 
coupled with  has the effect of making the negation imperative. This reveals that the 
childlike cannot be ‘bracketed-out’ from an examination of the Christian faith.  
Having accepted the term’s significance, it is still not clear what precisely is 
meant by childlike in either nonsense or faith. The presence of the term has been affirmed 
in both cases, but the specific characteristics may share little or no resemblance. In order 
to explore what might be meant by the term from a religious perspective, this chapter will 
lean on the commentary of George MacDonald, who is perhaps the pre-eminent thinker 
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on the relationship between theology and the childlike. In addition, MacDonald was also 
Carroll’s close friend and a writer of children’s fairy tales and was instrumental in 
encouraging Carroll to publish Alice in Wonderland.31 MacDonald insists that his own 
stories are not written ‘for children, but for the childlike’32 and establishes his theology 
from a simple, overarching principle that ‘God is child-like’.33 In his Unspoken Sermons, 
MacDonald presents the following deduction:  
God is represented in Jesus, for that God is like Jesus: Jesus is represented in the 
child, for that Jesus is like the child. Therefore God is represented in the child, for 
that he is like the child. God is child-like. In the true vision of this fact lies the 
receiving of God in the child.34  
 
This implies that the childlike is not just a phase in relationship with God, but is the 
essential and abiding formula of that relationship.  
This initial step in the contemplation of the childlike has reached a similar 
conclusion to that expressed by Angela-Shier Jones: ‘for the theologian […] the journey 
is not optional. In order to obey the biblical imperative to become like a little child […] 
the richness and complexity of childhood must be explored’.35 However, there are a 
number of definitional issues to consider concerning the conflating definitions of ‘child’, 
‘childhood’, and ‘childlike’.  
The clarification that the childlike is distinguishable from the child is a helpful 
observation to prevent the creation of ‘immaterial fairy-children’,36 where it is 
presupposed that children possess inherent childlike qualities. Peter Green admits there 
has been a tendency, especially in the Victorian era, for ‘Children [to] become the ideal 
                                                     
31
 Carroll’s diary entry on May 9th [1863] ‘Heard from Mrs MacDonald about “Alice’s Adventures 
Under Ground”, which I had lent them to read and which they wish me to publish’. Lewis Carroll’s 
Diaries (Bedfordshire: The Lewis Carroll Society, 1993). 
32
 George MacDonald, A Dish of Orts (Whitehorn: Johannesen, 1996), p. 317. 
33
 George MacDonald, Unspoken Sermons I, II, III (Whitehorn: Johannesen, 1999) ‘The Child in the 
Midst’, p. 12. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 A. Shier-Jones, ‘The Never-Land of Religion and the Lost Childhood of the Children of God’ in 
Children of God: Towards a Theology of Childhood, (ed.) Angela Shier-Jones (Suffolk: William 
Clowes, 2007), p. 183. 
36
 U. C. Knoepflmacher, Ventures into Childland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 157. 
  
157 
symbol of their elders’ glutinous yearning for purity’.37 We could perhaps entertain this 
idea if it were true that all children embody an unreserved purity, in which case the 
childlike would be translatable with the child. In a letter to Mrs T. Dyer-Edwards, Carroll 
expresses indignation at the assumption that he possessed a universal delight in children. 
‘I do not (as is popularly supposed of me) take a fancy to all children, and instantly: I fear 
I take dislikes to some)’.38 Carroll thus accepts, along with MacDonald, that there are 
children who are not in the least childlike. MacDonald believes: ‘One of the saddest and 
not least common sights in the world is the face of a child whose mind is so brimful of 
worldly wisdom that the human childishness has vanished from it as well as the divine 
childlikeness’.39 It seems fair to assume that it is the childlike child to whom Carroll was 
most attracted. In a letter to the mother of Enid Steves he writes, ‘many thanks for lending 
me Enid. She is one of the dearest of children. It is good for one (I mean one’s spiritual 
life, and in the same sense in which reading the Bible is good) to come into contact with 
such sweetness and innocence’.40 From this comment we can further distinguish Carroll’s 
belief that the child (that is, the childlike child) reveals some aspect of divinity and 
speculate that Carroll perceived such qualities in Alice Liddell, his ‘ideal child-friend’ 
and further, in her literary self, incarnated these qualities. 
MacDonald makes a similar observation in his paraphrase of Matthew 18:5 
(‘whoever welcomes one such child in my name welcomes me’). He writes: ‘“He that 
sees the essential in this child, the pure childhood, sees that which is the essence of me,” 
grace and truth—in a word, childlikeness’.41 MacDonald’s contention is not that the 
particular child in Jesus’ teaching is perfected in the image of Christ, but that the child 
reveals the essential childlikeness of Christ.  
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In his sermon ‘The Child in the Midst’ MacDonald explains ‘[Christ] could never 
have been a child if he would ever have ceased to be a child, for in him the transient 
found nothing. Childhood belongs to divine nature’.42 In this quotation MacDonald puts 
forward the view that Christ is an eternal son since he has an infinite father. In a later 
sermon, MacDonald develops this idea explaining ‘because his father is his father, 
therefore he will be his child. The truth in Jesus is his relation to his father’.43 The 
sonhood of Christ is not confined only to his life on earth; it is expressed as a constant 
mode of interaction, both incarnate and triune: ‘I came from the Father and have come 
into the world; again, I am leaving the world and going to the Father’.44 Christ’s speech 
implies that it is his sonhood that is infinite and his personhood (both adult and child) that 
is conditional. 
 For MacDonald, Christ’s eternal sonhood authorises his claim that ‘childhood 
belongs to divine nature’.45 However, the usage of the word ‘childhood’ is potentially 
misleading since it could imply that the Christian cannot enter adulthood and remain a 
son of God.  Although according to the Bible Jesus was incarnate first as a child,46 the 
focus of the gospels is on the adulthood of Jesus; it is in his adult ministry that he is 
ascribed the titles ‘Master’,47 ‘Teacher’,48 and  ‘Lord’.49 Whilst this is not disputed, John 
Milbank argues that ‘it is Christ the confused child who dies upon the cross’.50 Evidently, 
Christ was at the peak of his physical maturity at the point of his crucifixion, so if it is at 
all fitting to refer to him as ‘child’ this must be interwoven with his status as son. 
MacDonald unpacks this suggestion for us:  
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He who is the Unchangeable could never become anything that He was not 
always, for that would be to change. He is as much a child now as ever he was. 
When he became a child, it was only to show us by itself, that we might 
understand it better, what he was always in his deepest nature.51  
 
Thus, the definition established here is that Christ participated fully in both childhood and 
adulthood whilst remaining continuously childlike, and his childlikeness is linked to his 
sonship. 
It seems that we are now able to affirm that sonship is an important aspect of the 
childlike. However, if sonship was all Christ intended to convey in commanding his 
disciples to become like little children he could have done so in many other ways, and 
with much greater clarity by using the word ‘sonlike’, or alternatively, as he does 
elsewhere, by using the metaphor of man’s earthly parents to express that God is like a 
parent.52 One of the evident distinctions between sonhood and childhood is that the title 
‘son’ does not disappear in adulthood.53 It therefore seems unlikely that the childlike, in 
the context of the gospels, means only the sonlike, as there would be no distinction 
between any human being and the little children. The child-son is not more sonlike than 
the adult-son; that is to say, the essence of his sonship is not somehow more true in his 
infancy. Therefore, whilst it will be recognised that sonship is part of the childlike, it is 
not this quality alone which Christ identifies in the child. It is important, therefore, not to 
dismiss the child or childhood as irrelevant but to understand that their function is 
analogical; the childlike is the essential category. 
In relation to the wider thesis, we were able to establish paradox and anarchy as 
thematic elements within the stories. The childlike, however, is more amorphous because 
the theme is primarily discerned through the character of Alice. Therefore, to structure 
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this chapter I will examine Alice’s most prominent childlike qualities individually, 
considering each in relation to MacDonald’s theological writings, specifically his 
homiletic series Unspoken Sermons and The Hope of the Gospel.  
Alice is of course not a perfectly childlike child. Among other fallen traits, Alice 
displays stubbornness, irritation and pride. But, as Carroll recognised in her namesake, 
she also possesses certain childlike qualities. Most significantly, however, ‘Alice is the 
first fictional child to escape from the moral-finder’,54 and in being stripped of a projected 
moral or immoral attitude, Carroll is free to present Alice as a childlike child as opposed 
to a ‘good child’ or a ‘bad child’, and she represents a helpful heuristic guide from which 
to begin deciphering specific characteristics of the childlike.  
MacDonald commences his discussion of the childlike from the following 
premise: ‘Nothing is required of man that is not first in God’.55 He appeals to Matthew 
18:5 to provide evidence for his claim: ‘Whoever welcomes one such child in my name 
welcomes me’. He explains: ‘For it is in my name. This means as representing me; and, 
therefore, as being like me’.56 MacDonald then proposes ‘when he tells them to receive 
such a little child in his name, it must surely imply something in common between them 
all—something in which the child and Jesus meet’.57 This chapter will be concerned with 
identifying the nature of this ‘something’ and the grounds upon which ‘the child and 
Jesus meet’.  
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iii) Simplicity 
 
Simplicity will be considered as the first point of association between Christ and the 
child. I will draw upon Carroll’s direct connection between the child and simplicity as a 
warrant for proceeding with the subject, and then explore the biblical relationship 
between simplicity and faith, consulting MacDonald to see if, and in what sense, he 
acknowledges simplicity as a childlike attribute. Simplicity has been chosen as an initial 
childlike quality because Carroll uses the term frequently in his diaries and 
correspondence to convey his reason for delighting in the company of his child friends.  
In a letter describing a photography session with the five-year-old daughter of Dr. 
Gray, he writes, ‘she is so perfectly simple and unconscious that it is a matter of entire 
indifference to her whether she is taken in full dress or nothing’.58 To the mother of 
another child friend he emphasises: ‘I have never seen anything more beautiful in 
childhood than their perfect simplicity’.59 These two letters by no means stand alone in 
Carroll’s use of simplicity as a way of characterizing the child, but they may suffice as a 
prima facie indication of its relevance. 
Alice in Wonderland closes with Carroll’s contemplation concerning ‘how she 
[Alice] would keep, through all her riper years, the simple and loving heart of her 
childhood […] how she would feel with all their simple sorrows, and find a pleasure in all 
their simple joys, remembering her own child-life and the happy summer days’.60 It is not 
clear from these quotations what exactly Carroll means by ‘simple’ or ‘simplicity’ or if it 
is very much more than Victorian sentimentality. What is a ‘simple heart’ or a ‘simple 
sorrow?’ In what way might simplicity be related to ‘indifference’ as Carroll’s comment 
above implies? Let us suspend these questions for a moment whilst we look briefly at the 
biblical usage of the term. 
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In the New Testament, the word  is often translated as ‘simplicity’ 
although the Greek also denotes singleness and wholeness. Its derivatives  
and  are also interpreted as simplicity and singleness. In Matthew 6:22, for 
example, Christ declares: ‘The lamp of the body is the eye. If, then, your eye is  
[simple, single, undivided] your whole body will be bright’. In a like manner Paul 
articulates his concern for the Corinthians that ‘as the serpent deceived Eve by its 
cunning, your thoughts will be led astray from a sincere and  [simple, single, 
whole] devotion to Christ’.61 The New Testament principle of simplicity seems to be 
concerned with the teaching that the Christian cannot serve two masters,62 and that to be a 
true child of God demands undivided or  obedience. Theological simplicity thus 
consists in the ability to give oneself to God, with a whole and undivided will. 
MacDonald identifies in Christ this same simplicity or singleness of vision. He 
writes: ‘his thought was ever and always his Father. To its home in the heart of the Father 
his heart was ever turned […] No vain show could enter at his eyes; neither ambition not 
disappointment could distort them to his eternal childlike gaze’.63 Perhaps this can help to 
illuminate Carroll’s idea of a ‘simple sorrow’ as a disappointment or misfortune, which, 
whilst acknowledging the element of sorrow, does not upset the simplicity of the 
‘childlike gaze’. If the focus of an individual is truly  then ‘sorrows’ and 
‘joys’ become illumined by (and do not detract from) such focus. MacDonald explains 
that ‘the simple purity of a single affection’ enables man’s personal vision to become a 
‘willed harmony of dual oneness […] with God’.64 From this it is possible to deduce that 
Christ’s purpose is always , since his mission consists solely in the carrying out 
of his Father’s will. Such a purpose according to MacDonald is childlike because it is 
perpetually defined within the unity of the relationship between Father and Son. 
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For MacDonald it is important to affirm that childlike simplicity is not entirely 
abstracted from childhood simplicity. In direct terms MacDonald writes, ‘At childhood’s 
heart, the germ of good, lies God’s simplicity’.65 Elsewhere he warns against 
‘Forg[etting] the simplicity of childhood in the toil of life’,66 a simplicity which John 
Milbank believes allows the child to remain ‘relatively immune to the goals of ambition, 
possession and sexual conquest’.67 The idea that children are in some sense removed from 
the ‘toil of life’ could be connected to their dependence and trust in parental provision, 
which might indicate that the child’s lack of burden reveals something of the simplicity of 
divine childlikeness.  
This belief that the child is liberated from anxiety as a result of parental 
dependence has a clear connection with Christ’s proclamation of God’s provision: ‘do not 
worry about your life, what you will eat or what you will drink, or about your body what 
you will wear […] your heavenly Father knows that you need all these things’.68 Perhaps 
Christ appeals to the epithet ‘Father’ because of its metaphorical significance; the true 
‘child’ of God is assured that their ‘Father’ will provide for them, and so the disciples 
who heed this message exhibit the Christian virtue of non-attachment to anything other 
than God. The evocation of the parent/child relationship seems to be a practical way of 
explaining what simplicity achieved within the toil of life looks like. Simplicity is 
manifest as an unburdened attitude to the world, which frees the individual from a 
consuming attachment to things. ‘Cast your burdens onto me,’ declares Christ, ‘for my 
yoke is easy and my burden light’.69Although in a sense the Alice stories are not without 
darkness, the overarching sentiment remains light: they refuse to mourn; they will not be 
burdened.  
                                                     
65
 George MacDonald, ‘To My Sister’ in Poems (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Roberts, 
1857), p. 223. 
66
 George MacDonald, ‘Wordsworth’s Poetry’, A Dish of Orts, p. 255. 
67
 John Milbank Fictioning Things, p. 4. 
68
 Matthew 6:25, 32. 
69
 Matthew 11:30. 
  
164 
Much literary criticism on the genre of nonsense focuses on its complex and 
intricate linguistic games. For example, Kimberly Reynolds emphasises that ‘literary 
nonsense requires a high degree of technical knowledge and intellectual sophistication for 
its effects’.70 Without denying that much of Carroll’s humour relies on semantic puns, the 
narrative structure of the Alice books reveals a radical simplicity as Becker-Lennon 
observes. She remarks: ‘the utter simplicity of the opening of Alice is disarming, and no 
explanations are required […] by paragraph three the rabbit has taken a watch out of its 
waistcoat pocket and started down the rabbit-hole and in paragraph four Alice is down 
after it’.71 The lack of logical explanation is a characteristic feature of the nonsense 
narrative, which lends itself to an extremely simple, paratactic narrative: something 
happens and then something else happens. As Wim Tigges acknowledges in his definition 
of the genre: ‘[nothing] can be obtained by considering connotations or associations 
because these lead to nothing’.72 Although in some ways this seems like an overstatement 
by Tigges—there is, for example, a link between the egg in the shop and the egg-shaped 
Humpty Dumpty, however, it is true that on the whole there is no progressive linearity to 
the narratives.    
U. C. Knoepflmacher in Ventures into Childland explains, ‘The structure of 
“Through the Looking-Glass” relies on what James Kincaid rightly calls “a series of 
good-byes” in which the parting from the gnat and the fawn “are succeeded by the 
climactic farewell with an old wasp”’.73 This structural device also seems to be prominent 
in Wonderland, such as the sudden appearing and then vanishing of the Cheshire Cat, or 
the abrupt transfiguration of characters such as the baby into a pig. The very fact the 
stories are dream narratives is often a disappointment to the reader, especially the adult, 
who may be looking for Wonderland as a means of escape, but finds that the tales refuse 
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their entrapment. Alice is not in the least disappointed to find out she was only dreaming, 
nor is she traumatized from her adventure. She merely expresses ‘what a curious dream!’ 
My point here is not that there is any formal theology in the structural lightness of 
the dream narrative, but that engagement in nonsense literature encourages the reader to 
imagine in terms of non-attachment. Like Alice, the reader must become accustomed to 
letting go of expectations and not getting weighed down by negative emotions. The 
reader is expected to approach new situations in the story without the learned anxiety that 
comes from allowing past traumatic experiences to dictate present attitude. Whether 
kings, caterpillars or mad hatters, Alice engages each with the same straight-forward 
simplicity, unfractured by ‘goals of ambition, possession and sexual conquest’. According 
to W. H. Auden, the simplicity of Alice’s character is a symbol of ‘what, after many years 
and countless follies and errors, one would like, in the end, to become’.74 Alice draws the 
reader into an experience of wholeness, which provides (albeit inadvertently) an 
analogous participation in Christian simplicity.  
To refer back to our original question: would it make sense for Christ to say 
‘unless you change and become simple like this little child you will not enter the 
Kingdom of heaven?’ It would seem so, if Christianity believes in the actual provision of 
Christ’s promise, then the Christian ought to possess a childlike lack of burden, an 
‘unclouded brow’, a oneness of will enabling the individual to enter into the same 
 relationship to the Father as Christ. Simplicity thus seems to be one element 
connecting the Alice stories to a Christian account of the childlike. 
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iv) Wonder 
 
Following the description of her ‘pure unclouded brow’ in the prefatory poem to Through 
the Looking-Glass, Carroll identifies Alice’s ‘dreaming eyes of wonder’.75 Perhaps the 
recognition that it is in Wonderland that Alice has her adventures, reveals some other 
aspect of her childlike nature. Elsewhere, Carroll describes Alice as ‘curious—wildly 
curious, and with the eager enjoyment of Life that comes only in the happy hours of 
childhood, when all is new and fair’.76 This abiding sense of newness and curiosity 
characterises Carroll’s understanding of the child’s capacity for wonder. Alice follows the 
White Rabbit because she is ‘burning with curiosity’77 and recalls her adventures as ‘a 
wonderful dream’.78 Whilst Alice experiences a range of reactions, wonder seems to be 
her primary response to the world she encounters.  
Virginia Woolf believes that the type of wonder associated with childhood stems 
from a literal perception of reality. She explains: ‘To become a child is to be very literal; 
to find everything so strange that nothing is surprising […] It is to be Alice in 
Wonderland’.79 Woolf puts forward the belief that Alice is not only immersed in a 
wonder-land, but in a consuming attitude of wonder, whereby ‘everything’ is strange. 
This idea could be supported by the fact that her musing outside wonderland is equally 
wonder-filled. Take, for example, her contemplation of nature: ‘I wonder if the snow 
loves the trees and fields, that it kisses them so gently?’80 Her wondering at the snow is 
divorced from the effect it has on her; it is an appreciation of the thing for its own sake. In 
addition, her animated perception and quasi-personification imbues everyday events in 
the natural world with a sense of magic. 
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 Alice has no learned immunity to the phenomenon of the natural world for she still 
exalts in the wonder of the everyday. She delights in the washing habits of her cats as 
much as she marvels at talking chess pieces or dancing lobsters. This suggests a constant 
condition of wonderment rather than isolated astonishment. Alice does not experience 
wonder as aberrant or nonsensical intrusions into ‘reality’. Rather, her constant state of 
wonder enables her to distinguish between the merely sensational and the truly wondrous. 
Her sense of wonder is not dependant on, nor radically heightened by, the extraordinary 
circumstances because from her perspective, ‘everything is queer […] Everything is so 
out-of-the-way’.81 The important point to observe here is that Alice experiences wonder 
as a comprehensive vision. 
 In Ronald Hepburn’s essay on ‘wonder’ he draws a distinction between different 
types of wonder including ‘surprise wonder’ and ‘existential wonder’. ‘Surprise wonder’, 
he explains is an encounter with something astonishing, which disappears once an 
explanation has been found or once normalcy resumes. This type of wonder, given its 
contingency, does not fully represent Alice’s consuming attitude of wonderment. 
Hepburn acknowledges that there are ‘varieties of wonder which are not undermined by 
causal explicality’;82 such as ‘existential wonder’, which he further characterises as 
‘wonder’ at ‘the sheer existence of a world’.83 This type of wonderment seems more aptly 
to characterise Alice’s manner of perceiving the world. Hepburn’s ‘existential wonder’ is 
closely related to Chesterton’s depiction of ‘spiritual wonder’, which, like Alice’s 
condition of wonderment is concerned with an ongoing mode of perception not isolated 
instances of particular amazement.84 
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Chesterton indicates that the spiritual element present within childhood wonder is 
related to an instinct of exaltation and awe.85 This could be why MacDonald emphasises: 
‘To cease to wonder is to fall plumb-down from the childlike to the commonplace—the 
most undivine of all moods intellectual. Our nature can never be at home among things 
that are not wonderful to us’.86 MacDonald believes the unchildlike are not at home, 
because the unchildlike do not delight in the mundane. They have lost their ‘simple sense 
of wonder at the shapes of things’,87 which for Chesterton and MacDonald is vibrantly 
present in the child. ‘For grown-up people’, explains Chesterton, ‘are not strong enough 
to exalt in monotony’.88 He believes that children, on the contrary, ‘want things repeated 
and unchanged’.89  Chesterton concludes that God has the ‘eternal appetite of infancy; for 
we have sinned and grown old, and our Father is younger than we’.90 This suggests that 
the failure to sustain a childlike awed appreciation of the everyday is a characteristic of 
man’s fallen nature. 
 Assuming, for the moment, that the Christian ought to possess an attitude of 
wonder even within the most mundane circumstance, how, then, might a Christian 
respond to the miraculous? We can draw some insight from Christ’s reply to the 
Pharisees’ demand for miracles: ‘And he sighed deeply in his spirit and said, “why does 
this generation seek a sign? Truly, I say to you, no sign will be given to this 
generation”’.91 Instead, he blesses the believers ‘who have not seen and yet have 
believed’.92 It could be suggested that it is a childlike unsensational attitude to wonder 
that Christ desires in response to his miracles. MacDonald explains: ‘Those who would 
not believe without signs and wonders, could never believe worthily with any number of 
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them’.93 This quotation indicates, perhaps surprisingly, that within Christianity the type of 
‘surprise-wonder’ elicited by Christ’s miracles is not the essence of wonderment, and in 
fact, focus on the sensational seems to miss the point entirely.94  
 To support this claim it might be helpful to contrast the varying responses of the 
chief priests and the children to Christ’s miracles. Both parties have witnessed the healing 
of the blind and the lame: 
When the chief priests and scribes saw the wonderful things that He did, and the 
children crying out in the temple, ‘Hosanna to the Son of David!’ they were 
indignant. And they said to him, ‘Do you not hear what they are saying?’ And 
Jesus said to them, ‘Yes; have you never read, “Out of the mouths of infants and 
nursing babies, you have prepared praise”’.95 
 
It could be assumed that the jubilation of the children after seeing the healing is certain 
indication that religious wonder is deeply connected to astonishment and marvel. 
Although this is undeniably an aspect of the children’s adulation, Christ doesn’t 
commend them because they are suitably impressed by his miracles; rather, he seems to 
use them as a point of comparison with the unbelieving scribes. Both parties have seen 
the miracles and yet the priests and scribes still won’t believe even with signs and 
wonders. Their indignation indicates that a Christian concept of wonder is not located in 
the sensational because to those without a sense of wonder even the sensational doesn’t 
appear to be wondrous. This might indicate that ‘surprise-wonder’ is an aspect of 
‘existential wonder’ and that to engage in the former one must already possess the latter. 
 The Christian understanding of wonder seems therefore to be located in an 
approach to the world and not induced by the miraculous. It is this attitude that Christ 
both blesses and identifies within the child, and it is here that Jesus and the child meet. 
Christ’s Incarnation can be seen as the embodiment of the miraculous entering the 
ordinary and his life exemplifies the importance of the ordinary within the miraculous. He 
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subverts the fallen expectation that ‘wonder’ means a sort of gnostic ascent from reality 
and instead lifts reality into the realm of the wondrous. Chesterton echoes this sentiment 
in his essay ‘Defence of China Shepherdesses’, suggesting that the function of religious 
imagination ‘is not to make strange things settled, so much as to make settled things 
strange; not so much to make wonders facts as to make facts wonders’.96  MacDonald, 
like Carroll, believes this is the natural approach of the child, for whom everyday events 
are as extraordinary as the uniquely miraculous.  
 This interpretation of wonder appears compatible with the foregoing category of 
simplicity, since a sensational construal of wonder does not allow the subject to focus on 
the miracle per se, but is overcome by the individual power associated with the ability to 
astonish. If such astonishment is not also located in the everyday, relationship with God 
ceases to be  but oscillates and becomes contingent upon sensational 
circumstances. In his novel, Phantastes, MacDonald uses the journey into fairyland to 
articulate his concept of childlike wonder. He explains that one who travels in fairyland, 
‘takes everything as it comes; like a child, who, being in a chronic condition of wonder, 
is surprised at nothing’.97 It is the type of wonder that leads to a delight in the object 
itself, rather than in the sensation generated in the beholder.  
 To refer back to Carroll’s description of Alice, wonder has been described as an 
on-going approach to reality rather than a momentary climactic encounter, contingent 
upon an astounding event. The distinction between ‘surprise-wonder’ and a more 
enduring type of ‘existential wonder’ was highlighted by considering Christ’s reproach 
to the demand of the Pharisees and the indignation of the scribes even after having 
witnessed a miracle. We saw how the Bible set these attitudes in contrast to the 
children’s adulation and considered the nature of childlike wonder assisted by 
MacDonald whose protagonist believes, ‘the eye of the child, whose every-day life, 
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fearless and unambitious, meets the true import of the wonder-teaming world around 
him, and rejoices therein without question’.98 The perpetual astonishment at the everyday 
seems to be an important characteristic of childlike faith, and an attitude naturally 
assumed in a nonsense world in which ‘everything is strange’.   
  
 
v) Trust 
 
After Carroll defines Alice as ‘wildly curious’, he describes her as ‘trustful, ready to 
accept the wildest impossibilities with all that utter trust that only dreamers know’.99 This 
‘utter trust’ may be described as ‘credulity’ in the sense that Alice trusts without 
suspicion or wariness. For example, when she notices a doorway in a tree she 
acknowledges, ‘that’s very curious!’ and then immediately reasons, ‘But everything’s 
curious to-day. I think I may as well go in at once’.100  Alice’s inclination to react with 
trust rather than fear allows her natural curiosity to be satisfied. Her utter lack of wariness 
over unknown consequences is a clear demonstration of her impulsive credulity.  
 This is compatible with the conclusions drawn from the discussion of wonder in 
that it keeps open and defends the child’s un-delimited sense of the possible. By this, I 
mean that Alice’s trust in some sense safeguards her experience of the incredulous. For 
example, Alice asks herself: ‘Would it be of any use […] to speak to this mouse?’ She 
answers, ‘everything is so out-of-the-way down here, that I should think it very likely it 
can talk: at any rate, there’s no harm in trying’.101 Because she trusts, her capacity for 
wondrous experience increases. 
 The principle of trust therefore extends the realm of wonder by insisting upon the 
trustworthiness of the incredulous real, and it is this manner of credulous imagining that 
Jacqueline Flesher believes is requisite for engaging in nonsense texts. She writes: 
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‘Nonsense can be read at different levels. Like most great children’s books, it is not 
simply a book for children. It can be read with the freshness of a child or the critical mind 
of an adult. Yet, in a way, a full appreciation of nonsense requires “a willing suspension 
of disbelief”’.102 In this quotation, Flesher seems to suggest that trust is the most 
appropriate mode for interpreting nonsense, indicating that the reader must practice 
accepting (if only for the sake of story) wild impossibilities. The reader is led by the child 
in this exercise of credulity, guided by Alice’s internal dialogue of curiosity followed by 
her instinctive trust.  
In order to find out if trust, like simplicity and wonder, forms parts of the 
common ground where ‘the child and Jesus meet’ we need to first identify the concept 
within Scripture before drawing upon MacDonald’s theology to explore this union in 
greater depth. Trust is in many ways the primary seed of faith. Paul communicates this in 
his letter to the Hebrews: ‘whoever would draw near to God must believe that he 
exists’.103 Trust, we learn, is necessary for any manner of union with God, it is not some 
superior quality possessed by the learned disciple. Specifically in reference to Salvation, 
John’s gospel records Christ’s emphasis: ‘Truly, truly, I say to you, whoever hears my 
word and believes him who sent me has eternal life’.104 The double use of the adverb 
ἀμὴν ἀμὴν makes clear the supreme importance Christianity places on accepting the 
trustworthiness of the testimony of Scripture. 
Whilst it is clear that trust is a necessary feature of faith, it is not evident why this 
is specifically linked to the child. Tolkien’s famous essay ‘On Fairy Stories’ provides 
some insight. He observes: ‘A child may well believe a report that there are ogres in the 
next county’.105 Tolkien emphasises that this is not because the child desires to live in a 
mythical world, but because a goblin is in one sense just as plausible as an elephant, and 
                                                     
102
 Jaqueline Flesher, ‘The Language of Nonsense in Alice’, in Yale French Studies, No. 43, The 
Child’s Part (1969), p. 144. 
103
 Hebrews 11:6. 
104
 John 5:24. 
105
 J. R. R. Tolkien, ‘On Fairy-Stories’, p. 118. 
  
173 
the child, in general, has an instinctive trust. The child’s unadulterated naivety is 
precisely why Dusinberre believes the child has a noetic advantage over the adult. She 
explains in reference to Alice’s interaction with the unicorn, ‘The child’s capacity for 
belief […] is infinitely greater than the adult’s because every aspect of his experience 
tests it. He has no ground of acquired knowledge from which to divide the phenomena of 
the world into the real and unreal’.106 This helps to address the question of whether trust 
is a necessary criterion for a child to ‘understand’. It can be inferred from Dusinberre’s 
statement that because the child’s grasp of reality is limited, his verification must be 
based upon an intuitive trust rather than some prior belief system. For Dusinberre this 
means that that the position of scepticism is unnatural to the child. 
In more directly theological terms, Chesterton affirms that a lack of scepticism is 
required for a discernment of Christian truth. He writes: ‘the degree to which we can 
perceive [truths] depends strictly upon how far we have a definite conception inside us of 
what is truth. It is ludicrous to suppose that the more sceptical we are the more we see 
good in everything’.107 Alice seems to possess the type of intuitive trust described by 
Dusinberre and Chesterton: her worlds are full of possibility. ‘“Oh, how I wish I could 
shut up like a telescope! I think I could if only I knew how to begin.” For, you see, so 
many out-of-the way things happened lately, that Alice had begun to think that very few 
things indeed were really impossible’.108  
Within Carroll’s nonsense worlds fearlessness seems to emerge as an important 
prerequisite for trust. Donald Rackin ascribes to Alice a type of innocent fearlessness, 
which he specifically connects with her status as child. He writes: ‘Alice enters upon her 
journey underground simply because she is curious with the fearlessness of an innocent 
child ‘never once considering how in the world she was to get out again’.109 ‘Is it because 
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Alice is a child’, he asks, ‘that she fails after all this to see Wonderland for what it is? Is it 
her youthful ignorance that makes her miss the dangerous significance of a grin without a 
cat?’110 Alice does not fear the Cheshire Cat because she trusts in the essential goodness 
of the creature’s intent. She acknowledges it has ‘very long claws and a great many 
teeth’,111 but still maintains that ‘it looked good-natured’.112 Despite the Cheshire Cat’s 
flagrant defiance of Alice’s normal creaturely expectations, she still thinks the Cat is 
trustworthy enough to ask for directions. 113  
Alice’s fearlessness, based on her instinctive trust, shares an analogous 
association with the child of God, who is instructed to be ignorant to the fear that comes 
from insecurity. ‘Have no fear of them’, Christ commands, ‘for nothing is covered that 
will not be revealed, or hidden that will not be known’.114 The focus of Christ’s teaching 
is the trustworthiness of God, which overcomes man’s fearfulness. MacDonald 
comments: ‘It is not alone the first beginnings of religion that are full of fear. So long as 
love is imperfect, there is room for torment […] When the conscience is not clear, the 
anxiety may well amount to terror’.115 This, as MacDonald argues, is a form of 
superstitious fear which is outside a relationship of trust. MacDonald is adamant that a 
fearful conscience is the result of ‘a lack of faith and childlikeness’, suggesting that fear 
comes from a deficiency of trust in the Father’s character.116 MacDonald affirms: ‘The 
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true son-faith is that which comes with boldness, fearless of the Father doing anything but 
what is right fatherly, patient, and full of loving-kindness’.117 
In his sermon on ‘The Cause of Spiritual Stupidity’ MacDonald declares: 
‘Distrust is atheism, and the barrier to all growth. Lord, we do not understand thee, 
because we do not trust thy Father’.118 He agrees that trust is attributable to the childlike, 
and uses the suffering of Job as an example: ‘The true child, the righteous man, will trust 
absolutely, against all appearances, the God who has created in him the love of 
righteousness. God does not, I say, tell Job why he had afflicted him: he rouses his child-
heart to trust’;119 and it is trust that MacDonald links to divine illumination.120 Thus, when 
Christ asks his disciples to become like children, he is not demanding an epistemological 
regression. Instead, he uses the child to demonstrate that it is possible to be a part of the 
world of experience and yet remain one of the ‘innocently fearless’.121 It is the child, 
‘impregnably fortified in a helpless confidence’,122 who is able to achieve naturally what 
the disciples must endeavour to re-learn.  
Perhaps this is why in his essay ‘Fictioning Things’, John Milbank writes that the 
child’s ‘initial imaginative and intuitive response’ contains ‘more authority than the adult 
reflection’.123 Alice in many crucial ways displays the type of instinctive trust valued by 
Christian thinkers and we see once more how nonsense might not be the negation of 
theological truth, but analogous to the type of thinking required for theological insight. 
One such element is Alice’s innocently fearless approach to her adventures, which, 
considered in conjunction with wonder, suggest that ‘the child and Jesus meet’ in an 
incredulous reality approached with ‘helpless confidence’ 
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vi) Make-Believe 
 
Trust has been discussed as the natural orientation of the child and a manner of perceiving 
the world, without which faith is impossible. It was suggested that Alice’s trusting nature 
is in some sense responsible for her experience of the wondrous—because she trusts, she 
increases her engagement with the incredulous. Alice’s entrance to Wonderland, for 
example, is only possible because of her trusting reception of the White Rabbit. However, 
her entry into Looking-Glass Land is not located in the credulous reception of an 
extraordinary event, but rather in her own creative appetite for the fantastic: her ability to 
make-believe.  
Let’s pretend there’s a way of getting through into it, somehow, Kitty. Let’s 
pretend the glass has gone all soft like gauze, so that we can get through. Why it’s 
turning into a sort of mist now, I declare! It’ll be easy enough to get through—124  
 
and so she does. Here Alice’s capacity for make-believe gives way to actual belief.  
Carroll describes Alice’s make-believe as an on-going gamelike approach to 
reality: ‘“Kitty, dear, let’s pretend—” And here I wish I could tell you half the things 
Alice used to say, beginning with her favourite phrase “Let’s pretend”’.125 There appears 
to be a self-referential wink in this reference to Alice’s make-believe, for in a sense 
Carroll, Alice and the reader are all playing the game together. Indeed, the dominance of 
the theme in Through the Looking-Glass is such that not only does Alice make-believe in 
Looking-Glass Land, but Looking-Glass Land makes-believe in her. Tweedledum and 
Tweedledee explain to Alice: ‘You’re only one of the things in his [the Red King] dream. 
You know very well you’re not real’.126 The unicorn overcomes his doubt at the existence 
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of a human child (‘I always thought they were fabulous monsters’127) by proposing a 
game of make-believe (‘if you’ll believe in me, I’ll believe in you’128). 
In order to explore whether make-believe is a theological category connecting 
Jesus and the child, I want to invoke Catherine Pickstock’s concept of liturgical 
impersonation as a way of explaining the role of make-believe in religious 
transformation. I will then appeal to C. S. Lewis’ concept of ‘dressing-up as Christ’ in 
which he discerns a strong correlation between mature faith and the imaginative play of 
childhood. 
To begin with, however, it is not immediately clear why make-believe is 
applicable to a religious conviction, since it carries connotations of frivolity and pretence. 
It seems likely that Christians would want to claim that Christ’s miracles are authentic, 
not just mere play, and that his resurrection is not a game, but has real effect for the 
salvation of man. Yet Miller, writing from a Christian perspective, puts forward the view 
that ‘Faith is make-believe. It is playing as if it were true’.129 Miller goes on to explain 
that it is not that religion is therefore false, but that faith is acting ‘as if’ the unseen were 
seen.130 If we consult the biblical outline of faith—‘the belief of things hoped for, the 
evidence not seen’—make-believe can become a helpful approach to thinking 
theologically because it involves a creative abstraction from the seen reality. Not only 
does the Christian believe that the reality of creation is mysteriously other than how it 
appears, but that man’s apperceptive mode is also fallen. This emerges as a twofold 
obstruction to true seeing, which accordingly requires a twofold imaginative reversal: a 
purified vision of the real and a purified visibility by which to perceive this vision.  
In reference to liturgy, Pickstock shows how play-acting is entirely necessary for 
true participation in liturgical transformation. Make-believe, as a mode of imagining, 
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seems to be a prerequisite for traversing two worlds or the ‘transgressions of domains’.131 
Pickstock accepts that the Fall has effected a radical disconnection between the divine 
and the human and emphasises that ‘liturgical expression is made “impossible” by the 
breach which occurred at the Fall’.132 She calls for a ‘liturgical reform’ that refuses to be 
‘enculturated’ into commonplace speech and thought.133 Pickstock admits a distance 
between things taken as they appear and the transcendent ‘real’.134 It is this ‘admission of 
distance’ that lays the foundation for suggesting that make-believe is required to bridge 
this transcendental gap.  
 Pickstock uses the word ‘impersonation’ to signify what I consider to be the 
presence of make-believe in liturgical theology. She explains: ‘the Celebrant enacts on 
our behalf an impersonation of the angels in their perpetual hymn of praise. This would 
suggest a protean ontology whereby impersonation precedes our “authentic” voice’.135 
The celebrant’s impersonation can be considered ‘make-believe’ in the sense that he is 
acting as if he possesses an angelic vision of the real and the ability to break out of the 
enculturated imagination to perceive this real with the simple vision of the angelic eye. 
Through the Celebrant’s invitation to participate in his impersonation, Pickstock believes 
that ‘we can enter into purification because we are not simply purified like Christ, but, 
through the gift of the Spirit […] we put on Christ’s own purity’.136 This putting-on 
appears as a form of make-believe, which, according the Pickstock is made real through 
the transformative power of the Spirit. 
C. S. Lewis in Mere Christianity evokes a similar concept of impersonation or 
make-believe to bring about the transformation of vision. He entitles a chapter with 
Alice’s reprise ‘Let’s pretend’ and puts forward the contention that the words of the 
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Lord’s Prayer ‘Our Father’ ‘mean quite frankly that you are putting yourself in the place 
of a son of God. To put it bluntly, you are dressing up as Christ. If you like, you are 
pretending’.137 Lewis suggests that Christ encourages his followers to put themselves in 
the place of Jesus and act as if they were fully obedient to the will of the Father. Lewis 
continues: ‘It [the New Testament] talks about Christians “being born again”; it talks 
about them “putting on Christ”; about Christ “being formed in us”; about our coming to 
“have the mind of Christ”’.138 The command ‘to become like little children’ it would 
seem, also follows this pattern of make-believe impersonation. The disciple is called to 
assume the character of Christ: ‘to be conformed to the image of his Son’.139 Alice 
illustrates the child’s natural orientation to make-believe, and it is here that a point of 
union between the child and Jesus emerges.  
It ought to be acknowledged that from the sceptical perspective, make-believe is 
the absence of the real, rather than the transformation of the unreal. Likewise, Pickstock 
accepts that ‘from a non-liturgical perspective it would seem that nothing really 
“happens” in the liturgy’.140 However, for a Christian, make-believe is a relevant 
theological category because of the conviction of the supreme power of pneumatic 
transformation. 
The purpose of appealing to the Holy Spirit is to demonstrate that for the 
Christian, make-believe is not about regression but about spiritual growth. Christianity is 
not endorsing a Peter Pan-like refusal to grow up. On the contrary, the Christian is 
instructed ‘to grow up in every way into him who is the head, into Christ’.141 What I am 
suggesting is that the playful imagination of the child can be an aid to spiritual maturity 
based on the belief that the act of imitating Christ is itself a sanctifying process. This is 
radically unlike Peter Pan’s play, which is pneumatically static; it does not develop or 
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become more real because there is no ontological substitution; Peter is in effect 
impersonating his own shadow. Make-believe is not, as Peter believes, about remaining a 
child, but is in fact about becoming.  
Alison Milbank describes make-believe as ‘a child’s mode of engagement in adult 
activity’.142 Lewis agrees that it is a natural aspect of the growth of a child—‘that is why 
children’s games are so important’, he acknowledges, ‘the pretence of being grown-up 
helps them to grow up in earnest’.143 Christian make-believe, like the child’s game, is not 
about escaping, but, rather, about a fuller mode of becoming. The Christian imitates 
Christ in order to grow more like Christ, Christian make-believe is therefore fixed on a 
telos outside itself, ‘Let us pretend’ explains Lewis, ‘in order to make the pretence into a 
reality’.144  
If make-believe is successful as a method, then it would seem that there ought to 
be a terminus to the game. John Milbank, however, disagrees, arguing that play is not 
something to be grown out of, but a reality into which one continues to grow. ‘Full 
mature self-consciousness’, he believes, ‘comes at the point where one half steps back 
into childhood […] back into a flexibility of role-playing in the surer knowledge that 
one’s unique character […] will shine through many necessary social disguises’.145 Play 
is defined here as a fluidity or freedom; it is perichoretic in essence, moving between 
steadfastness of character and fearlessness of variable circumstance. Meister Eckhart 
unequivocally champions the perichorectic quality of play in his description of the 
Trinity: ‘The Son has eternally been playing before the Father as the Father has before the 
Son. The playing of the twain is the Holy Ghost in whom they both disport themselves 
and he disports himself in both’.146 In order for the individual to become like the child, 
make-believe or impersonation is required to aid the transformation from ideality to 
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reality. He must do his best to be childlike, until he is fully-grown, that is to say he 
becomes an unfailing child of God. The Christian is commanded to impersonate faith 
until his faith is perfect, that is, until his faith is fully within the play of the Trinity. 
At this point we can perhaps establish an order emerging between make-believe 
and play, which would indicate that the end of make-believe is the eternality of play. 
From Eckhart’s depiction of the Trinity it can be suggested that the childlike do not stop 
playing, rather their make-believe is subsumed into the infinite play of the Trinity. This is 
consistent with Chesterton’s eschatological vision, in which he suggests that ‘the true 
object of all human life is play. Earth is a task garden; heaven is a playground’.147 And it 
is here, it seems, that Jesus lifts up the little child and uses him to reveal the reality of 
heaven, brought closer to those on earth through the imagination of make-believe.  
 
 
vii) Conclusion: ‘A childhood into which we have to grow’ 
 
This chapter has been dedicated to charting the significance of the childlike in the Alice 
novels and investigating the specific attributes this entails. At the same time we have 
considered the implication of Christ’s instruction to become like children, comparing the 
childlike features exhibited by Alice with the Christian imagination. Reflecting upon the 
act of reading nonsense literature, we have suggested that while Carrollian nonsense does 
not offer religious teaching, it nevertheless seems to provide a very real way by which to 
engage in something akin to religious thinking. In order to enter the realm of nonsense at 
all, the reader must exercise a willed lack of scepticism and practice some of the central 
characteristics of the childlike: simplicity, wonder, trust and make-believe. When we read 
a story we engage in a type of play-faith; we pretend as if it were true if only for the sake 
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of the narrative.148 The content of Wonderland, as Carroll fully intended, is devoid of 
religious allegory, but there appears to be a likeness between the imagination required for 
Christian faith and the imagination practiced in reading nonsense. The game of nonsense 
ends and Alice wakes up, but the reader has nonetheless experienced an analogous 
participation in childlike faith. 
MacDonald tells us that God ‘can be revealed only to the child; perfectly, to the 
pure child only. All the discipline of the world is to make men children, that God may be 
revealed to them’.149 For MacDonald, then, any act which makes men childlike prepares 
them for the revelation of God, and a trip down the rabbit hole seems to be one such 
instance. ‘There is a childhood into which we have to grow’,150 writes MacDonald, 
echoing Wordsworth’s radical privileging of the child’s perspective. The idea that the 
child is ‘the father of the man’ suggests that the attunement of the mind to a certain 
childlikeness is not regressive but integral for Christian maturity. 
The idea of growing up into a child remains absurd as long as we think in terms 
of secular development, believing that ‘grown-up’ refers to independence, responsibility 
and serious endeavour. As we have seen in this chapter, Christianity completely reverses 
these secular principles of ‘grown-up’, preaching that we must become little children; we 
must be born again. The mature Christian seeks dependence upon the Father’s provision 
and surrenders the governance of his life to God.  
A final point I wish to emphasise is that the usage of the Christian concept of the 
childlike to understand literary nonsense does not limit or skew our interpretation of 
nonsense. Rather, because Christianity believes in the theological significance of the 
child, it frees nonsense to be nonsensical as it does not have to apologise for its 
connection with the child. Tigges inadvertently attests to the fact that without a religious 
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appreciation of the child, literary nonsense cannot express itself as fully childlike. Tigges 
writes: ‘that [nonsense] appeals to children does not automatically entitle us to relegate it 
to an inferior category of literature labelled “juvenile” or “trivial”’.151 In this statement, 
Tigges, like so many other literary critics refuses to accept nonsense on its own terms; it 
is trivial, but as we have hinted, maybe triviality is itself an encounter with the truly 
serious. In a world of reversals where the last are first, perhaps the inferior supersedes the 
superior and maybe that which is juvenile is closer to what is ultimately mature. 
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Chapter four: Nonsense Theology 
Would they not say that you are mad? 
 
1 Corinthians 14:23 
 
 
1. Jerusalem and Wonderland 
 
This thesis began by asking if there is any theological value in venturing the other side of 
reason and proceeded to discuss parallels between the Christian imagination and certain 
central features of literary nonsense. Following the confirmation of our initial intuition 
that these aspects have some religious connotation, it was then asked ‘can the imagination 
as it is involved in Christian faith be accurately characterised according to these three 
features of literary nonsense?’ This led to the discovery that a significant resemblance 
exists between the imaginative process of reading nonsense literature and willing assent 
to the Christian message.  
It should be emphasised that the thesis does not aim to discredit Christian doctrine 
by likening it to literary nonsense, nor does it attempt to ‘Christianize’ nonsense by 
showing its likeness to the religious imagination. A study of the two has revealed this 
intriguing correspondence and we are now in a position to consider the significance of 
this connection, and ask the fundamental question: what does Wonderland have to do 
with Jerusalem? I am not of course the first to have noticed a correspondence. Indeed, the 
idea that faith and nonsense are in some way related can be found both within a range of 
theological texts, and to a lesser extent, within the canon of literary nonsense. 
The most well-known example uniting both nonsense and Christianity is G. K. 
Chesterton’s ‘Defence of Nonsense’. In his brief essay, Chesterton alludes suggestively to 
the central argument of this thesis: ‘the well-meaning person who, by merely studying the 
logical side of things, has decided that “faith is nonsense”, does not know how truly he 
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speaks; later it may come back to him in the form that nonsense is faith’.1 However, like 
many of Chesterton’s brilliant aphorisms, the idea is not developed. Elizabeth Sewell 
includes Chesterton’s quotation in her own conclusion and believes that faith relates to 
nonsense, ‘not as a foreign element but as a necessary extension and completion of our 
own form of play’.2 Yet it is only at the very end of her argument that she suggests faith 
might have a place in the study of nonsense and so leaves many questions unanswered 
and unasked. ‘For thirteen chapters’, Sewell concedes, ‘we have been logical, only to find 
at the end that we need an insulation from our own logic which has landed us in the world 
of magic without telling us what to do there. We need some way of moving from the 
circle of logic to the world outside the circle, from manipulation to make-believe’.3 This 
suggestion undercuts most of her previous conclusions, though she does not attempt to 
explain how it is that ‘words and play together fringe out into liturgy and magic’.4  
It is therefore unsurprising that Tigges believes that Sewell ‘fails in her attempt to 
bridge the gap between game and dream at the end of her book, where we are meant to 
reach ‘“the world of religion, magic, alchemy, astrology, poetry”’.5 Most critics of 
literary nonsense seem to overlook Sewell’s last chapter entirely and engage with her 
work as if the fourteenth chapter had never been written. This appears to be because 
nonsense criticism, as it currently exists, is essentially a secular enterprise. It is 
philosophical and psychoanalytical, philological and mathematical; it may be studied 
from an historical or a cultural perspective but apparently not a religious one.  
There seems to be an unspoken rule that because nonsense literature does not 
contain explicitly theological language, theology is therefore inappropriate as a means of 
interacting with the text.6 Tigges is in a sense correct when he states: ‘Absolutely 
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 G. K. Chesterton, ‘A Defence of Nonsense’ in The Defendant, p. 70. 
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forbidden grounds are the themes of sex, feeling or emotion, God and religion, and 
beauty’.7 However, the prevalence of psychoanalytical readings of nonsense writing 
suggests the themes of ‘sex, feeling or emotion’ may nonetheless be involved in some 
less apparent way. One might therefore wonder if the same may be true of religious 
themes. Why, then, is theological inquiry so evidently absent from the canon of nonsense 
criticism? It may be that the reason rests more with theologians than with literary critics. 
Perhaps there is a concern from within theology that incorporating nonsense into 
theological discourse would risk characterising the venture of faith as absurd. 
Within theology, generally speaking, there is little formal interaction with 
nonsense as a possible religious principle, and when the term is used, it is seldom 
considered in connection to literary nonsense. Catherine Pickstock, for example, 
enlighteningly invokes the language of nonsense to describe the demarcation in the 
perspective between believers and atheists. She writes: ‘Christ is often represented as a 
madman. The insanity of the Cross, the non-sense of sacrifice, was a wisdom which 
drowned in the “rationality” of the world, and revealed there its non-sense’.8 This shares 
something with the writings of Erasmus, the ecstatic and insane elements of which have 
helpfully been identified by M. A. Screech:  
The worldly-wise laugh at Christians; human beings laugh at real or perceived 
madness; what the worldly-wise laugh at in Jesus—not only as he hung on the 
Cross—is the sheer lunacy they see in him. The world admires money, self-
interest, success: Christians, insofar as they turn their back on such values and 
hold them to be at best indifferent, are turning the world upside down may indeed 
seem mad.9  
 
Although we might be able to see how this equates to earlier definitions of literary 
nonsense in terms of the anarchic disordering of the familiar, Screech does not employ 
the word ‘nonsense’ preferring to use ‘insanity’, ‘madness’ or ‘upside down’. Ronald 
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Hepburn’s study Christianity and Paradox, however, seems to bring us closer to the 
location of nonsense within theology. He tells us emphatically ‘the language of 
Christianity is nonsensical’.10 Yet Hepburn does not offer any further definition of the 
nonsensical except to assert that the paradoxes within Christianity invite the sceptic’s 
identification of Christianity with nonsense. He uses nonsense in the colloquial sense to 
mean untenable and not to be taken seriously. 
 The foregoing examples would seem to indicate that the relationship between 
theology and literary nonsense is at best strained or tangential and at worst a religious 
distortion of nonsense literature or an offensive description of Christian faith. However, 
what we have seen from the previous three chapters is that there are substantial and 
significant connections between literary nonsense and religious faith. Furthermore, we 
have witnessed a number of theologians dealing with nonsensical themes and critics of 
nonsense describing such literature in ways that recall the language of religious belief. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that if nonsense writers see a connection to theology at all, it 
tends to be as an aside or a local analogy, unrelated to their main treatise. If on the other 
hand, theologians adopt the language of nonsense, it is generally as an attempt to describe 
theological principles as they appear outside a religious grammar, rather than as a 
descriptive category within religious thought. This is Sten Stenson’s concern in his study 
Sense and Nonsense in Religion, in which he examines the ‘absurd locutions’11 of 
religious language by measuring them against secular systems of logic.  
There is at present no extended theological study of literary nonsense, nor do we 
find a sustained ‘nonsense theology’ within the religious corpus. Nevertheless, it appears 
that theology could bring something vital and original to the appreciation of literary 
nonsense, and, in turn, that nonsense could assist the communication of theological truths 
both within a religious context and in dialogue with non-believers. In order to test the 
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plausibility of this contention, Part Two of the thesis will be dedicated first of all to 
outlining a theology of nonsense, and, second, to discussing the practical and evangelical 
implications of this association. 
 
 
 
2. The Logic of Nonsense 
 
My heart shall rejoice in your salvation 
Psalm 13:5 
 
In adumbrating a theology of nonsense, it will be helpful to begin from within theology 
and then see if nonsense can assist or deepen our understanding of certain ideas. In order 
to avoid the accusation that the area of theology examined is arbitrary or peripheral; the 
doctrine of Salvation will provide the theological principles against which we can test 
whether or not nonsense is a helpful and apposite term. The basic features of soteriology 
can be extrapolated from the central creeds: 
 
i) Jesus Christ is fully God and fully man.12 
ii) The life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is not a metaphorical event, but 
actually took place in human history.13 
 
iii) The purpose of Jesus Christ’s life, death and resurrection was to be the perfect 
sacrifice for the sin of man, and all who believe in this are forgiven from sin and 
granted eternal life.14 
 
 
Before constructing a more detailed theology of nonsense, it may be helpful to offer some 
introductory contextualising remarks on the apparent connections between Christianity 
and nonsense more generally, as well as the surprising parallels involved in accepting the 
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doctrine of Salvation and in reading nonsense literature. It should be emphasised that 
these resemblances do not pertain to the level of content, but to the role of the 
imagination as it engages in the act of reading or believing. 
 Firstly, addressing the belief that Christ is ‘fully God and fully man’, we can 
recognise this as a breach with conventional rationality since it goes against the law of 
non-contradiction. The imagination is involved in the process of holding these dynamic 
opposites in tension and not seeking to reconcile or collapse the ostensible contradiction. 
Drawing on the information considered in the chapter on paradox, we acknowledged that 
belief in Christ requires the ability to imagine in paradoxical terms, to uphold two 
opposing absolutes in simultaneous harmony. A similar observation, as we have noted, 
has been made by Wim Tigges, who describes ‘the strong predilection of nonsense for 
paradox and dialectic, for a sustained balance between opposites’.15 He explains that this 
‘requires the non-resolution of the tension between the two meanings’,16 which appears to 
be the same dynamic simultaneity that is essential to the imagination of those who would 
hold that Christ is perfect man and perfect God. 
Secondly, the claim that Christ ‘suffered for our salvation; descended into hell; 
rose again the third day from the dead’ stipulates that these are historical events, which 
really happened—either Christ was raised or he was not. The importance of considering 
the historicity of these claims is emphasised by Paul: ‘if Christ has not been raised then 
our preaching is in vain’.17 The contravention of common-sense principles is once more 
apparent; the empirical understanding of the natural cycle of life and death has been 
overturned and re-envisaged according to religious ideas.  
The imagination is involved in the mind’s capacity to reconceive reality 
according to spiritual principles—to accept a distance between how things appear and 
how they actually are. As we saw in the chapter on anarchy, this requires a re-orientation 
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of customary thinking as the authority of the laws of nature is imaginatively overturned. 
The essence of this belief is reflected in the terms that Susan Stewart uses to introduce the 
character of literary nonsense: ‘Nonsense is considered as an activity by which the world 
is disorganized and reorganized’.18 The account of the miraculous within Christian 
doctrine therefore, in this sense, appears to have more in common with the grammar of 
the nonsense realm than a world governed by empiricism. Cohen describes Wonderland 
and the world behind the looking-glass as ‘mysterious places where characters do not live 
by conventional rules and that meaning does not play a conventional role. Even the laws 
of nature, the law of gravity for instance, do not work as they should’.19 As we have seen, 
Christianity seems to require a similarly ‘anarchic’ act of imagining in relation to the 
miracles of Christ and his bodily resurrection. 
 The third aspect of the doctrine of Salvation is the conviction that all who believe 
in the power of Christ’s death and resurrection become children of God, who are forgiven 
of their sin and initiated into an eternal relationship with the Father. From a 
conventionally rational perspective it would seem that this claim does not correspond to 
that which is the case: that is to say, believing in God does not appear to alter the 
believer’s mortality; Christians continue to sin, even though it is claimed that Christ has 
purged them from all sin; and despite the assurance that God is a benevolent and 
omnipotent Father, Christians are not immune from injustice, illness or misfortune. 
To maintain a belief in the salvific promises in spite of evidence to the contrary 
requires an ability to approach the world in a childlike fashion, which as we saw in the 
previous chapter is characterized by simplicity, wonder, trust and make-believe. 
According to Robert Polhemus, nonsense literature offers the reader a similar experience 
of imaginative transformation:  
[Nonsense] plays with and makes light of some of the central locations of 
humanity’s fear. The intention that comes through in Through the Looking-Glass 
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is, in effect, the meaning of mankind’s comic capacity, and it is this: I will play 
with and make ridiculous fear, loneliness, smallness, ignorance, authority, chaos, 
nihilism, and death; I will transform, for a time, woe to joy.20  
 
 Having established a tentative link between Christian belief and nonsense 
literature—on the basis of an analogous breach of quotidian rationality—I want to make it 
clear that I am not proposing that a nonsensical articulation of faith should replace a more 
rational apologetic, or that the tradition we have inherited from the Enlightenment is 
wrong. What I am suggesting is that whilst Christian faith is plausible and cogent it is 
also extravagant, playful and foolish, and that the nonsensical aids the recovery of a 
number of these currently underemphasised aspects of traditional theology. This is not to 
say that either system is without coherence or cogency—on the contrary, Christianity and 
literary nonsense are both systems that possess in different ways deep internal coherence. 
‘Nonsense’, as Deleuze argues, is ‘a word which says its own sense’,21 thus suggesting 
that there is not simply one fixed standard of sense but alternative models of sense, which 
may appear to each other as absurd. The point has been forcefully made by Kierkegaard, 
who describes ‘the inwardness of faith’ as ‘an offense to the Jews, foolishness to the 
Greeks—and an absurdity to the understanding’.22 To adopt Deleuze’s language we might 
suggest that Christianity ‘speaks its own sense’ in a tongue that is ‘an absurdity’ to those 
who do not believe. 
 In offering a working definition of nonsense, it is important—however 
paradoxical it might seem—to avoid seeing sense as its adversary. Instead, as Deleuze 
and Tigges have suggested, nonsense involves a balance between meaning and non-
meaning, which requires both the disorganisation and the reorganisation of sense. Literary 
nonsense plays with sense and this often takes the form of reversals and inversions of our 
fixed expectations of how the world works, which, as we have indicated, parallels certain 
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religious ideas such as bodily resurrection. In what follows, I want to investigate the idea 
that the meaning of literary nonsense is perhaps described most accurately as the 
inversion of the sensible, not its absence or its destruction.  
This is an established definition used by nonsense critics. Tigges, for example, 
describes the art of ‘mirroring’ as ‘a prominent stylistic feature’,23 which he in turn 
attributes to Susan Stewart’s proposal of ‘reversals and inversions’ as a central 
nonsensical device. Similarly, Deleuze lists ‘the reversals which constitute Alice’s 
adventures: the reversal of becoming larger and becoming smaller […] the reversal of 
more and less […] the reversal of cause and effect’.24 This more generalised definition 
has been abstracted from the specific attributes of the nonsensical imagination; paradox, 
anarchy and the childlike, all which in their own way reverse common-sense 
assumptions. In the following section I want to ask whether a similar pattern of reversals 
and inversions are present in any significant way in Christian theology. I will consider 
both views supporting the analogy between Christianity and nonsense and also confront 
various objections to this hypothesis. G. K. Chesterton’s interpretation of the Fall will be 
of particular consequence in this discussion, as will Robert Polhemus’ endeavour to 
construct an atheistic ‘faith’ using comic and nonsensical literature. 
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3. The Great Reversal 
 For the trumpet shall sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we shall be 
changed.  
 
1 Corinthians 15:52 
 
The idea of reversal is a common feature within the Alice stories. As one critic observes, 
‘Alice found herself in a world which reversed the patterns of the world, and the story of 
the looking-glass is a story of complete reversal of the real world’.25 The White Queen 
explains it to Alice as ‘the effect of living backwards’26 where to stay still one needs to 
keep running and to leave a house one must re-enter it. The idea of reversal is not only 
present throughout the stories, but also in the titles of the texts27: Through the Looking-
Glass and In Wonderland (or Under Ground).28 Both imply that there are alternative 
ways of perceiving reality that shatter our common-sense expectations.  
Sir Edward Strachey’s essay, ‘Nonsense as a Fine Art’ (1888) is the first known 
study of literary nonsense as its own genre. Strachey describes nonsense as the process of 
reversal and disorder, which he sees as, ‘not a mere putting forward of incongruities and 
absurdities but the bringing out a new and deeper harmony of life in and through its 
contradictions’.29 This is crucial for our investigation, for if nonsense is to be a 
theologically useful term, it will be necessary to demonstrate that it is not simply a 
meaningless destruction of order, but rather, as Strachey suggests, it may also function as 
a means of illumination. He believes that nonsense ‘bring[s] confusion into order by 
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setting things upside down’.30 The question we need to ask now therefore is whether 
theology applies a similar method of ‘setting things upside down’ to ‘bring confusion into 
order’.  
Robert Polhemus, whilst a great advocate of the theme of reversal within 
Carrollian nonsense,31 believes that the presence of reversal in the text demonstrates the 
subordination of its religious subject matter. He suggests: ‘the structure of the game and 
the plot, as well as the thought and humor of the book, reveal […] Carroll winning out 
over the Reverend Mr. Dodgson, and comic regression and reversal winning out over 
orthodox religion’.32 If Polhemus’ conclusions are correct, then bringing nonsense into 
dialogue with theology would not only be a misleading association but would also have an 
injurious effect on theology. Yet are they correct? Let us consider the assumptions upon 
which they are based. Firstly, Polhemus assumes that nonsense and Christianity are 
radically at odds because nonsense is unconventional and Christianity is conventional.33 
Secondly, he claims that the concept of wonder—pervasive in nonsense—has become 
secularized and ‘Carroll is its prophet’.34 Thirdly, Polhemus assumes that religious 
institutions do not overcome ‘the limits and terrors of reality’.35 It is worth considering 
these assumptions in detail, since Polhemus formulates with particular clarity the secular 
standard that currently dominates criticism of the genre, which views ‘comic regression 
and reversal’ as manifestly irreconcilable with ‘orthodox religion’. 
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i) Standing on One’s Head 
 
 And when they called in the apostles, they beat them and charged them not to speak in 
the name of Jesus, and let them go. Then they left rejoicing that they were counted worthy 
to suffer dishonour for the name. 
  
Acts 5:40-41 
 
In Orthodoxy, Chesterton describes, ‘conventional’ Christianity in terms that call into 
question Polhemus’ depiction of ‘orthodox religion’: ‘People have fallen into a foolish 
habit of speaking of orthodoxy as something heavy, humdrum, and safe. There never was 
anything so perilous or so exciting as orthodoxy […] The orthodox Church never took the 
tame course or accepted the conventions; the orthodox church was never respectable’.36 
Cameron Freeman in his recent monograph, ‘Post-metaphysics and the paradoxical 
teachings of Jesus’ describes how Christ’s teachings ‘perplex and disrupt the history of 
metaphysics in the West with unexpected reversals that burst through the limits of 
conventional wisdom’.37 Chesterton would agree with Cameron’s stance and point out 
that orthodox Christianity cannot assume a conventional attitude to the world because it is 
radically at odds with the conventions of that world. This view is based on the belief that 
following the Fall, man is ‘born upside down’. Chesterton writes: ‘the primary paradox of 
Christianity is that the ordinary condition of man is not his sane or sensible condition; that 
the normal itself is an abnormality. This is the inmost philosophy of the fall’.38 Seen in 
this light, Christianity seems destined to defy common sense or conventional 
interpretations of the way things are, and as such, ‘unconventional’ begins to seem like it 
might be a more appropriate description.  
Chesterton’s proposal that man is born upside down takes us back to the earlier 
discussion of Catherine Pickstock’s ‘liturgical stammer’, which ‘bespeaks its admission 
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of distance between itself and the transcendent “real”’ .39 Like Chesterton, Pickstock 
identifies the cause of this distance as ‘the breach which occurred at the Fall’.40 This gap 
implies that a Christian vision of ultimate reality may contradict our secular sense of 
things, even though this also corresponds to that which is the case. To be clear: I am not 
suggesting that reason is always antagonistic to Christian epistemology; on the contrary, 
we have maintained throughout that Christian faith can be rationally defended. 
Nonetheless, it seems in-keeping with Christianity’s paradoxical core that internal 
coherence should be balanced against the admission that there are certain Christian 
beliefs that require a different way of thinking, since they break with conventional 
systems of reasoning. Pickstock argues in a similar manner that ‘the insane figure of God 
incarnate is the wisdom which cannot be understood by empirical or “logical” 
investigation, Christ made man, but seen by men as a madman’.41 At this point we are 
confronted again with the idea that secular rationality is merely one mode of sense and 
that Christian (ir)rationality ‘speaks its own sense’, which as Pickstock suggests, cannot 
be interpreted solely through empirical or ‘logical’ methods. This different mode of 
thinking, required for Christian faith according to Chesterton, ‘is based on the fact that we 
do not fit in to the world’,42 and that our natural reasoning is distorted by our fallen 
condition.  
 The descriptions of the condition of man given by Chesterton and Pickstock differ 
of course in a number of ways, though they are both founded on the scriptural account of 
the same unnatural state of our naturalness and the breach between fallen reason and 
spiritual truth. Paul explains to the church in Corinth: ‘The natural person does not accept 
the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand 
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them because they are spiritually discerned’.43 Paul’s contrast between ‘natural’ and 
‘spiritual’ evident in the quotation provides biblical support for the claim that the 
imagination of the believer is attuned to a different manner of acquiring knowledge, 
which in many instances runs counter to ‘natural’ or conventional habits. The biblical 
indication that spiritual discernment is a breach with conventional patterns of thought 
clearly casts doubt on Polhemus’ contention that Reverend Charles Dodgson had to ‘split 
his identity from his conventional self’ in order to create a world of nonsense and 
reversals. Indeed, as Chesterton’s account of man’s condition might suggest, being a 
Christian he was always already in a topsy-turvy world. 
So far, we have understood the condition of being born upside-down as a charter 
to seek out alternative ways of knowing, believing natural reasoning to be in some sense 
distorted by the effects of the Fall. Something that is upside down, of course, carries the 
connotation that there exists a correct way round. Literary nonsense, as we have seen, is 
only nonsense because the reader recognises a sensible idea or conventional rule to which 
it corresponds that has been turned upside-down. Susan Stewart summarises: ‘in every 
case, nonsense depends upon an assumption of sense. Without sense there is no 
nonsense’.44 From this it is clear that topsy-turvydom is only topsy-turvy if the reader has 
a strong sense of the untopsy-turvy. For example, Paul Tieck’s play The Land of Upside 
Down commences with the epilogue. This is ‘nonsensical’ comedy because we appreciate 
that plays conventionally conclude with the epilogue and that there are highly sensible 
reasons for this. If we apply the same rule to Christianity, the claim that man is born 
upside-down implies that Christianity must be also be able to provide a picture of what 
the right way up looks like, and that we can expect this to involve a pattern of reversals 
and contraries.45 If this is the case, in particular with regard to soteriology, then there 
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would seem to be grounds for challenging Polhemus’ contention that the prevalent use of 
reversal within nonsense ‘wins out’ over orthodox religion.  
Noel Malcolm’s study The Origins of English Nonsense uses the device of 
reversal to demonstrate the union between modern and early examples of nonsense. 
Significantly, Malcolm traces the link back to the prophecies in the book of Isaiah: 
The literary device which presents reversals of the natural order of things (known 
as ‘impossibilia’ in Latin and ‘adynata’ in Greek) has a very long history. It can be 
found […] in some of the best-known prophetic verses of the Bible: ‘The wolf 
shall also dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid’.46 
 
The prophesies in Isaiah referred to above signal an inversion of the assumed 
natural pattern of animal behaviour, where the lion uncharacteristically eats straw 
like the ox, instead of devouring the ox, which we may have expected. We are told 
by the prophet that leading the revolution of the animal kingdom is a little child,47 
an image that frustrates our expectation of leadership. For the believer, prophetic 
references to the reversal of natural order have a soteriological function, as they 
are seen as a reference to the eschaton, when the present (fallen) working order of 
the natural world will be changed.48 Since such prophecies tell us something about 
the nature of the world ‘the right way up,’ it will be worth considering some of the 
particulars. 
 Death, for example, is a condition established as a result of the Fall: ‘By 
the sweat of your face you shall eat bread, till you return to the ground, for out of it 
you were taken; for you are dust and to dust you shall return’.49 The Old 
Testament delivers the message that this fallen order is not God’s final plan for 
mankind and this is attested to in the salvific prophesies: ‘Your dead shall live; 
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their bodies shall rise. You who dwell in the dust, awake and sing for joy’.50 The 
New Testament reveals Christ as the manifestation of God’s promise to reverse the 
chaotic conditions of the Fall. His miracles can be seen as the revelation of a new 
order and as the counteraction of the curse from Genesis. Such an example might 
be the raising of Lazarus from the dead,51 which Isaiah prophesies. However, it is 
the death and resurrection of Christ himself which is the herald of ‘the great 
reversal’ when the old order of death and sin is fully and ultimately overturned. 
Paul expresses this in his letter to the Romans: ‘Now if we have died with Christ, 
we believe that we will also live with him. We know that Christ, being raised from 
the dead, will never die again; death no longer has dominion over him. For the 
death he died he died to sin, once for all’.52 
 The transformation of death into life is just one illustration of the biblical 
overturning of conventional expectations: ordinary human reasoning tells us that the dead 
ought to stay dead; that death is the natural and inevitable course. The resurrection is a 
miraculous event in the sense that it is a breach or interference with the laws of nature—
that is, assuming we define ‘miracle’ thus. This traditional definition of the miraculous as 
the interruption of the regulative principles of nature is not unanimously agreed upon 
within the Christian tradition. It is, for example, slightly modified by George MacDonald, 
who acknowledges that Christ’s miracles and his resurrection seem as if they interfere 
with the laws of nature, but argues that ‘A higher condition of harmony with law, may 
one day enable us to do things which must now appear an interruption of law’.53 In other 
words, Macdonald believes that the miracles of Christ’s ministry and pre-eminently of 
Easter are not the suspension of the natural order but the restoration of that order. As a 
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result, the supernatural world of healing and resurrection is in a sense more truly ‘natural’ 
than the fallen conditions of sickness and death. 
 MacDonald’s inversion of the status of the natural helps to shed light on 
Chesterton’s declaration that Christianity emphasises ‘the unnaturalness of everything in 
light of the supernatural’.54 In the section on anarchy, we witnessed a similar ‘corrective 
disordering’ and discussed how God’s supreme order appears anarchic within a fallen 
world. In this chapter we have observed how God’s restoration of the natural world seems 
like a breaking-in of the supernatural or unnatural. What this implies is that to restore 
something that is upside-down to its right way up requires a radical reversal, and if that 
something has always been upside-down, it sounds like nonsense to suggest it was the 
wrong way up in the first place. 
 It should of course be mentioned that salvation is not just a reversal or 
counteraction—it more than simply returns us to how things were before. The transition 
from the Garden of Eden to the New Jerusalem is a return with difference. In one sense 
the New Jerusalem is the reconstitution of Eden with ‘the tree of life’ at the centre.55 But 
in another sense ‘the new heaven’ and ‘new earth’56 reveal something other and there is a 
transformation that is not merely an edenic replica. In Genesis the overarching imagery 
depicts the harmony and majesty of the natural world, Revelation, on the other hand 
speaks of a community of believers, a holy city within which the tree of life is restored. 
Yet, without losing sight of the idea that transformation is not merely opposition, it still 
seems useful to draw to the language of reversal in order to illustrate how radically 
alternative the concept of Eden and the New Jerusalem appear to us within our current 
fallen world. 
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To return to MacDonald’s inversion of the status of the natural, the point I am 
trying to establish is that from a Christian perspective, the first place is not the first place, 
but a post-edenic, unnatural topsy-turvydom. In such a context, to speak of that which is 
‘natural’ or ‘the right way up’, it may thus be necessary to speak nonsensically. This may 
be why a dominant aspect of Christ’s ministry is concerned with turning conventional 
principles upside-down. According to the standards of secular order, the mighty are 
powerful, the hungry are empty and the wise govern the foolish. However, the New 
Testament teaches that ‘God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise’,57 and 
that the mighty are brought down from their thrones, whilst the humble are exalted; the 
hungry are filled and it is the rich who are empty.58 Cameron Freeman draws the reader’s 
attention to the prevalent pattern of reversals and believes that this awakens in the 
individual a sense of the absurd. He explains: ‘in accordance with the paradoxical 
reversals of meaning and expectation that Jesus used to jolt open the awareness of his 
audience, then, the truth will strike us as deeply absurd and come to us as something we 
did not see coming’.59 It is interesting for our project that Freeman draws the same 
conclusion concerning the absurdity of Christ’s message and yet suggests that its very 
absurdity is—in a counter-intuitive sense—a mark of Christian authenticity. 
 It might be helpful to describe Jesus’ paradoxical teachings as ‘anastrophic’, 
insofar as the normal, established patterns of society have been inverted and re-arranged. 
Anastrophe is usually classified as a rhetorical device that alters the order of words in a 
sentence, ‘a preposterous order, or a backward setting of words’,60 a device, 
unsurprisingly, utilized by writers of literary nonsense.61 However, the Bible uses 
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anastrophe (ἀναστρέφω) to mean to turn upside down, to overturn or to turn back. When 
Jesus casts the vendors out of the temple, ἀναστρέφω is the word used to describe the 
overturning of the tables.62 Its derivative στρέφω is used in connection with conversion, 
implying that to become a Christian requires a complete overthrowing and turning upside-
down of the old self. Matthew’s gospel, for example, uses στρέφω to emphasise the 
radical nature of conversion: ‘unless you change [στρέφω] and become like little children 
you will never enter the kingdom of heaven’.63 
 This correspondence between ἀναστρέφω and στρέφω suggests that the 
overturning of tables can act as both a linguistic and visual metaphor for the overturning 
of the heart in conversion. This provides strong grounds for maintaining that the 
language of ‘upside-down’ and ‘topsy-turvy’, traditionally associated with nonsense, is a 
more accurate description of Christian faith than the common misrepresentation of 
Christianity as a strictly conventional way of thinking and living. So it seems that far 
from constituting a threat to theology on account of its frequent use of reversal and 
contradiction, the application of the term nonsense could actually prove an effective tool 
by which to communicate firstly, the upside-down nature of man’s fallen condition; and 
secondly, the wholly orthodox sense that to get the right way up requires a topsy-turvy 
orientation.  
 At this point it may be worth considering Rabkin’s description of fantasy as ‘a 
quality of astonishment that we feel when the ground rules of a narrative world are 
suddenly made to turn about 180 degrees’.64 Tigges has already commented that 
‘Rabkin’s definition of fantasy […] seem[s] to tally very well with the “topsy-turvy” 
view of nonsense’.65 My purpose in also observing this is to bring to light the potentially 
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hidden union between fantastic nonsense and Christian faith through the principle of 
reversal.  
Before going any further, however, an important caveat must be inserted: whereas 
literary nonsense is, in accordance with Rabkin’s definition, a 180 degree turn about, 
within salvation history there is a double reversal at work—a 360 degree turn, in two 
halves. In other words, the Fall makes things the wrong way round and salvation flips 
them back the right way.66 As such, nonsense could become a way of describing both 
man’s fallen order from a heavenly perspective, and God’s restored order from a human 
perspective. To each, the other is upside-down.67  
This seems a bit like the visual paradox of the mirror, where the image in the 
glass is not an identical representation but the reversal of the original perspective. In fact, 
it was this peculiarity of the looking-glass that prompted Carroll to write the sequel to 
Wonderland: Alice Through the Looking-Glass.68 The logical puzzle that Carroll turned 
into a brilliant nonsense story is, in a metaphorical sense, the same problem that 
Chesterton confronts when dealing with Christian truth from a fallen viewpoint. ‘All the 
real argument about religion’, he writes, ‘turns on the question of whether a man who was 
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born upside down can tell when he comes the right way up’.69 This is an invitation to 
question on which side of the looking-glass we are—the side which seems sensible or the 
side that appears nonsensical.   
If salvation history is indeed a story of double reversal, then it seems more likely 
that Christianity would join the talking flowers in the impossible dimensions of Looking-
Glass Land than side with the rationalists who reduce heaven and Wonderland alike to a 
whimsical dream. Chesterton, who finds deep religious truth within MacDonald’s fairy-
tales, praises this kind of fantastic imagining as an orthodox defiance of the sensible, 
joyless limitations of a postlapsarian world where flowers cannot talk and dead men 
cannot rise. Chesterton writes: 
It is not that he [MacDonald] dresses men and movements as knights and dragons, 
but that he thinks that knights and dragons, really existing in the eternal world, are 
dressed up here as men and movements. It is not that the crown, the helmet or the 
aureole that are to him the fancy dress; it is the top hat and the frock coat that it 
are, as it were, the disguise of the terrestrial stage of conspirators. His allegoric 
tales of gnomes and griffins do not lower a veil but rend it.70 
 
For this reason, Chesterton describes MacDonald’s fairy-tales as ‘celestial nonsense’, a 
mode of creative thinking that seeks to reveal man’s upside-down predicament and to 
bring him the right way round by treating the supernatural as natural.  
 So it seems that for Christianity, in light of the Fall, all theology is in some sense 
‘looking-glass theology’, requiring an anastrophic act of imagination, such as is common 
practice to readers of nonsense. On this basis, then, it is possible to refute Polhemus’ 
contention that nonsense and Christianity are at odds because nonsense is unconventional 
and Christianity is conventional. A world in which flowers can talk bears a closer 
resemblance to a world in which stones can cry out71 than the conventional realm where 
both must remain silent. 
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ii) The Secularization of Wonder 
 
How great are his signs, how mighty his wonders! His kingdom is an everlasting 
kingdom, and his dominion endures from generation to generation. 
 
Daniel 4:3 
 
A second reason given by Polhemus for believing that Carroll’s nonsense is subversive of 
religious belief relates to the concept of wonder. Polhemus writes, ‘Fantasy indicates […] 
the secularization of wonder, and Carroll is its prophet. In large degree, fantasy flourishes 
and fantasy life looms so large in the modern era because the past two centuries have 
been a time of religious confusion and doubt’.72 This suggests two things: firstly, that 
wonder is an important element within nonsense literature; and secondly, that this type of 
nonsensical wonder is opposed to the religious.  
We have already considered wonder as a childlike attribute, but we have not yet 
addressed the possibility that an aspect of nonsensical wonder might in fact be hostile 
towards religion. Polhemus is not alone this contention. There are many religious 
believers who would caution against the reading of non-moral nonsensical fiction for 
exactly this reason. In Carroll’s own culture, for instance, child educators such as Mrs 
Trimmer expressed the dangers of subjecting children to fairy-tales, because they were 
concerned that children would be unable to distinguish between religious truth and 
fantastic fiction. 
 Although Polhemus is writing in support of literary nonsense, he essentially puts 
forward the same case as Mrs. Trimmer, in arguing that the type of wonder presented in 
Carrollian nonsense is antagonistic towards a religious truth. As we have already 
observed in the chapter on the childlike, both nonsense and religion offer an experience of 
wonder in the sense that they contain ideas that generate astonishment.73 The crowds are 
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‘astonished’ at Jesus’ teachings and miracles,74 just as Alice is continually astonished at 
the unfolding events in Wonderland. The potential theological problem is that the 
wondrous activities of Wonderland evidently have nothing to do with God’s power. 
Moreover, in some instances, wonder seems to be a device used in nonsense literature as 
a way of mocking things of theological gravity.  
 For example, Genesis depicts man as the pinnacle of God’s creation, made in the 
image of God, revealing the solemn dignity of each human life. Psalm 8 emphasises that 
wonder is the appropriate response to the majesty of creation: 
When I look at your heavens, the work 
Of your fingers, 
The moon and the stars that you 
Have established; 
What are human beings that you are 
Mindful of them, 
Mortals that you care for them? 
 
Yet you have made them a little lower 
Than God, 
And crowned them with glory and 
Honour. 
 
This finds a comic corollary in Carroll’s nonsensical world where the creatures of 
Looking-Glass land meet the pinnacle of God’s creation: 
‘What-is-this?’ he said at last. 
‘This is a child!’ Haigha replied eagerly, coming in front of Alice to introduce her, 
and spreading out both his hands towards her in an Anglo-Saxon attitude.  
‘We only found it to-day. It’s as large as life, and twice as natural!’  
‘I always thought they were fabulous monsters!” said the Unicorn. ‘Is it alive?’ 
‘It can talk,’ said Haigha solemnly. 
The Unicorn looked dreamily at Alice, and said ‘Talk, child’.75 
 
This seems to be the kind of nonsensical wonder to which Polhemus draws our attention 
as being subversive of religious sentiment, since it appears to laugh at and make light of a 
subject of theological seriousness. This is a true and valid point as long as we insist on 
seriousness as the only proper Christian response to God’s majestic creation. If we look 
again at Psalm 8 the emphasis does not seem to be on man’s solemn dignity but rather, on 
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his undeserved and almost ludicrous dignity: ‘What are human beings that you are mindful 
of them?’ In fact, wonderment or the quality of astonishment can only be extracted from 
this psalm if it is a surprise that God should care for human beings. It is for this reason that 
Chesterton believes nonsense is a help rather than a hindrance to the presentation of 
Christian truth. He writes: 
Religion has for centuries been trying to make men exult in the ‘wonders’ of 
creation, but it has forgotten that a thing cannot be completely wonderful so long 
as it remains sensible. So long as we regard a tree as an obvious thing […] we 
cannot properly wonder at it. And here we fancy that nonsense will, in a very 
unexpected way come to the aid of the spiritual view of things.76 
 
The unicorn regards Alice as thoroughly unobvious, and as a result is astonished at her 
basic humanity. In this sense, the unicorn displays a similar attitude to the wonderment at 
creation presented in Psalm 8. Nonsense in this light both disturbs a purely rationalistic 
explanation of man and provides an account that is at once both more humble and more 
exalted. We laugh at the unicorn because he regards an ordinary thing as something 
extraordinary; but the unicorn, like the psalmist, is perfectly serious: there is something 
fearful and wonderful about human beings.77 In his defence of ‘baby worship’, Chesterton 
seems to adopt a similar attitude to that of Carroll’s unicorn. He writes:  
We do actually treat talking in children as marvellous, walking in children as 
marvellous, common intelligence in children as marvellous […] Any words and 
antics in a lump of clay are wonderful, the child’s words and antics are 
wonderful, and it is only fair to say that the philosopher’s words and antics are 
equally wonderful. We should probably come nearer to the true conception of 
things if we treated all grown-up persons, of all titles and types, with precisely 
that dark affection and dazed respect with which we treat infantile limitations.78  
 
It is of course comical to suggest that we should clap the politician on the back for simply 
managing to get dressed in the morning, but there is a certain sense in which a deep 
humility would be born from introducing nonsensical wonder to everyday events, chiefly 
because the response of astonishment refuses to take accomplishment for granted (in the 
instance of Psalm 8 the remarkable creation of human beings and God’s love for each 
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individual). This suggests that theological wonder is not exactly a matter of taking things 
seriously, but rather, as we discussed in the previous chapter, it concerns a perpetual 
childlike astonishment at God’s love, grace and power. This is magnified, rather than 
subverted, by nonsensical wonder because the subjects of wonder are mundane objects 
that are made wonderful by the spirit of nonsense comedy. 
 Sewell is keen to emphasise nonsense’s strong predilection for the ordinary;79 she 
comments on Carroll’s re-writing of the well-known poem, ‘The Star’80 and observes that 
its absurdity is located not only in the incongruous association of bats and tea-trays, but 
also in the substitution of the ethereal (star, diamond) for the ordinary and earthly. The act 
of making commonplace things extraordinary is, as Chesterton has indicated, an excellent 
expression of theological wonder. For the Christian, as long as God’s love for man 
remains an astonishing fact, man himself remains humble and gracious. 
 
iii) The Limits and Terrors of Reality 
If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain. 
1 Corinthians 15:14 
 
Polhemus’ third reason for seeking to divorce theology from nonsense is that he believes 
the latter, unlike religion, has the ability to traverse ‘the limits and terrors of reality’. 
Polhemus explains: ‘People need to believe that the limits and terrors of reality can be 
changed, that the future can be different and better, that wonderful things can happen; if 
religious institutions cannot do these things, something else must’.81 He believes 
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nonsense can do this for a variety of reasons, but primarily because nonsense plays with 
and imaginatively breaches the boundaries of human experience. 
Polhemus sees humour as the tool by which humanity has the power to transform 
an attitude of fear, and argues that this institutes a secular faith in the place of a religious 
one. ‘It isn’t God,’ Polhemus stresses, ‘but the power of humor that takes away death’s 
sting’.82 He offers the following example from Through the Looking-Glass: 
‘…you may observe a Bread-and-butter-fly…’ 
‘And what does it live on?’ 
‘Weak tea with cream in it.’ 
A new difficulty came into Alice’s head. ‘Supposing it couldn’t find any?’ she 
suggested. 
‘Then it would die, of course.’ 
‘But that must happen very often,’ Alice remarked thoughtfully. 
‘It always happens,’ said the Gnat.83 
 
From this passage, Polhemus describes an experience of the unseriousness of death, a 
sensation that he cannot seem to articulate without using religious language: 
Death jokes are actually resurrection jokes, they announce that there is nothing 
which the life-force of the mind can’t transform into vital pleasure […] We cannot 
understand the prevalence of black humor—any more than we can understand the 
belief in hell—without seeing that it performs a kind of theological function. 
Joking about death is one of the most sophisticated ways that we have of 
combating its menace—of accepting it and defying it at the same time.84  
 
Polhemus’ ability to transform the darkness of death into something lighter via nonsense 
humour seems to be an excellent, if unwitting, demonstration of the religious potential of 
nonsense. It is true that within nonsense worlds, everyday limitations upon reality are 
frequently traversed and undercut. It is also true that ‘terrors’ within nonsense tend to be 
short-lasting and quickly forgotten. Neither of these tendencies is necessarily religious. 
However, the idea that the reader’s imaginative experience underground or through the 
looking-glass can overcome the horrors of real life is a theological statement and this is 
attested to by Polhemus’ inability to disassociate his secular belief from religious 
language. 
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 Polhemus makes a vital theological statement: death jokes are resurrection jokes 
and they serve ‘a kind of theological function’. One could go further though and suggest 
that death can only be seen as a sort of joke because of the resurrection.85 Martin Luther 
describes salvation as Christ’s usurpation of the ‘rights’ and ‘power’ of death. He writes: 
‘it was a strange battle where death and life struggled. Life won the victory, it has 
swallowed up death […] death has become a mockery’.86 Given that Christianity 
describes Christ’s victory as enduring, there are grounds for suggesting that even 
apparently non-religious ‘death jokes’ may participate in the ultimate mockery of death: 
the resurrection. The earlier reflection on miracles led to the conclusion that if 
Christianity is true, it could overcome the limits and terrors of this-worldly reality, 
because it is subversive to those limits and ontologically opposed to those terrors, as they 
are post-edenic without being pre-parousia. 
 It would seem, then, that there are two conclusions we can draw from this: firstly, 
that if there is a God, who has a plan for human salvation, where the future really is 
radically different and the limits of reality are altered, then nonsense can in some 
analogous sense participate in this celebration of redemption. Alternatively, if there is no 
god, or if that deity does not grant human salvation, either because he is unable or 
unwilling, then nonsense cannot bring the reader any closer to overcoming terrors or 
limits of reality, except as a temporary measure in the form of mental escape from that 
reality. In suggesting that nonsense literature provides an imaginative basis for 
transforming humanity’s attitude of fear, Polhemus unwittingly advances a theological 
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statement and offers valuable evidence that the non-believer may be able to participate in 
a religious experience through engaging with literary nonsense. 
 
4. Salvific Extravagance 
In him was life, and the life was the light of men. 
John 1:4 
 
Having considered some of the potential difficulties that might be encountered in drawing 
an analogy between religious belief and literary nonsense, I want in this section to 
examine the ways that literary nonsense can offer a true and helpful method for 
interacting with Christian theology, with particular emphasis on the doctrine of Salvation. 
Any exploration of soteriology involves the balancing of future promise with present 
experience and to this extent it is true to say that soteriology is always concerned with an 
end beyond what is possible now.  
The Bible likewise situates salvation in the present as well as the future. Paul 
preaches ‘now is the day of salvation’87 whilst Peter tells us salvation is ‘kept in heaven 
for you […] ready to be revealed in the last time’.88 By acknowledging that both are 
correct Christianity disturbs our conventional understanding of temporality, as it preaches 
a paradoxical both/and time frame. Giving equal emphasis to both teachings allows 
soteriology to speak in its own terms, although these are terms which stray outside 
quotidian conceptions of the possible. In this sense, then, salvation can be described as 
‘extravagant’89, insofar as it is extra-vagant90 and involves wandering beyond the given, 
and straying outside the possible.91  
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If nonsense is a discourse that can help to express what it means to live in 
accordance with the promise and actuality of salvation, we need to locate within nonsense 
moments which not only go beyond purely rational limitations of experience but also in 
some sense correspond to a ‘salvific extravagance’. It would be of limited value to 
theology if nonsense simply broke down present conditions without opening up an 
analogous participation in something outside the quotidian. This is not to say that literary 
nonsense does provide an exhaustive eschatological analogy—as we have mentioned 
soteriology is not a simple looking-glass reversal—however, I do wish to argue that 
nonsense literature contains within its structure some important ways of engaging the 
imagination, which closely identify with a Christian attitude to living in the light of 
salvation. 
 
i) Final Seriousness 
 I came that they may have life and have it abundantly 
John 10:10 
 
We have already looked at the idea that salvation involves passing from the state of 
deadness in sin to new life in Christ. This new life is described in the gospels as 
‘abundant life’, expressing a sense of extravagant vitality—a life that experiences God’s 
over-generous love and his excessive gesture of grace. This new life in Christ also calls 
the individual to live on the margins of society, always in part oriented elsewhere, already 
assuming a ‘citizenship in heaven’.92 Among other consequences, living life abundantly 
seems to involve the Christian assuming two particular roles: the Child of God and the 
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Fool for Christ. Both have an extravagant dimension: the child of God knows he is fully 
provided for and lives amidst extravagant love and joy. He is carefree and light-hearted. 
The fool for Christ lives an extra-vagant lifestyle, straying beyond the boundaries of 
respectability never fully centred in the world, heeding a wisdom which comes from 
elsewhere. Both of these roles crucially involve an anti-serious element, not because they 
are dissociated from realities that we may consider ‘serious’, such as hard work, suffering 
and death but because they interpret God’s reality as far more serious than any worldly 
telos. 
 Karl Barth in Ethics maintains that an important effect of salvation upon the 
believer is the understanding that ‘ultimately, in the last resort, our life is truly only a 
game’.93 Barth explains this is a direct result of believing that the only truly ‘serious’ 
event in history was (and is) Jesus Christ’s life, death and resurrection. Accepting this, 
Barth says, ‘we cannot allot final seriousness to what we do here and now. We do it under 
the divine patience which gives us time, but not with the significance of eternal action’.94 
In this we find a suggestion, from an orthodox theologian not noted for his levity, that 
believing in salvation encourages a response to the world and an individual’s place in it 
which is freed from ultimate seriousness by approaching life as a game.  
Nonsense has as curious relationship to seriousness. Carroll’s cast of absurd 
creatures all take themselves and their business seriously. In fact, it is often the sombre 
and earnest devotion to their cause which creates the nonsense humour. Take for example 
Tweedledum’s anguish at his spoilt rattle: 
‘Do you see that?’ he said, in a voice choking with passion, and his eyes grew 
large and yellow all in a moment, as he pointed with a trembling finger at a small 
white thing […] Tweedledum cried in a greater fury than ever. ‘It’s new, I tell 
you—I bought it yesterday—my nice NEW RATTLE!’ and his voice rose to a 
perfect scream.95 
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The reader of course is not encouraged to pity Tweedledum but to laugh at his outrage. 
However, if the rattle were substituted for an expensive car then we might be expected to 
respond with a degree of empathy, but given the context, the reader is not meant to take 
Tweedledum’s reaction seriously. The scene progresses and he prepares to fight his 
brother insisting that Alice deck him out in ‘bolsters, blankets, hearth-rugs, table-cloths, 
dish-covers and coal-scuttles’.96 In this scene Carroll takes what actually is a serious 
situation (a fight between two brothers) and makes light of it by overemphasising its 
solemnity: ‘“You know,” he [Tweedledum] added very gravely, “it’s one of the most 
serious things that can possible happen to one in a battle—to get one’s head cut off.” 
Alice laughed loud: but she managed to turn it into a cough, for fear of hurting his 
feelings’.97 Tweedledum actually makes a perfectly reasonable statement, it is of course 
one of the worst possible eventualities of a battle. However, picturing the scene (perhaps 
with the aid of Tenniel’s drawing) of an oversized schoolboy, padded out with cloth and 
saucepans, preparing to duel over a rattle, the reader is encouraged to laugh along with 
Alice at the ridiculous solemnity displayed by Tweedledum.  
 When we close the book, I wonder, does our laughter die or does an echo remain? 
Is there any case for suggesting that laughing at nonsensical situations translates to the 
ability to take lightly our own anguish?  Both the child and the fool embody this making 
light of seriousness in different ways, and both occupy central positions in nonsense 
literature. What I want to consider in the rest of this section is whether the foolish wit and 
childish play of nonsense share any likeness with the attitudes of God’s child and Christ’s 
fool. 
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ii) The Child of God 
 
 For you did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received 
the Spirit of adoption as sons, by whom we cry, ‘Abba! Father!’ 
 
Romans 8:15 
 
Barth’s interpretation of Christian living as breaking free from seriousness participates in 
the biblical message that salvation involves becoming God’s child: ‘we now start with the 
fact that the divine command is also that of the Father whose children we are’.98 In the 
previous chapter on the childlike, it was concluded that a prerequisite of salvation 
involves assuming a childlike status before God. We have similarly found that in the 
practice of reading nonsense, there is a shift away from adult thinking to a childlike 
imagining, and this is one of the foremost reasons that nonsense, like Christianity, breaks 
away from seriousness.  
The theme of regression dominates Polhemus’ attempt to establish a ‘secular 
faith’ derived from Carroll’s nonsense. ‘In all comedy’, he writes, ‘there is something 
regressive that takes us back to the world of play that we first knew as children. And if all 
comic literature somehow involves regression, many will naturally find it frivolous’.99 
Barth describes a similar ‘frivolity’ that ought to be identifiable in the redemptive play of 
the children of God. He writes, ‘we should not fail to say that as God’s children we are in 
fact released from the seriousness of life and can and should simply play before God’.100 
Christianity, properly understood, does not advocate regressive infantilism, but reverses 
the idea that mature adult seriousness is more ‘grown up’ than childlike playfulness. This 
corresponds with Eckhart’s expression of the eternal play of the Trinity and seems to call 
for our participation in that infinite expression of joyfulness. Barth expresses that this 
invitation to play is in fact the one vital and emphatic mode of Christian being: 
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We are not only permitted but commanded to find the concept of our essential 
relationship to God in the promise that we are his children in the sense of his little 
children […] We must not play the part, then, of adult sons and daughters of God 
who gradually come to be on a level with their father […] We are always, in fact, 
his little children.101  
 
Barth seems to be adamant that the childlike is not merely a helpful mode for certain 
individuals to think theologically. He accepts that no ultimate seriousness can be allotted 
to anything accomplished here and now,102 believing everything has been (and will be) 
accomplished on the Cross and at the Parousia. ‘From this angle’, explains Barth, ‘we can 
regard our action only as play […] We have simply to realize that we are children, and 
will be so to the very end’.103   
For all their differences, Polhemus and Barth use very similar language. They 
both tell us there is a specific connection between play and being like children and both 
indicate that this makes the activity free from seriousness and can have the appearance of 
frivolity. Barth describes this mode of frivolity as ‘Christian relaxation’: ‘relaxation of 
man as such, of his whole present being as a creature’.104 By adopting this attitude to the 
world, the child of God—assured of Christ’s victory and trustful of God’s promises—is 
reborn beyond seriousness, and even amidst suffering and sorrow he is called to embody a 
joyous frivolity.  Barth explains: ‘in the present we are still sick and frail. We are still 
imprisoned, bound and confined […] Nevertheless—here is the point—there is a release 
and relaxation even in this sighing’.105 This suggests that living an extravagant life of joy 
and trust is not a matter of pretending that there is no suffering, but rather entails 
approaching experiences with a certain degree of detachment enabled by an 
eschatological perspective. 
The imagination of the child of God possesses the capacity to overturn and break 
down obstacles that appear to demand a more serious response. So, for example, the 
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preoccupation with economic success and worldly status, or the fear of death, illness and 
failure are ‘serious’ concerns that disturb what according to Barth should be the gamelike 
quality of life lived in the conviction of salvation. Seriousness for Barth comes into 
operation when the eschatological imagination is in some way hindered. Literary 
nonsense seems to encourage a similar imaginative suspension of the serious. The worlds 
of nonsense fiction are of course far from utopic and terrible things happen to characters. 
But as Sewell explains, this is all done with a ‘detachment of those involved […] and so it 
does not matter if they meet with dreadful fates’.106 Several good examples of this aspect 
of literary nonsense are found in the limericks of Edward Lear: 
There was an Old Man of the Nile, 
Who sharpened his nails with a file, 
Till he cut off his thumbs, and said calmly, ‘This comes 
Of sharpening one’s nails with a file!’107 
 
Lear’s character shows a remarkable detachment to his physical anguish emphasised by 
the calm manner with which he articulates his predicament. Sewell describes this manner 
of detachment as a ‘robust carelessness towards characters and objects’.108 Of course, 
there is a crucial distinction here: nonsense can take these things lightly because it is a 
purely fictional world with a cartoon ontology. By contrast, from a Christian perspective, 
whilst on the one hand there is no diminution of the immediate suffering, Christians are at 
the same time enjoined to see it in a wider perspective from which suffering is not 
ultimate.109 ‘We cannot’, as Barth says, ‘be totally serious as the children of God’.110  
In other words both nonsense and Christianity demand a degree of imaginative 
frivolity to enter into difficult experiences with an attitude of childlike play. On this 
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matter, Barth is resolute: ‘you live in and by the fact that you are the child of God, that 
you already stand at his side, triumphing over the contradiction and the limits of your 
existence […] Act as one who lives in and by this gift’.111 To act and live in the belief that 
God has already triumphed over every cause for sorrow suggests that Christianity has an 
ontological warrant for thinking and acting in a manner of extravagant frivolity.  
It is worth remarking that without the conviction that the non-serious may be a 
religious posture many nonsense critics seem to feel it necessary to temper or defend the 
frivolity of the fiction, as if nonsense in itself is not serious enough to warrant intellectual 
study. Polhemus admits that literary nonsense seems frivolous but qualifies that although 
some find comic regression frivolous, ‘I see the comic regression in Through the 
Looking-Glass as profound’.112 Polhemus has to claim that nonsense humour is not mere 
frivolity because otherwise he cannot draw meaning from it. Nonsense thus becomes a 
pseudo-frivolity since it is covertly transformed into something else in an attempt to save 
its significance.  
A theology of nonsense, by contrast is possible precisely because nonsense is not 
a pseudo-frivolity, it actually is a frivolous activity. From a theological perspective, 
nonsense is not an extravagant frivolity if there is an underlying expectation of ‘profound’ 
thought. Barth tells us that ‘art is always play’,113 and this is because ‘in art we venture 
not to take present reality with final seriousness’.114  For the Christian it is a duty not to 
take reality too seriously, but from a secular point of view, deconstructing the seriousness 
of a subject could be seen as a devaluation of meaning. This is particularly problematic 
for Polhemus, as he not only wants to use art to say something meaningful about the 
world, but also wants to construct a secular faith by showing that there is something more 
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profound to art than just play. For Barth, it is precisely because there is nothing more to 
art than just play that it is profound, and also religious.115  
At this point we might pause and reflect that in attempting to outline how literary 
nonsense is relevant to faith, we have ended up describing how the categories of faith 
feed into the study of nonsense. This seems to be a natural consequence of defining 
humour and childlike play as discourses that carry with them ontological implications. 
Because the secular critic is without an ontological understanding of the non-serious, they 
are often forced to distort the genre in order to defend their study of it. We observed a 
similar misrepresentative defence of nonsense in the conclusion to the chapter on the 
childlike. Tigges found he could not let the juvenile remain juvenile because this would 
apparently relegate his study to a similar status. By contrast, Barth’s non-serious theology 
of the child calls for the embrace of light-hearted modes such as nonsense play, due to the 
conviction that light-heartedness has intrinsic worth.  
 
iii) The Fool for Christ 
We were fools for Christ’s sake, but you are wise in Christ. We are weak, but you are 
strong, you are held in honour and we in disrepute. 
 
1 Corinthians 4:10 
 
We have already commented on the frequent practice of reversal within Scripture, 
including the election of the foolish ‘to shame the wise’.116 This does not seem to be a 
passing comment, but a consistent and central emphasis.117 It is not with hesitation but 
with ‘boasting’ that Paul describes his status as a fool to the Corinthians: ‘But whatever 
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anyone else dares to boast of—I am speaking as a fool—I also dare to boast of that’.118 
Erasmus celebrates Paul’s teaching as ‘a high praise of folly from a high authority’119 and 
describes folly as ‘a valuable and necessary quality of mind’.120 This suggests that folly 
(or foolishness) is not an optional but a necessary attitude for the Christian to assume. It 
is not, however, immediately evident what precisely either Paul or Erasmus mean by 
‘fool’, nor why they depict folly as an important Christian quality, since ‘fool’ also has 
biblical connotations of being impious and spiritually blind.121 
 In seeking to define the term, Jean-Yves Lacoste makes a helpful distinction 
between the fool and the lunatic; he explains: ‘The fool denies his belonging to the world, 
while the lunatic’s insanity prevents him from joining happily in human society, and the 
denial is not the same thing as the prevention’.122 Lacoste maintains that intention drives 
folly, whereas he sees lunacy as distinctly lacking pre-meditation. Significantly, Lacoste 
also situates folly within the context of salvation, he observes that ‘The fool’s experience 
has an eschatological horizon – otherwise we could not account for it – while the lunatic’s 
experience is obviously devoid of such a horizon’.123 Here, Lacoste identifies folly’s 
extra-vagant dimension, an otherworldly focus that is orientated towards the not-yet 
aspect of God’s Kingdom, appearing topsy-turvy to those upside-down.124  
The tradition of Christian folly seems thus to involve the overthrowing of 
quotidian principles in a manner which sets the fool apart from society. Such an 
understanding leads the Christian theologian John Saward to remark: ‘if the world does 
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not regard us as foolish it is probable that we are conformed to it’.125 Accordingly, being 
seen as a fool is an important statement of the believer’s genuine attachment to a reality 
elsewhere. Saward describes Paul’s instruction ‘be transformed by the renewal of your 
mind’126 as ‘a precept which necessarily entails non-conformity to the world and thus to 
its wisdom’.127 Folly in a Christian context is therefore used to call into question the 
certainty of our a priori rational assumptions and the significance we attach to worldly 
standards and endeavours. 
Robert Polhemus’ interpretation of foolishness in Carroll’s nonsense seems to 
strongly accord with this religious characterization of folly. Polhemus claims that 
nonsensical folly prompts us to consider whether our attitude towards a particular 
convention or idea is unnecessarily solemn. He writes: 
Victorian intellectual life was filled with the self-important voices of sages who 
professed to speak in the name of science, poetry, and nature. Assuming roles, 
they identified their egos with cosmic intentions. Carroll [’s] […] weapon is 
reductio ad absurdum: seizing on an authority figure’s grandiose words, he takes 
them literally, like a child, and imagines their full implications to show how 
ridiculous they are.128  
 
Almost all the characters Alice meets take themselves very seriously (like the Victorian 
intellectuals) but Carroll makes them ridiculous by their words and actions. For example, 
the White Queen’s boast to Alice: ‘I’ll tell you a secret—I can read words of one letter! 
Isn’t that grand? However, don’t be discouraged. You’ll come to it in time’.129 Kings, 
Queens, courts, judgment, death, war, learnedness, rank and authority in Carroll’s worlds 
are all dealt with in a manner that gives emphasis to their foolish sides.130 Through 
nonsense literature, the reader is able to laugh at and ridicule institutions that he may 
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normally revere. Nonsense takes a grave theme (like war) and depicts it in such a way 
that diminishes its fearful and horrific quality by turning that which is threatening into 
something small and comic. Polhemus elaborates upon this idea with reference to the 
episode with Tweedledee and Tweedledum: ‘The comedy controls for the moment the 
potential horror of battle by putting it in a context of play asserting from a dispassionate 
point of view, which we have the power to assume, war means the ridiculous behaviour 
of Tweedledee and Tweedledum’.131 
Barth, without any reference to the art of literary nonsense, provides us with a 
similar theological interpretation of this particular venture of folly. He writes, ‘like art, 
humour undoubtedly means that we do not take the present with ultimate seriousness, not 
because it is not serious enough in itself, but because God’s future, which breaks into the 
present, is more serious. Humour means the placing of a big bracket around the 
seriousness of the present’.132 As we can see, without any consideration of literary 
nonsense, Barth has informed us of nonsense’s deeply theological core, nonsense is 
nonsense as long as it brackets out the seriousness of the present, and insofar as the reader 
must surrender his seriousness in order to engage in literary nonsense, he shares an 
analogous participation in the Christian practice of faithful folly. Barth emphasises that 
God’s future is ‘more serious’ than any worldly situation, including our own physical or 
psychological problems. Humour, he believes, is a way in which we can implement this 
perspective and aim towards the ‘eschatological horizon’ just like Lacoste’s fool. 
Literary nonsense thus not only offers a respite from ‘the age of dignity’,133 but 
also an active rebuttal of its over-solemnised values.134 Carroll’s nonsense can help us to 
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see the vanity of those things we are tempted to take most seriously: death, power and the 
self. It should be stressed that I am by no means claiming that nonsense intends to present 
a theological message through folly; I am suggesting, rather, that nonsense cannot help it. 
As we have seen, for Barth, the theological significance of humour relates to moving 
beyond seriousness to a position of humility before God. He explains, ‘When we have 
first laughed at ourselves we can then laugh at others, and we can stand cheerfully the 
final test of being laughed at by them’.135  
There is of course a significant distinction between Christian folly and 
nonsensical folly. Being a fool for Christ, as Lacoste observes, is pre-meditated and 
involves having one’s eyes set on an ‘eschatological horizon’; the foolish wit in Carroll’s 
nonsense does not have such an ultimate goal or purpose. However, simply by being the 
other of common sense, nonsense folly resists and challenges the certainty of man’s a 
priori rational assumptions. Lacoste indicates how this can be interpreted as a theological 
activity: ‘A human being cannot confront God without first ridding himself of the a priori 
dominion exercised by the world, no one is born the possessor of what is most proper to 
him; we do not gain access to ourselves without doing violence to the initial conditions of 
experience’.136 These conditions include our intuition of the possible and the plausible. 
Hence, the foolish comedy of nonsense provides a comic relief from human wisdom and 
in so doing, participates in the activity of mental extra-vagance, which is akin to an 
eschatological faith. Lacoste speaks of the necessity of breaking down the a priori 
dominion of worldly wisdom, and this is what Christ’s fool tries to bring about, and what 
literary nonsense inadvertently does.  
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5. Evangelizing Nonsense 
These men who have turned the world upside down have come here also. 
 Acts 17:6  
 
So far, the investigation has been predominantly theoretical. I have addressed the 
principal structural devices of literary nonsense, the character of the religious imagination 
and identified a correlation between the two in terms of an extra-vagant and non-serious 
comportment. We can now use this information to investigate whether there are any 
peculiar advantages for theology in discovering an analogy with nonsense. We have 
established that there is a connection; I now want to find out what the evangelical and 
practical associations are. 
It tends to be assumed that nonsense means a detour or lack of communication. I 
want to argue instead that nonsense may be both an appropriate and helpful way to speak 
about the divine. The relationship between theology and nonsense has been articulated by 
way of analogy, and to this extent, we have established a metaphorical association. It will 
be helpful to begin by considering the broader application of metaphor in theology and 
then proceed to examine the particular suitability of nonsense as a theological analogy.  
The initial question I want to ask concerns when (if at all) metaphorical speech 
might be relevant in theological discourse. Perhaps the most obvious instance is in the 
conveyance of mystical experience. Janet Martin Soskice in her seminal work Metaphor 
and Religious Language writes that the mystic ‘often feels a crisis of descriptive language 
because there do not seem to be words and concepts in the common stock adequate to his 
or her experience’.137 Soskice remarks that this leads to a heavy reliance on metaphor to 
communicate what appears to the individual as an ineffable experience. The use of 
metaphor is a commonly accepted form of communicating mystical encounters; but there 
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is often an assumption that everyday occurrences can be vocalised without resort to 
metaphor.  
Christians, however, are in some sense involved in a daily mystical experience, 
and face the task of communicating an ongoing, everyday, relationship with a 
transcendent deity. Soskice’s study reveals the mystical dimension present in all 
theological statements and accounts for this by drawing a distinction between ‘referral’ 
and ‘definition’, maintaining that God can always be referred to without ever being 
exhaustively defined. For this reason, she argues, metaphorical speech lies at the heart of 
all theological expression: ‘in our stammering after a transcendent God we must speak, 
for the most part, metaphorically or not at all’.138  
 This observation certainly seems to be in-keeping with biblical language, as 
Chesterton reminds us: ‘the diction used by Christ is quite curiously gigantesque; it is full 
of camels leaping though needles and mountains hurled into the sea’.139 Certainly 
metaphor is a consistent mode of communication in Scripture, to the extent, Sallie 
McFague argues, that it is correct to assert that all theology is rooted in biblical metaphor. 
Metaphor, she insists, is primary to theology: ‘We are never given a theology of the 
kingdom’, she explains, ‘but we are told stories about it […] we are shown metaphors—
pearls, seeds, camels and needles, children, hungry and thirsty strangers, maidens and a 
bridegroom, and so on—which image it forth’.140 If we accept that metaphor is not simply 
a helpful tool, but forms the basis of all religious communication then we need to 
consider what implication this has for our analogy with literary nonsense. Is it merely a 
species of metaphor that works like any other? Or is there anything about it that makes 
literary nonsense particularly significant in the conveyance of Christian truth? 
 
                                                     
138
 Ibid., p. 140. 
139
 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy, p. 270. 
140
 Sallie McFague, Speaking in Parables: A Study in Metaphor and Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1975), p. 40. 
  
227 
i) Embracing Atheism 
 
We know that in colloquial usage, nonsense is a term that is applied to faith, though it is 
for the most part, intended pejoratively. It might seem that the implications of the term are 
thoroughly detrimental to the religious cause, as the label ‘nonsense’ suggests those who 
hold a religious conviction are deluded. On the other hand, the established existence of 
the term could provide a possible point of entrance into religious discourse for the non-
believer in terms they are likely to have already accepted. Could bringing nonsense into a 
theological grammar offer a non-threatening linguistic basis by which a theist can interact 
with a strong evidentialist such as A. J. Ayer? Take for example Ayer’s following 
statement: 
To say that something transcends the human understanding is to say that it is 
unintelligible. And what is unintelligible cannot be significantly described […] If 
one allows that it is impossible to define God in intelligible terms, then one is 
allowing that it is impossible for a sentence both to be significant and to be about 
God. If a mystic admits that the object of his vision cannot be described, then he 
must also admit that he is bound to talk nonsense when he describes it.141 
 
What would happen if the same believer whom Ayer is attempting to trap in his 
verificationist rhetoric conceded Ayer’s point? Admittedly, in doing so, the believer 
would be playing a language game with Ayer, for the theist would be accepting nonsense 
as an analogy, in accordance with literary nonsense, rather than Ayer’s colloquial 
definition. However, the believer would thereby have avoided Ayer’s language trap, and 
instead established nonsense as a common ground.  
By discussing nonsense and faith analogously we are thus effectively able to 
agree with the empiricist and affirm a religious conviction. The believer is then poised to 
offer the empiricist a new interpretation of nonsense, and stipulate that nonsense does 
not necessarily make a statement redundant or untrue, but calls for a different type of 
logic. As he divulges his reasons for agreeing with the empiricist, the believer has found 
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he is engaged in a type of apologetics originating from the terms offered by atheism. If it 
is recognised that from the perspective of empiricism certain aspects of Christian faith 
are nonsensical, then the first practical implication we can draw from the association 
between faith and nonsense is an increased potential to avoid unprofitable conflict in 
evangelical discussion, chiefly because the apologist begins by embracing the complaints 
of atheism in the sphere of logical unfeasibility. 
Another important consequence of exhibiting a relationship between nonsense 
and religion is revealed within the context of postmodern theology. John Milbank 
believes ‘The end of modernity […] means the end of a single system of truth based on 
universal reason, which tells us what reality is like’.142 He goes on to explain, ‘with this 
ending, there ends also the modern predicament of theology. It no longer has to measure 
up to accepted secular standards of scientific truth or normative rationality’.143 This is the 
crucial message of postmodern theology: the ‘Enlightenment critique of religion 
boomerangs back against itself’.144  
There seems to be a certain metaphysical boldness encouraged by postmodernity; 
the ‘boomerang’ effect has turned staunch rationalism (not theism) into an outmoded and 
blinkered position, the outcome of which means theology no longer has to apologise for, 
or suppress the fact that it does not harmonise with ‘normative rationality’, something 
that is now being celebrated rather than concealed. Jeffrey Robins in his introduction to 
After the Death of God articulates a similar sentiment: ‘religion has moved from being on 
the defensive for having to answer to reason to its contemporary rebound where it has 
recovered its proper sense as a faith rather than some lesser known form of 
knowledge’.145  
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Such developments in postmodern thinking have unquestionably made possible a 
theological exploration into nonsense, and yet, whilst revelling in the spirit of 
postmodernity we don’t want to fall into the trap of ‘defending religion by attacking the 
Enlightenment’.146 There have been a number of apt critical responses to the postmodern 
tendency to demonize Enlightenment principles, failing to recognise the self-evident 
goods that weave similar threads. John Cottingham, for example, offers an important 
qualification of Caputo’s rejection of Enlightenment values147 and discusses how certain 
postmodern positions are themselves indebted to modernity. ‘The values of the 
Enlightenment’, Cottingham explains, ‘are part of the long journey of the human mind 
towards an ever fuller and more accurate understanding of the natural order’.148  
Perhaps it is true that postmodern theology goes too far in its condemnation of 
Enlightenment thought, but its attempt to establish faith as a sufficient epistemological 
basis sends out a clear and important message that religion should not apologise for its 
lack of conformity to secular standards of reason. In a similar way, acknowledging a 
congruity between nonsense and theology is an unashamed recognition of the scandal of 
faith. This idea of awakening a sense of scandal seems to be the second practical 
implication we can draw from considering nonsense literature as a theological analogue. 
It is worth remembering that a bold or scandalous declaration of faith is prevalent 
throughout the New Testament, Paul asks the Ephesians to pray that he may ‘boldly 
proclaim the mystery of the gospel’.149 This prayer can be seen as a biblical invitation to 
be bold about the mysterious core of Christianity, to declare there is something 
inexplicable and unreasonable about the good news of Christ, and to expect the message 
to be perceived with scepticism and even ridicule. In order to ‘boldly proclaim the 
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mystery of the gospel’, Christianity needs to find a way to reassert the mystery, or make 
the word strange again in order that it may be boldly declared. By unearthing an analogy 
with literary nonsense, Christianity can disturb the placid acceptance of the gospel as a 
‘nice story’ and reawaken the strangeness of the faith: it is, in short, a way of recovering 
the scandal of the Gospel. 
 
ii) The Virtue of the Non-Moral 
 
 
The next practical strength prominent in using the term ‘nonsense’ to describe faith is that 
it can help correct the common misapprehension that Christianity is exclusively 
concerned with observing a moral code. Atheists and agnostics will often concede that 
although Christianity’s metaphysical claims are nonsense, it is still a good way to live 
because of its positive ethical standards. To seek deliberately to undercut this message 
therefore has the potential to sound offensive to Christianity, where Christianity has been 
accepted primarily for its ethical merit. However, C. S. Lewis, in his humorous collection 
of letters from a senior devil to a junior devil, describes the reduction of Christianity to its 
ethical function as a ‘devilish’ technique: 
We thus distract men’s minds from Who He is, and What He did. We first make 
Him solely a teacher […] we want very much to make men treat Christianity as a 
means; preferably, of course, as a means to their advancement, but failing that, as 
a means to anything—even to social justice. The thing to do is to get a man at 
first to value social justice as a thing which the Enemy [God] demands, and then 
work on him to the stage at which he values Christianity because it may produce 
social justice.150 
 
In this text, (with the devil as a mouthpiece) Lewis expresses the supreme error of placing 
the advantage of an ethical code above Christianity’s theological truths. The point Lewis 
conveys is that ethics, isolated from faith, is not a different expression of the same belief, 
but an outright rejection of the Christian message. A sole emphasis on the morality of 
Christianity, as Screwtape tells us, ‘distracts men’s minds from Who He is, and What He 
                                                     
150
 C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters (Glasgow: Collins, 1984), pp. 118-9. 
  
231 
did’. Instead, Paul explains to the Romans, justification comes about through faith ‘apart 
from works of the law’.151 Of course, morality is an important demonstration of God’s 
supreme goodness, but, as Paul teaches, ‘the righteousness of God has been manifested 
apart from the law, although the Law and the Prophets bear witness to it—the 
Righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe’.152 To suggest, as 
Paul does that both God’s goodness and man’s justification are manifest outside the moral 
law argues against the assumption that Christianity is a narrowly ‘moral’ religion.  
The advantage of comparing nonsense literature to religion is that the genre is 
distinctly disassociated from the moral tale. Carroll’s stories were revolutionary as they 
initiated the break with the conventions of children’s literature by refusing to offer moral 
homilies. Jack Zipes explains, ‘Carroll made one of the most radical statements on behalf 
of the fairy tales and the child’s perspective by conceiving a fantastic plot without an 
ostensible moral purpose’.153 Although there were several earlier diversions from the 
moral tale,154 Zipes is accurate in his contention that the stories, poems and novels written 
for children during the time of the publication of Alice were predominantly intended as 
religious instruction. ‘If literary fairytales were written and published’, Zipes explains, 
‘they were transformed into didactic tales preaching hard work and pious behaviour’.155 
Carroll not only refused to present a moral resolution but blatantly mocked this Victorian 
preoccupation, evidenced in the exchange between the Duchess and Alice: 
‘You’re thinking about something, my dear, and that makes you forget to talk. I 
ca’n’t tell you just now what the moral of that is, but I shall remember it in a bit.’ 
‘Perhaps it hasn’t one,’ Alice ventured to remark. 
‘Thu, tut, child!’ said the Duchess. ‘Everything’s got a moral if only you can find 
it’.156 
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The Duchess proceeds to describe to Alice the moral value of ‘mustard mines’, croquet 
games and the fact that flamingos and mustard both bite. By suggesting the moral 
qualities of such ludicrous ideas (especially given the dominant context of the moral tale) 
Carroll invites his readers to laugh at the fixation upon morality. To use a distinctly 
amoral fiction to propose a point of analogue with Christianity could thus be an effective 
method of shifting the primary focus off moral behaviour and instead prompting an 
individual to reconsider their diagnosis of Christianity as either oppressively legislative or 
simply a nice code by which to live. Rather, Christianity looks beyond the moral realm 
and fixes on the ultimate source of goodness, which is another type of goodness 
altogether. C. S. Lewis sums up the position thus: 
I think all Christians would agree with me if I said that though Christianity seems 
at first to be all about morality, all about duties and rules and guilt and virtue, yet 
it leads you on, out of all that into something beyond. One has a glimpse of a 
country where they do not talk of those things, except perhaps as a joke. Every 
one there is filled full with what we should call goodness as a mirror is filled 
with light. But they do not call it goodness. They do not call it anything. They 
are not thinking of it. They are too busy looking at the source from which it 
comes.157 
 
Lewis’ suggestion—that from an ultimate perspective preoccupation with morality might 
be joked about—intimates that associating Christianity with nonsense is not irreligious, 
but could be a positive way of confronting unhelpful assumptions about the religion. 
Rather like Lewis’ method of teaching Christian truths through the mouth of a devil, the 
analogy with nonsense is an apology for Christianity that recommends it by means of its 
opposite. Suggesting that Christianity is nonsense is really a way of commenting on the 
nonsense of the world and the uprightness of the upside-down kingdom 
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iii) The purpose of the non-useful 
 
In addition to not offering a moral homily, any literature wishing to be defined as 
nonsense must avoid concluding with any meaningful objective. Nonsense theorists 
commonly acknowledge the lack of utility as an essential attribute of the genre. Tigges, 
for example, states: ‘the game of nonsense by is played for its own sake rather than with a 
transcendent aim’.158 Stewart likewise describes nonsense as ‘an activity where means 
become more important than ends’.159 Carroll is often quoted for his own admission that 
the Alice stories ‘do not teach anything at all’.160 It might seem strange to recommend 
nonsense as a Christian analogue on account of its apparent uselessness, why would any 
religion want to assert its lack of purpose? 
In his work Theology and Joy, Jürgen Moltmann speaks out against valuing the 
church ‘only on the basis of its usefulness […] [where] its ends are determined by 
morality and politics’.161 He works from the central premise that ‘man is trapped in 
usefulness’.162 Moltmann calls for a means of approaching Christianity without 
considering its utility. He writes: ‘Those who try to defend religion by establishing its 
external usefulness and necessity turn out to be its worst enemies in the long run’.163 
Moltmann substitutes utility for play and presents a theology of play which stems from 
the conviction that games interrupt the focus on goal and ‘serve as temporary suspensions 
of the normal state of affairs’.164  
 Theories of play often tend to emphasise that whilst games must appear 
purposeless from an external viewpoint, ‘a game is meaningful within itself’.165 This 
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suggests that within even the most basic game, strategy is important, tasks have an end, 
costumes serve a purpose and props are functional. However, nonsensical play seems to 
be an interesting exception to this rule because it refuses meaning even within the context 
of its own play. For example, at the mad tea party the Hatter instigates a game of riddles: 
‘Why is a raven like a writing-desk?’166 The point of this game is to guess the correct 
answer. Alice experiences frustration, not because she fails to work out the solution, but 
because there isn’t one:  
‘Have you guessed the riddle yet?’ the Hatter said, turning to Alice again. 
‘No, I give it up,” Alice replied: ‘what’s the answer?’ 
‘I haven’t the slightest idea,’ said the Hatter. 
‘Nor I,’ said the March Hare. 
Alice sighed wearily. ‘I think you might do something better with the time,’ she 
said, ‘than waste it in asking riddles that have no answers’.167 
 
Alice does not enjoy the game of nonsense and finds it tiresome because she has learnt 
that all things have a purpose, even games. The problem that confronts Alice, as Tigges 
puts it, is that ‘the “pointe” is essentially lacking in nonsense’.168 This reveals a potential 
danger with the game analogy; winning can easily become the purpose of the game and 
can in effect become a shadow version of the professional world. An ideal game 
metaphor would therefore need to produce new standards of game playing that are 
divorced from the traditional patterns of winning and losing. Whilst all play appears to be 
composed for its own sake, nonsense play is perhaps unique because it is supremely 
subversive to purpose; it does not even ‘play’ at being useful. 
Carroll’s absurd Caucus Race promotes a method of play which through nonsense 
refuses to conform to established patterns: ‘There was no “One, two, three, and away,” 
Alice reports, “but they began running when they liked, and left off when they liked, so 
that it was not easy to know when the race was over”’.169 When the contestants inquire as 
to the winner, the Dodo announces, ‘Everybody has won and all must have prizes’. This 
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nonsense game radically diverts from the normal condition of winning where there is 
often a fixation on coming first or being the best.170 Rather, the absurd Caucus Race is in 
a sense closer to ‘the game of grace’ where, as Moltmann tells us, ‘the loser wins’.171 
Nonsense play through rejecting purpose and end allows for the temporary suspension of 
achievement measured by a secular standard of accomplishment. 
By introducing ‘grace’ into the system of ‘game’, it becomes once again apparent 
that nonsense is only conceivable as a theological analogy due to the doctrine of 
Salvation. Moltmann explains: ‘Easter opens up the boundary-crossing freedom to play 
the game of the new creation […] The cross of Christ therefore does not belong to the 
game itself, but it makes possible the new game of freedom. He suffered that we may 
laugh again’.172 This is an important qualification to highlight because it emphasises that 
the playful transcendence of purpose is only possible because Christ embodies and 
satisfies supreme purpose. ‘For this purpose I was born’, Christ states, ‘and for this 
purpose I have come into the world—to bear witness to the truth’.173 God’s Incarnation in 
Christ is understood as the manifestation of ultimate purpose and by seeing his purpose 
through to the end, God effectively concludes all worldly telos, and as such, ushers in an 
eternal playtime.  
Perhaps, even more so than a general analogy with play, the association with 
nonsense subverts the categories of purpose and necessity on a grand scale. Moltmann 
asserts: ‘Religion refuses to answer questions concerning its practical social value and its 
moral usefulness. Its dignity lies precisely in that it compels us to abandon this greedy 
and selfish line of questioning if we are to understand religion’.174 The colloquial 
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connotations of the term ‘nonsense’ as ‘futile’ or ‘pointless’ together with the refusal of 
the literary genre to offer a significant meaning could thus prove beneficial in the 
communication of Moltmann’s message and the wider mission of the church, that God’s 
purpose is greater than any social utility or personal accomplishment. 
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Conclusion: The Lunatic’s Risk 
He who loses his life will find it. 
Matthew 10:39 
 
We have looked at some of the reasons why using literary nonsense as a theological 
analogue is accurate and helpful—on the one hand, for the believer, it preserves a biblical 
sense of scandal and at the same time it makes faith more presentable to the atheist. This 
project has suggested that literary nonsense can serve—albeit imperfectly—as a cosmic 
allegory of both man’s fall and his salvation. I have described the structural principles of 
literary nonsense as replicating the shape of the salvific imagination. Experiencing God 
can be likened to falling down the rabbit hole—all manner of things become believable 
which were previously thought impossible. Certain aspects of faith seem like nonsense 
when the individual’s dominant method of assessment is rationalistic. This is why the 
imagination is so vital to Christian faith, because if our inherited a priori faculties are 
upside-down then we require a radically alternative way of thinking in order to begin the 
process of approaching God’s topsy-turvy Kingdom.  
Moreover, this type of imagining might also be a useful exercise for the Christian 
for whom religious faith makes obvious sense. Because nonsense is a looking-glass 
analogy, it confronts not only the self, but also the reverse image of the self, and can 
therefore become a useful symbol for reminding Christians about the strangeness of their 
message. As such, making a connection with literary nonsense could also be beneficial 
for the believer who cannot understand why the Christian message is often 
incomprehensible to an atheist.  
This thesis has suggested is that whilst Christian faith is a solemn and sensible 
matter, it is also extravagant, playful and foolish, and that the category of the nonsensical 
aids the recovery of a number of these underemphasised aspects of traditional theology. 
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The project has, in a sense, been a long response to Martin Heidegger’s question: ‘will 
Christian theology one day resolve to take seriously the world of the apostle and thus also 
the conception of philosophy as foolishness?’175 
Perhaps, above all, what the analogy between faith and nonsense reminds us, is 
that faith is a risk. Kierkegaard reaches a similar conclusion and invokes the language of 
absurdity in order to highlight the risk entailed in religious belief. ‘Someone’, he writes, 
‘a serious man,’ may say, ‘But is it certain and definite that there is such a good, is it 
certain and definite that there is an eternal happiness in store?—because in that case I 
surely would aspire to it; otherwise, I would be lunatic to risk everything for it’.176 
Kierkegaard frustrates the serious man’s desire for epistemic certainty because of his 
conviction that ‘the absurd is precisely the object of faith and only that can be 
believed’.177 Kierkegaard wants to separate faith from the language of logical probability 
as he sees this thirst for assurance as a barrier to religious belief. Faith is a risk precisely 
because of its noetic uncertainty and at any point an individual could come to the 
conclusion that it may not be true.  
The suggestion that certain aspects of Christian faith are rationally indefensible 
thus draws attention to the daily risk involved in believing in God, which according to 
Richard Kropf is vital for spiritual integrity and growth: ‘We cannot advance spiritually’, 
Kropf states, ‘unless we are willing to let go of the security that so often binds us to what 
is familiar or comfortable. In other words, faith involves risk’.178 A heavily rationalized 
apologetic can often give the illusion that the ‘risk’ content of faith has been greatly 
reduced. By contrast, what an association with nonsense brings to the fore is that the risk 
involved in religious belief is immense.  
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Hugo Meynell suggests ‘the true scandal of faith is its insistence that man should 
surrender his illusion of self-sufficiency’.179 Part of the problem, we have discovered, 
with over-emphasising the logical credibility of faith is that the individual is more 
susceptible to sustaining the ‘illusion of self-sufficiency’. Take, for example, 
Wolterstorff’s introduction to Faith and Rationality in which he describes reason as 
‘something that each of us possesses intrinsically […] Thus, to follow the voice of 
Reason is not to submit to some new external authority. It is to follow one’s own 
voice’.180 In this thesis we have adopted Chesterton’s description of the topsy-turvy 
condition of man and therefore encounter a theological problem with Wolterstorff’s 
dictum, since, if our inner voice of reason is upside-down then following it, as he 
recommends, will not deliver us the right way up. The language Wolterstorff uses 
promotes the sufficiency of our internal powers of reasoning and so in this sense 
disguises the ‘scandal of faith’ and the inherent risk. 
 Does the believer then live in constant fear of the instability of his belief? Does 
faith bring with it a desperate insecurity? The assurance from the Bible is that faith is an 
unveiling of knowledge not previously known, which brings with it a restoration and 
transformation of the individual. It is in this purified state that the risk of faith is calmed: 
‘blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God’.181 It is not that faith, once entered 
into, ceases to involve any uncertainty, but that in the venture of faith, as the individual 
struggles against his desire for security, a new standard of assurance is revealed to the 
believer, although it may not seem any less certain to the atheist.  
The description of faith as a risk may help to illuminate the purpose of this 
project; we have drawn an analogy with nonsense because it seems to be a true 
characterisation of aspects of Christian belief, not because we wanted to say something 
controversial about faith or because it seems bold and counter-intuitive. In fact, what we 
                                                     
179
 Hugo Meynell, Sense and Nonsense in Christianity (London: Sheed and Ward, 1964), p. 253.  
180
 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, Introduction, p. 5.  
181
 Matthew 5:8. 
  
240 
have described as the nonsensical component of religious belief is, viewed from the 
believer’s perspective, simply the most accurate description of reality. For all his famous 
statements on the lunacy and incredulous nature of faith, Kierkegaard also reflects that 
‘when the believer has faith, the absurd is not the absurd—faith transforms it, but in every 
weak moment it is again more or less absurd to him. The passion of faith is the only thing 
which masters the absurd’.182 In agreement with Kierkegaard, I do not seek to promote 
nonsense as some eternal or superior category, but to use the term to aid the passage to 
the other side of reason where nonsense can reveal its hidden sense. This sentiment is 
described beautifully by Coleridge in his Biographia Literaria, where he writes:  
the scheme of Christianity […] though not discoverable by human reason, is yet 
in accordance with it; that link follows link by necessary consequence; that 
religion passes out of the ken of reason only where the eye of reason has reached 
its own horizon; and that faith is then but its continuation: even as the day softens 
away into the sweet twilight.183  
 
So too as we have seen with nonsense, it is but the re-awakening of sense, at the dawn of 
the upside-down kingdom. 
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